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Rumination, a type of repetitive negative thinking, is implicated in the onset and 
maintenance of adult and youth depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Whilst 
experimental studies, key to establishing causality, have shown rumination (in 
comparison to alternative processing styles including concrete thinking) has a 
negative effect on cognitive maintaining factors amongst depressed and dysphoric 
adults, there is a paucity of research with adolescents. Vivid, intrusive memories of 
autobiographical events are often reported by depressed adults (Brewin et al., 1999). 
Depressed young people also experience intrusive memories, however, there is little 
research exploring the nature of these (Meiser-Stedman et al., 2012). Inducing a 
ruminative processing mode in comparison to distraction resulted in undergraduates 
rating an intrusive memory as more distressing (Williams & Moulds, 2010). This 
study aimed to explore the nature of intrusive memories provided by a dysphoric 
adolescent sample. It then aimed to determine if analytical rumination, in comparison 
to concrete thinking, impacted on the experience of intrusive memories. High 
dysphoric adolescents were recruited from a secondary school. They completed the 
Intrusive Memory Interview and experimental inductions were used to compare the 
effect of processing styles (rumination vs concrete) on how participants emotionally 
evaluated their memory.  
 
Intrusive memories were experienced frequently in our sample; roughly 1.5 times a 
week. The memories mainly concerned death/ injury/ illness to a close other, or 
interpersonal problems. They were experienced as vivid and distressing, with a 
considerable sense of reliving. The emotions most experienced in relation to the 
memories were sadness and anger. No significant differences were found regarding 
memory evaluation between participants in the rumination and concrete conditions. 
Reasons for these non-significant results are discussed and the need for further 
research is highlighted. This study is one of very few to explore the experience of 
intrusive memories in adolescent depression. This study points to the importance of 
considering intrusive memories in cases of youth depression, and supports the 
exploration of new avenues regarding the treatment of depression when intrusive 







Rumination can be defined as a cognitive processing style which focuses an 
individual’s attention on his or her depressive symptoms and the possible causes and 
consequences of those symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema 1987, 1991). For example “Why 
do I always feel like this? ... Why can’t I pull myself together?”….and so on. 
Rumination is a passive style of thinking where individuals focus on the causes and 
consequences of their depression but do nothing to change their circumstances 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 1993). 
 
Rumination has been implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression in both 
adults and young people (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Rumination, when compared to distraction has experimentally been shown to have a 
negative effect on mood (Nolen-Hoeksema et al, 2008), and when compared to a 
concrete processing mode, to have a negative effect on other cognitive aspects of 
depression, including the experience of negative intrusive memories (Williams & 
Moulds 2010), in dysphoric adult samples. These experimental studies have started to 
reveal what it is about rumination that results in the maintenance of depressive 
symptoms in dysphoric samples. While self-focus appears to lower mood in the short 
term, an analytical mode of processing seems to maintain a number of cognitive 
factors known to be important in depression in the long term. There is, however, very 
little research into the effect of experimentally inducing rumination and alternative 
thinking styles in young people.   
 
The experience of intrusive memories is one cognitive aspect of depression found to 
be involved in the maintenance of depression.  There is very little research into the 
experience of intrusive memories in young people and none that looks at the impact 
of rumination on this experience. This study therefore aims to explore the nature of 
the intrusive memories provided by a dysphoric adolescent sample and then aims to 
use experimental inductions to see if inducing rumination affects participants distress 
and sadness ratings of their negative intrusive memory, from pre to post induction, in 
comparison to participants induced to think in a concrete, experiential way. This 
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design allows exploration of the mechanism by which rumination may have a 
negative effect.  
 
This chapter will review the relevant literature in relation to styles of cognitive 
processing in adult and youth depression, the experience of intrusive memories in 
depression, and how intrusive memory experience may be affected by rumination. 
 
1.2 Depression in young people 
 
Depression is common in young people and represents a “significant, persistent, and 
recurrent public health problem” (Weisz, McCarty and Valeri, 2006, p132). It has a 
negative impact on social and school functioning, is associated with severe family 
distress, and results in significant use of mental health services (Angold et al 1998; 
Clarke, DeBar & Lewinsohn, 2003). It is a recurrent disorder which will often 
continue into adulthood (Rao et al., 1995). The scope, impact, and long-term nature 
of youth depression highlight the need for effective treatment (Weisz et al., 2006). 
 
1.2.1 Presentation. The essential feature of a major depressive episode 
according to the Diagnostic Statistical Manual 5
th
 edition (DSM-V) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) (ICD-10 classification criteria are broadly similar
1
) is 
a period of at least two weeks duration where there is either depressed mood, or the 
loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities. The depressed mood in a Major 
Depressive episode (MDE) must last during waking hours and is often described by 
the person as sad, hopeless or discouraged. Loss of interest in activities is almost 
always reported with individuals describing “not caring anymore” or not feeling any 
enjoyment in activities that were previously experienced as pleasurable (DSM-V). 
 
A number of associated features can occur alongside low mood in depression, at least 
four of which are required for a diagnosis of a MDE. Changes in appetite and/or 
weight are common when depressed with many individuals reporting that they have 
                                                          
1
 The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, tenth revision 
(ICD-10), published by the World Health Organisation (WHO), is widely used in the UK and 





little appetite, although some experience increased appetite. Sleep disturbance is also 
frequently reported. The type experienced most often is insomnia, but hypersomnia 
(over-sleeping) is sometimes described. Psychomotor changes experienced during a 
MDE can include agitation (e.g. pacing, hand wringing) or retardation (e.g. slowed 
speech, thinking, and body movements). Decreased energy including tiredness and 
fatigue is common in depressed individuals who report that even the smallest tasks 
require substantial effort. Feelings of worthlessness or guilt tend to be associated with 
a MDE and may include negative, unrealistic evaluations of one’s worth, or guilty 
preoccupations and ruminations over past failings. Recurrent thoughts of death and/or 
suicidal ideation, plans or attempts can be further features of a MDE. Motivations for 
suicide when depressed may include “a desire to give up in the face of perceived 
insurmountable obstacles, an intense wish to end what is perceived as an unending 
and excruciatingly painful emotional state, an inability to foresee any enjoyment in 
life, or the wish to not be a burden to others” (DSM-V, p164).  
 
For a diagnosis of a MDE, the episode must additionally be accompanied by 
clinically significant distress and/or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning (DSM-V). Where impairment is severe, individuals 
may be unable to perform basic self-care (e.g. feeding and clothing) or to maintain 
minimal personal hygiene.  
 
The clinical and diagnostic features of depression are generally similar in adults and 
young people. The DSM-V, however, additionally states that in children and 
adolescents, depression can be defined by irritable rather than depressed mood. In 
terms of weight loss as a symptom of a MDE, the DSM-V further notes that failure to 
make expected gains should be considered in children. 
 
Despite the extra guidance provided by the DSM-V to help identify depression in 
young people, there is concern that episodes of youth depression may be missed due 
to the “prominence of irritability, mood reactivity, and fluctuating symptoms” 
(Thapar, Collishaw, Pine, & Thapar, 2012, p1057). 
 
Research does suggest some slight differences in the picture of a MDE between 
children, adolescents, and adults. Drawing on this research the DSM-V notes that 
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symptoms such as hypersomnia and hyperphagia are more likely in younger 
individuals, whereas melancholic symptoms and psychomotor disturbances are more 
common in older individuals. Carlson and Kashani (1988) studied 4 depressed groups 
across the age span of childhood to adulthood and found symptoms of depressed 
mood, diminished concentration, insomnia, and suicidal ideation to occur with 
similar frequency across the developmental span. Anhedonia, hopelessness, 
psychomotor retardation, and delusions increased with age whereas depressed 
appearance, low self-esteem, and somatic complaints decreased with age.  In other 
research higher rates of suicidal behaviour have been reported among depressed 
adolescents, particularly female adolescents, compared to depressed adults (see 
Lewinsohn, Petit, Joiner & Seeley, 2003; Carlson & Kashani, 1988). 
 
1.2.2 Prevalence and Epidemiology. Depression is present in about 2.8% of 
children and 5.6% of adolescents (Costello, Erkanli, & Angold, 2006).  First onset of 
depression often occurs between the ages of 14 to 19 years and the life time 
prevalence for mood disorders by the end of adolescence is estimated to be as high as 
25% (Kessler, Avenevoli, & Ries Merikangas, 2001). The dramatic rise in prevalence 
with the transition from childhood through adolescence appears primarily due to the 
large increase of depression rates in girls post puberty. Before puberty, boys and girls 
are at equal risk for depression, whereas after the onset of puberty, the rate of 
depression is about twice as high in girls (Brent & Birmaher, 2002).  
 
It is important to try and understand why this dramatic rise in depression occurs with 
the transition pre to post puberty as this may provide clues about the factors that 
cause and maintain adolescent depression and thus potential areas to target via 
interventions. A number of theories have been put forward to explain why girls are 
more likely than boys to develop depression post puberty. Explanations range from 
those concerned with hormonal changes in females (e.g. Brooks-Gunn & Warren, 
1989), to those focusing on psychosocial factors and response styles, which may 
differ between the genders, during the adolescent transition period.  
 
Cyranowski, Frank, Young and Shear (2000) outline an interesting theoretical model 
to explain the adolescent onset of the gender differences in depression, incorporating 
a number of explanatory factors. They present their model as one of “correlated 
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consequences” in which a number of combined factors trigger the onset of a 
depressive episode. In addition to the relevance of hormonal differences, one factor 
they highlight to explain the increased prevalence of depression in females is the role 
of limited coping abilities (in comparison to males) in response to negative life events 
(which adolescent females report more of than adolescent males; e.g. Larsen & Ham, 
1993), particularly interpersonal events. This model indicates that the way 
adolescents respond to and cope with stressors, particularly interpersonal ones, can 
contribute to the likelihood of them developing depression. Coping styles include the 
way that people think about their circumstances. The association of thinking styles 
with depression is supported by the fact that females (who are more likely to 
experience depression) evidence a more ruminative style of thinking and coping 
when distressed, in contrast to males’ more active or distracting responses (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1993). The importance of engaging in different thinking styles in 
response to adverse life events and circumstances is a key focus of this study and is 
considered in detail in later sections. 
 
1.2.3 Co-morbidity. The majority of people who experience depression have 
at least one co-morbid psychiatric disorder at some point in their lives (Rohde, 
Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1991). The most common psychiatric disorders co-morbid 
with depression in adults are anxiety disorders (e.g. Sartorius, Üstün, Lecrubier & 
Wittchen, 1996).  Before children reach puberty, depression occurs more frequently 
alongside other mental health disorders, primarily anxiety disorders, disruptive 
behaviour disorders and attention-deficit disorders (Angold & Costello, 1993). In 
adolescents, depression is similarly often associated with anxiety disorders, 
disruptive behaviour disorders, and attention-deficit disorders, but also substance-
related disorders, and eating disorders (DSM-V). Ford, Goodman, & Meltzer (2003) 
found that two thirds of adolescents with depression have at least one co-morbid 
disorder and 10-15% has two or more co-morbidities.  
 
1.2.4 Risk and resilience factors. The more understanding we have of factors 
that increase and decrease an individual’s likelihood of developing depression, the 
more clues we have about potentially useful areas to target prevention and 




One of the most well researched and significant risk factors in youth depression is 
having a parent with a history of depression. This is found to increase a child’s risk of 
a depressive episode by a factor of 2 to 4 (Beardslee, Versage & Gladstone, 1998) 
and is likely to be due to genetic and environmental factors.  
 
Research has increasingly shown that it is the interaction of certain genetic and 
environmental factors that represent a risk of developing psychiatric disorders 
including depression (Caspi & Moffit, 2006). Environmental factors found to be 
relevant and which may be even more so in those at high genetic risk (Hariri et al., 
2002), include chronic illnesses and stressful life events such as the loss of a friend, 
parent or sibling (Birmaher et al., 1996). Chronic, severe stressors that affect 
relationships seem most important (Thapar et al., 2012) such as parent-child discord, 
abuse, and neglect (Brent & Birmaher, 2002). 
 
In terms of resilience, individual factors that are found to protect against the 
development of depression in high-risk adolescents include inherited factors and high 
intelligence. Social competence is a skill found to protect adolescent children of 
depressed mothers from psychopathology (Conrad & Hammen 1993). Other findings 
also highlight the protective effects of good quality interpersonal relationships 
(Thapar et al., 2012). Other potentially modifiable factors found to protect against the 
development of depression in high-risk adolescents include emotion-regulation 
capacities, coping mechanisms, and thinking styles (Brennan, Le Brocque, & 
Hammen, 2003; Collishaw et al., 2007; Silk et al., 2007; Pargas, Brennan, Hammen 
& Le Brocque, 2010). In terms of emotional regulation, low levels of negative 
emotionality, high levels of positive emotionality, and/or the ability to effectively 
regulate emotions are found to contribute to resilience among children at risk for 
depression (Masten, 2004). Efforts to emotionally regulate are influenced by people’s 
thinking styles (the way in which individuals encode and construe information 
around them; Thompson, 1994), further highlighting the importance of thinking 
styles in youth depression. 
 
1.2.5 Outcomes and treatment. In the absence of treatment, a major 
depressive episode lasts an average of eight months (Brent & Birmaher, 2002). The 
risk of recurrence is high, approximately 40 percent at two years and 72 percent at 
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five years (Birmaher et al., 1996). The long term and recurrent nature of the disorder 
highlights the importance of developing effective treatments. 
 
Current NICE (2005) recommended first line treatments for moderate to severe 
depression in young people include Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
Interpersonal Psychotherapy (IPT). Both these psychological treatments focus on at 
least some of the risk/resiliency factors described above where the depressed 
individual has the potential to change such factors or their experience of them. In 
terms of medication, NICE has advised that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs) should not be prescribed to depressed adolescents without a concurrent 
specific psychological treatment. 
 
CBT for depression is based on Beck’s (1976) cognitive theory of depression. In 
CBT patients learn to increase pleasurable activities, acquire skills to improve 
interpersonal effectiveness, and identify and modify dysfunctional and self-defeating 
patterns of cognition that can lead to depressed mood (Brent and Birmaher, 2002).  
 
Interpersonal Psychotherapy was developed by Klerman (1984) and is a well-
established treatment for adult depression (Mufson and Fairbanks, 1996). Mufson and 
colleagues adapted IPT for adolescents (IPT-A) with major depression. In IPT-A 
adolescents learn to cope with interpersonal difficulties such as loss of relationships, 
discord, and role transition that are often associated with depression (Brent and 
Birmaher, 2002).  
 
Despite the evidence for CBT and IPT, in their meta-analysis of youth depression 
treatment trials Weisz et al., (2006) found the mean effect of psychotherapy to be 
0.34, a small to medium effect. This indicates that treatments for youth depression lag 
significantly behind those for other youth conditions. The meta-analysis also revealed 
that the beneficial effects of current treatments did not endure for more than a few 
months post treatment. Furthermore, while data for CBT says it is likely to be 
effective in adolescents with mild depression, it is not consistently effective for those 
with more severe depression (Thapar et al., 2012). And although it might be hoped 
that adding a psychological therapy to medication treatment may increase treatment 
effectiveness, Dubicka et al’s. (2010) meta-analysis found no significant additional 
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benefit for CBT when combined with antidepressant medication. This lack of benefit 
was in terms of depressive symptoms, suicidality, and global improvement in the 
short and longer term. 
 
Research has also indicated that non cognitive treatments for youth depression are as 
robust as cognitive treatments (Weisz et al., 2006). This is in line with adult research 
(e.g. Hollon, 2000; Jacobson et al., 1996, 2001) which has found that non-cognitive 
behavioural activation strategies are not improved upon by adding treatment 
components with a cognitive focus. This suggests effective treatment for youth 
depression may not require directly altering cognitions, despite this being one of the 
key aspects of CBT. 
 
Increasingly research is suggesting that the mechanisms by which current depression 
treatments for young people, including CBT, can work may not be fully understood, 
and the treatment effects may be modest and not maintained in the longer term. One 
potential way to improve treatments for a psychological disorder is to identify 
maintenance mechanisms and target these in treatment (Clark, 1999). This has led 
some to suggest that shifting focus from content to process of thoughts may be useful 
(Harvey, Mansell, Watkins & Shafran, 2004), which is consistent with what we know 
about the importance of thinking styles in youth depression. One such thinking style 
that has received increased attention in recent years is rumination. Rumination has 
been identified as a maladaptive cognitive processing style that is causally implicated 
in the onset and maintenance of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
 
1.3 Cognitive processing  
 
 1.3.1 Repetitive thinking. Repetitive thought (RT) is defined as the “process 
of thinking attentively, repetitively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world” 
(Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden & Shortridge, 2003, p909). All individuals regularly 
engage in RT (Harvey et al., 2004), with examples including worry, reflection, 
rumination, problem solving, and emotional processing. 
 
RT can have both helpful and unhelpful consequences (Watkins, 2008). For example, 
as will be discussed in detail later, some forms of RT about symptoms and upsetting 
18 
 
events can help people come to terms with these (Watkins, 2008; e.g. Tedeschi & 
Calhoun, 2004) whereas other forms of RT are associated with depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). This leads to the question of what it is about RT which 
determines whether it is helpful or unhelpful (discussed in detail in sections 1.3.4 & 
1.3.5). 
 
Repetitive negative thinking (RNT), as an unhelpful process, is transdiagnostic, 
found to be elevated in as many as 13 different disorders including affective 
disorders, anxiety disorders, insomnia and psychosis (Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  
Worry, in Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) for example, typically involves RNT 
about future imagined catastrophes, uncertainties, and risks (e.g. “What if they have 
an accident?”; Watkins, 2008). It is understood as an attempt to avoid negative 
events, to prepare for the worst, and to problem solve, and is linked to unconstructive 
outcomes such as increased negative affect, interference with cognitive function, and 
disruptions to physiological processes (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). Depressive 
RNT, as another example, is known as rumination. Ruminative responses can be 
defined as thoughts that focus the depressed individual’s attention on his or her 
symptoms and the possible causes and consequences of those symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema 1987, 1991). For example “Why do I always feel like this? …What is 
wrong with me?... Why can’t I pull myself together?”….and so on. People engaging 
in ruminative responses may worry about the causes and consequences of their 
depression, but they do not take action to change their situation, and they spend much 
of their time thinking about how badly they feel (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). 
 
The different definitions for RNT across the different identified disorders have three 
characteristics in common; thinking processes that are repetitive, passive and/or 
relatively uncontrollable, and focused on negative content. The disorders differ with 
regard to the negative content (e.g. symptoms of depression, future negative events, 
past traumas). The key aspect of RT (including RNT) is not what the person is 
thinking about but how they are thinking about it. 
 
Repetitively and passively thinking about symptoms, causes, and consequences of 
low mood in depression, i.e. rumination, has been shown to have a significant role in 
the development and maintenance of depression. The following two sections 
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summarise the cross-sectional research supporting this idea in both adults and young 
people.  
 
1.3.2 Rumination and depression. The Response Styles Theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) suggests that depressive rumination is a particular response style to 
depressed mood, which is causally implicated in the onset and maintenance of 
depression (see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008 for a review). According to the 
Response Styles Theory rumination exacerbates and prolongs distress, particularly 
depression, through several mechanisms. Firstly, and of particular relevance to the 
present study, is the suggestion that rumination enhances the effects of depressed 
mood on thinking, making it more likely that people will use the negative thoughts 
and memories activated by their depressed mood to understand their current 
circumstances. Second, rumination interferes with effective problem solving, partly 
by making thinking more pessimistic and fatalistic. Third, rumination interferes with 
instrumental behaviour, leading to an increase in stressful circumstances. Lastly, 
people who chronically ruminate will lose social support which in turn will fuel their 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). The Response Styles theory argues 
that these consequences of rumination make it more likely that the initial symptoms 
of depression will become more severe and develop into episodes of major 
depression. In addition, they could prolong current depressive episodes (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
 
Watkins’ (2008) review reveals that there is an extensive body of findings suggesting 
that ruminative thinking is involved in the onset and maintenance of depression. For 
example in cross-sectional studies using the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; a 
self-report questionnaire which assesses the extent to which people respond to 
feelings of sadness with rumination) (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow 1991), depressive 
rumination is found to be elevated in currently depressed patients, formerly depressed 
patients, and women relative to men (Riso et al., 2003; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 
1998), as well as being associated with depressive symptoms in adults (e.g. Eshun, 
2000; Ito et al., 2003).  
 
Depressive rumination also predicts future depression in longitudinal prospective 
studies. For example the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ) predicts the future 
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onset of a major depressive episode across a range of follow-up periods in initially 
non depressed individuals (e.g. Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), 
depressive symptoms across a range of follow-up periods in initially non depressed 
individuals, after controlling for baseline symptoms (e.g. Abela, Brozina, & Haigh, 
2002; Butler & Nolen- Hoeksema, 1994), and depressive symptoms in patients with 
clinical depression, after controlling for baseline depression (e.g. Kuehner & Weber, 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
 
1.3.3 Rumination and depression in young people. Compared to the adult 
rumination literature, there is less research on the role of rumination in youth 
depression. Questionnaire studies are consistent with the hypothesis that rumination 
is a predictor of depression in young people. Abela, Vanderbilt & Rochon (2004) 
found that third graders (mean age: eight years, three months) and seventh graders 
(mean age: 12 years, four months) who exhibited a ruminative response style 
reported higher levels of depressive symptoms than those who did not exhibit such a 
style. In terms of adolescents, Kuyken, Watkins, Holden and Cook (2006) found that 
adolescents at risk for depression (operationalized as high scores on a measure of 
neuroticism) reported more rumination than adolescents not at risk. Abela and 
Hankin (2011), who collected data over a two year period, found that in a sample of 
11-15 year olds higher levels of rumination at baseline were associated with a greater 
likelihood of exhibiting a past history of major depressive episodes, a greater 
likelihood of experiencing the onset of a future major depressive episode, and greater 
duration of future depressive episodes. Rumination was found to moderate the 
association between the occurrence of negative events and the development of future 
depressive symptoms and major depressive episodes. In addition, Leigh et al (in prep 
a) found that rumination partially mediated the relationship between depressive 
symptoms at time 1 and depressive symptoms at time 2 in a large sample of UK 
adolescent school children. 
 
This body of research has consistently linked depressive symptoms with individual 
differences in tendency to ruminate. In order to demonstrate and understand which 
aspect of ruminative processing is causally implicated in depression, experimental 
studies which manipulate the potential mechanisms by which rumination has its 
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effects are required. The two mechanisms considered in the following sections are 
level of self-focus and processing style. 
 
1.3.4 Rumination and adaptive processing in depression: self-focus 
mechanism. One way rumination may produce its negative consequences is via the 
considerable extent of self-focus involved. Research has repeatedly evidenced an 
association between self-focused attention and depression (e.g. Smith, Ingram & 
Roth, 1985). Compared to non-depressed individuals, depressed individuals evidence 
greater self-focus responding and less externally focused responding (Ingram & 
Smith, 1984). The role of self-focus in rumination has been investigated through 
comparison to distraction, where the level of self-focus is minimal. Distraction has 
been considered an adaptive and instrumental alternative to rumination where the 
individual is encouraged to redirect their thoughts away from the negative self-
content they have been focusing on to something pleasant or neutral. 
 
Experimental studies which have compared rumination and distraction have tended to 
use the rumination and distraction inductions designed by Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow (1993). In the rumination induction participants are asked to focus on the 
meanings, causes, and consequences of their current feelings for eight minutes (e.g. 
“think about the level of motivation you feel right now”, “think about the long term 
goals you have set”) and the contrasting distraction induction is designed to divert 
participants’ attention to non-self-related stimuli (e.g. “think about the layout of your 
local shopping centre”). Using these inductions, numerous studies have shown that 
rumination significantly increases dysphoric mood in dysphoric participants but not 
in non-dysphoric participants. In comparison distraction decreases dysphoric mood in 
dysphoric patients but has no effect on mood in non-dysphoric participants (for a 
review see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Such experimental research suggests that 
self- focused rumination does play a causal role in the development and maintenance 
of depression. 
 
In addition to the consistent finding of self-focused rumination impacting on mood, 
self-focused rumination has been found to impact on other aspects of depression. For 
example, in an experimental study, over general memory decreased and mood 
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improved after a brief distraction procedure, compared to rumination (Watkins, 
Teasdale & Williams, 2000).  
 
The findings described above suggest that self-focus may be an important mechanism 
determining the impact of rumination on depressive symptoms, and that distraction 
may be a positive alternative processing style to rumination. Focusing on non-self-
related information when depressed, however, may not be an ideal strategy for a 
number of reasons (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Firstly it may require too much 
effort. Secondly focusing attention away from negative thoughts and feelings may be 
similar to thought suppression and experiential avoidance, both of which are 
associated with recurrence rather than remediation of negative affect. Thirdly not 
attending to what one is thinking prevents one developing alternative interpretations 
of experiences, a key component of treatment according to the cognitive model 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). In addition to this, self-report data is inconsistent and 
has produced mixed findings as to whether distraction is linked to a reduction in 
depressive symptoms (e.g. Bagby & Parker, 2001; Schmaling et al., 2002; Abela et 
al., 2002). 
 
Watkins and Teasdale (2001) noted that focus of attention was not the only non-
constant variable between rumination and distraction and thus investigated the 
reasons behind Watkins, Teasdale and Williams’ (2000) finding that over general 
memory decreased and mood improved after a distraction procedure, in comparison 
to rumination. They aimed to see whether the effects depended on reductions in self- 
focus or reductions in analytic thinking. They found that thinking style significantly 
affected over-general memory, whereas focus of attention significantly affected 
despondent mood. In other words diverting individuals’ attention (distraction) 
improved mood in the short term. In Watkins et al., (2000) this short term 
improvement in mood appeared to mask the lack of effect distraction actually had on 
over general memory. The analytical style of self-focused thinking (rather than self-
focus per se) worsened over general memory in Watkins and Teasdale (2001) 
suggesting that high levels of naturally occurring ruminative analytic thinking may be 
important in the maintenance of over-general memory, which in turn may contribute 




The findings described above suggest that self-focus may be a mechanism important 
to understanding the unhelpful consequences of rumination but that it is not the only 
mechanism involved. Watkins and Teasdale (2004), building on the idea that non 
self-focus (distraction) may only be a short term solution which does not allow 
sufficient processing of material long term, suggested that processing style could be 
important in depression, even when focusing on the same content. They were 
developing from the idea that how an individual thinks about something is more 
important than what they are thinking about.  
 
 1.3.5 Rumination and adaptive processing in depression: processing style 
mechanism. Processing style is a mechanism which may explain the longer term 
unhelpful consequences of rumination in depression. Teasdale (1999) conceptualised 
rumination as thinking about or thinking around experience in contrast to focusing on 
the direct experiential awareness of experience. In this way rumination, like 
distraction, can be understood as a form of avoidance. This is consistent with 
research by Burwell and Shirk (2007) who found rumination to function like passive 
brooding and to be associated with voluntary disengagement strategies, whereas 
active reflection was associated with voluntary coping aimed at changing one’s 
attitude towards the stressor. Brooding was associated with self-rated depressive 
symptoms in the study whereas, once brooding was accounted for, reflection was 
unrelated to self-reported depressive symptoms.   
 
Building on this, and on research that has identified reduced concreteness as a key 
concept in unhelpful repetitive negative thinking, particularly worry, Watkins and 
Teasdale (2004) identified a thinking style which encouraged a concrete and 
experiential focus rather than avoidance. Concreteness is a key variable in terms of 
appropriate definition and analysis of problems which are important steps on the way 
to problem solution. By being associated with problem elaborations of reduced 
concreteness, worry, and potentially other forms of repetitive negative thought, is 
thought to impede detection and implementation of appropriate problem solutions 
(Stöber, Tepperwien & Staak, 2000). Research in this area has found that in 
comparison to more concrete words and sentences, less concrete words and sentences 
elicit detailed mental images much slower and with less ease (Stöber et al., 2000; e.g. 
Marschark & Cornoldi, 1991).  Worry has consistently been associated with 
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avoidance of aversive imagery (e.g. Borkovec, 1994) and thus it may be that the 
reduced concreteness of worry enables this avoidance. 
 
To investigate the effects of concrete thinking in depression, Watkins (2008) 
developed a new experimental procedure which involves inducing analytical focus or 
experiential focus in depressed patients, using the rumination stimuli developed by 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008). In the analytical condition patients are instructed to 
think about the causes, meanings, and consequences of their feelings in relation to the 
stimuli. In the experiential focus condition, the same stimuli are presented to 
participants, but they are instructed to “think about the concrete experience of x”. 
 
The studies described below show that while concrete thinking may not improve 
mood in the short term, it does have a positive effect on a number of the processes 
that maintain depression in the long term, in comparison to rumination. This suggests 
that thinking style (analytical vs concrete) may be a key mechanism underlying the 
longer term negative effects of rumination in depression. 
 
Rimes & Watkins (2005) demonstrated that inducing a ruminative analytic thinking 
style in comparison to an experiential thinking style in depressed patients increased 
ratings of the self as worthless and incompetent pre- to post-manipulation. This was 
not the case for non-depressed participants. The increase in global negative self-
judgements following analytical self-focus remained after controlling for change in 
mood. The finding that the increase in depressed mood after analytical self-focus was 
no longer significant once the change in worthlessness/incompetence was covaried 
out points to a potential maintenance cycle involving low mood, rumination and 
global negative self-judgements. 
 
A further cognitive aspect of depression implicated in the maintenance of depressed 
mood, social problem solving, is also found to be negatively affected by rumination 
in comparison to concrete thinking. Watkins and Moulds (2005) found that 
experiential inductions prompted depressed participants to engage in better problem 
solving compared to after analytical rumination inductions. The inductions did not 
have a differential effect on mood, again suggesting the effect was not only due to 




Experimental studies with rumination and concrete inductions have additionally 
found that trait predisposition towards ruminative repetitive thinking is moderated by 
the thinking style participants adopt. Thinking about negative self-experience has 
maladaptive effects on emotional self-regulation when thinking in a ruminative way 
for example, but not when thinking in a concrete process-focused mode. This was 
demonstrated by Moberly and Watkins (2006) whose participants repeatedly focused 
on both positive and negative scenarios in either a concrete, process-focused or an 
abstract, evaluative mode, before a failure experience. After the failure experience, 
higher levels of trait rumination were associated with lower levels of positive affect, 
but only for participants in the abstract, evaluative condition and not for participants 
in the concrete, process-focused condition. 
 
The studies outlined in this section all support the hypothesis that an analytical mode 
of self-focused rumination may be particularly maladaptive in adult depression. Non 
self-focus does lead to improvement in mood but the more recent research suggests 
inducing concrete thinking may be more beneficial in the longer term. The process of 
thinking on its own can affect levels of depressive symptoms even if the content of 
thoughts is not changed and a high level of self-focus remains. A concrete mode of 
thinking may be better than both distraction and rumination in the long terms as it 
does not allow difficult experiences to be avoided. 
 
1.3.6 Cognitive processing and depression in young people: experimental 
research. Compared to the adult literature there are far fewer experimental 
investigations of the role of rumination in adolescent depression. Park, Goodyer and 
Teasdale (2004) found that compared to distraction experimentally induced 
rumination increased depressed mood in both adolescents with first episode Major 
Depressive Disorder and in control adolescents. The finding that induced rumination 
worsens depressed mood in comparison to distraction is consistent with the findings 
in the adult literature. However, the fact that rumination increased depressed mood in 
the control as well as the depressed adolescents is in contrast to most of the adult 
literature where clear differences in the impact of rumination on dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants has been demonstrated (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-




Rood, Roelofs, Bögels & Arntz (2012) found an unexpected decrease in negative 
affect after adolescent participants were induced to think about a self-generated 
stressful situation in a ruminative way. In this study the effects of inducing 
rumination, acceptance, distancing and positive appraisal in response to thinking 
about a recent stressful experience were observed in a sample of adolescents. Overall 
positive appraisal significantly increased positive affect in comparison to the other 
three conditions. The authors suggest a number of potential methodological 
explanations for the unexpected finding that rumination did not produce a negative 
effect on mood. These included ceiling effects after the stress-induction and the 
possibility that the effect of naturally occurring rumination was attenuated because of 
the structure provided by the induction cards. Perhaps most importantly the authors 
state that the rumination condition was not characterized by reduced concreteness / 
increased abstractness of thought compared to the other conditions (based on 
observer rated VAS). This supports the possibility that the rumination induction may 
have been more adaptive than intended with greater concreteness meaning less 
avoidance of experience. 
 
Hilt and Pollack (2012) examined the utility of three different brief interventions for 
stopping an induced ruminative process. They found that distraction and mindfulness 
were successful in reducing rumination. Although the specific mechanisms of action 
were not examined, the authors suggest it is likely that distraction limited the mind 
from wandering to self-relevant content. This fits with Watkins and Teasdale (2001) 
conclusion that focus of attention affects mood in the short term. Mindfulness, which 
focuses on the acceptance of self-relevant thoughts, may have had positive effects 
because it encouraged experiential awareness in comparison to rumination. Problem 
solving was not helpful in getting children out of a ruminative state, but the authors 
put forward a number of explanations for this including methodological limitations 
and the fact that Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) has suggested distraction is needed to raise 
mood first for problem solving to be effective. The study acknowledges its findings 
only apply short term and future research is needed to determine the longer term 




In terms of thinking styles and their effects on longer term maintenance of depression 
in young people, Park et al. (2004) looked at the effect of inducing rumination (in 
comparison to distraction) on over-general memory as well as on state mood. They 
found that experimentally induced rumination increased negative over general 
memories in depressed adolescents. In comparison to the adult research in this area 
(e.g. Watkins et al., 2000) where distraction reduced over-generality, in Park et al. 
(2004) rumination increased over-general memory whereas distraction per se had no 
significant effect.  
 
Although induced rumination in Park et al. (2004) affected mood, it did not affect 
over-general categoric memory in non-depressed adolescents. The increase in over-
general memory was specific to depressed participants. The authors argue that given 
the lack of positive correlation between mood and memory change, the differential 
impact of rumination on negative over-general memory is not just a reflection of 
mood change. These findings imply that rumination may be unhelpful in youth 
depression, possibly by forming part of a vicious cycle involving lowering mood, 
increased rumination and negative over-general memories (Williams, 1996). It should 
also be noted, however, that the comparison of rumination to distraction in this study 
rather than a concrete mode of thinking means it is not possible to determine the 
mechanism which resulted in the effect of rumination. The level of self-focus and the 
content of thoughts differ between the conditions in addition to the style of 
processing.  
 
Two studies (Taylor et al., in prep; Leigh et al., in prep b) suggest that it is an 
analytical style of thinking which maintains depression in the long term for young 
people. In both these studies adolescents were induced to think about themselves in 
hypothetical and personal scenarios in either a concrete or ruminative way. Taylor et 
al (in prep) demonstrated that adolescents experienced more negative thinking about 
the future and the self when they were engaged in analytical  rumination compared to 
when they were engaged in concrete processing, regardless of their current level of 
depressive symptoms. Furthermore, the study revealed that the detrimental effect of 
engaging in analytical rumination was over and above its influence on mood. Leigh et 
al (in prep b) also found that adolescents, regardless of their current level of 
depressive symptoms, performed more poorly on the Means End Problem Solving 
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(MEPS) task when engaging in analytical rumination compared to when engaged in 
concrete processing. Again this effect was over and above the influence of analytical 
rumination on mood. 
 
The research considered so far suggests that an analytical mode of processing 
maintains a number of factors known to be important in depression. It appears to 
drive these effects via acting as an avoidance mechanism. Cognitive avoidance of 
intrusive memories in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been shown to 
maintain PTSD symptoms (see section 1.5). It therefore follows that intrusive 
memories, a key feature of adult depression (see section 1.4.2) may be an aspect of 
depression maintained by rumination. It may be, for example, that lowering mood, 
increased rumination, and distress resulting from unprocessed negative intrusive 
memories, form a vicious cycle that helps maintain depressed mood.  In line with 
Taylor et al (in prep) and Leigh et al (in prep b), and building on findings with adults, 
this study will compare a ruminative and concrete mode of processing to help 
identify the mechanism by which rumination may be unhelpful in relation to intrusive 
memory experience in youth depression. 
 
As this study will be investigating the nature of intrusive memories in youth 
depression and the impact of rumination, it is important to understand how 
rumination might influence the experience of intrusive memories in depression. This 
is considered in section 1.5. Firstly the role and nature of intrusive memories in 
depression will be discussed to demonstrate their significance in depression and thus 
why it would be important to know if a process like rumination were maintaining 
them. 
 
1.4 Intrusive memories 
 
1.4.1 Definition. Intrusive memories can be defined as the spontaneous 
intrusions of autobiographical memories. For example, a memory of last night’s 
dinner recalled deliberately in response to “What did you have for dinner last night?” 
can be contrasted with a memory of the same event that is generated involuntarily 
and interrupts activity (e.g. when studying late at night and getting hungry, an image 




Intrusive cognitive phenomena are most typically associated with PTSD, where the 
intrusive memories are of a traumatic event. Research, however, has demonstrated 
that intrusive memories of negative past events are not unique to PTSD but are also 
reported in depression.  
 
 1.4.2 Intrusive memories in adult depression. Adult patients with 
depression, like patients with PTSD, typically have memories of specific 
autobiographical events that intrude into consciousness at high frequency (Brewin, 
Reynolds & Tata, 1999). Reynolds and Brewin (1999) report that studies of 
depressed psychiatric patients have found that around 86% described experiencing 
repetitive intrusive memories (Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; Brewin, Hunter, Carroll, & 
Tata, 1996). The content of intrusive memories in depression generally consists of 
family illness and death, personal injury or assault, and interpersonal crises (Brewin 
et al, 1996). Reynolds and Brewin (1999) found in their study that a depressed group 
of participants were more likely to report intrusive memories consisting of death, 
illness or injury to family members, or interpersonal problems, whereas participants 
with PTSD were more likely to report memories consisting of personal illness or 
injury, or personal assault. 
 
PTSD and depressed patients both commonly report intrusive memories as being 
vivid and as being accompanied by physical sensations and by a sense of reliving the 
original experience (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Patel et al. (2007) found that the two 
main emotions associated with intrusions (intrusive memories and intrusive images) 
in their study involving moderately to severely depressed patients were anger and 
sadness. Ratings of vividness were high as were levels of physical and emotional re-
experiencing. 
 
Earlier thinking in the area of intrusive memories within depression was that the 
frequency of negative intrusive memories, as well as the extent to which people tried 
to avoid their intrusive memories, was predictive of depression severity. The 
evidence for this, however, is mixed. For example Brewin et al. (1999) conducted a 
prospective study of clinically depressed adults and found that depression symptoms 
at six month follow up were predicted by the degree of intrusiveness and avoidance 
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of intrusive memories of stressful life events at initial interview, even after 
controlling for baseline depression levels. In contrast Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, 
Hyman and Dayson (1998) found in a prospective study of depressed and non-
depressed cancer patients that after controlling for baseline depression, intrusion and 
avoidance did not predict depression symptoms at follow up (Newby & Moulds 
2011a). 
 
In PTSD the presence and frequency of intrusive memories can be poor predictors of 
PTSD symptoms prospectively (Newby & Moulds, 2011a; e.g. Michael, Ehlers, 
Halligan & Clark, 2005); rather specific memory qualities like nowness, the lack of 
context, and level of distress predict PTSD symptoms longitudinally (Michael et al., 
2005). Williams and Moulds (2007a) showed that similarly, sensory features 
(including perceived nowness and distress) of intrusive memories were associated 
with concurrent levels of depression and accounted for unique variance in the 
prediction of depression, even after controlling for intrusion frequency and severity 
(Newby & Moulds, 2011a).  Negative meanings of intrusive memories have also 
been correlated with depression, even after intrusion frequency and memory severity 
are accounted for (Starr & Moulds, 2006). These findings concerning the 
characteristics of intrusive memories which predict depression severity can 
potentially be explained using relevant principles outlined in cognitive models of 
PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Such models focus on the process of thinking and are 
discussed in section 1.5.1. 
 
Interventions which have successfully targeted intrusive memories have furthered our 
knowledge of their role in depression. Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison and 
Holmes (2012) evaluated a computerised cognitive bias modification intervention 
targeting interpretation bias in depression via positive mental imagery. Compared to a 
control condition, individuals in the treatment condition demonstrated significant 
improvements in depressive symptoms, cognitive bias and intrusive symptoms. 
Interestingly the analysis showed that within the treatment condition, reductions in 
negative biases in interpretation and appraisal of intrusions were associated with 
reductions in depressive symptoms. This further demonstrates that the use of a 




Research has also started to show that imagery rescripting is an intervention 
associated with significant reduction in distress when depression is accompanied by 
distressing intrusive memories (e.g. Wheatley et al., 2007). Brewin (2006) has put 
forward a retrieval account to explain these findings. He presents evidence that 
beliefs about the self do not only take the form of general semantic knowledge (e.g. 
“I am a bad person”) but are also underpinned by episodic memories of specific 
autobiographical incidents. Thus it would be expected that symptom improvement 
could be achieved not only by helping individuals challenge their maladaptive, 
negative beliefs (as in traditional CBT) but also by preventing the retrieval of 
episodic memories supporting depressive thinking (Wheatley et al., 2007). Such an 
explanation provides a good way of understanding why intrusive memories may be a 
key feature of depression. If rumination is involved in determining the experience 
and appraisal of intrusive memories (discussed in section 1.5.2), then this points to 
the importance of reducing rumination in treatments for depression. 
 
1.4.3 Intrusive memories in youth depression. The presence and nature of 
intrusive memories in much of child and adolescent psychopathology is under 
researched.  
 
Life events such as bereavements, parental separation or serious illness, can play a 
significant role in youth mental health problems (e.g. Goodyer, 1990). In fact 95% of 
major depressive episodes in young people arise in children and adolescents with 
long-standing psychosocial difficulties (NICE 2005).  
 
Copeland, Keeler, Angold and Costello (2010) support the idea that intrusive 
memories are associated with life stressors (rather than just extreme stressors) in 
children. They found that low-magnitude stressors, which were far more common 
than extreme stressors, generated a greater proportion of the negative outcomes 
among the child community sample in their study, accounting for half of those with 
subclinical PTSD and two-thirds of those reporting ‘painful recall’ (defined as 
unwanted, painful, and distressing recollections, memories, thoughts, or images of an 
event). For most of the children who developed PTSD symptoms after exposure to 
low magnitude stressors, the symptoms followed interpersonal loss (e.g. parental 




Given that intrusive memories are considered a common reaction to negative events 
(also see Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996), it makes sense that intrusive memories 
would play a role in maintaining youth depression. In line with this a recent study by 
Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish, Yule and Smith (2012) has found that non-traumatic 
intrusive memories do feature in depression in young people. Meiser-Stedman et al. 
(2012) found that in an adolescent school sample intrusive memories were a 
relatively common phenomena and the frequency of intrusive memories was similar 
for traumatic events and life events. The study found that similar to the adult 
literature, intrusive memory frequency and memory quality (e.g. sensory based 
quality, fragmented structure) contributed to the on-going experience for young 
people of intrusive memories of a negative life event. Intrusive memory frequency 
and memory quality also partially mediated the relationship between peri-event affect 
and depressive symptoms. Further research, however, is needed to enrich our 
understanding of intrusive memories in youth depression. 
 
1.5 Cognitive processing and intrusive memories.  
 
Avoidance plays a key role in maintaining intrusive memories in PTSD (discussed 
below). The literature considered in previous sections has conceptualised rumination 
in depression as a cognitive avoidance strategy where the direct experience of the 
event is not focused on. Further support for the idea that rumination is a form of 
experiential avoidance in depression is derived from a number of studies (Giorgio et 
al., 2010). For example research has found a direct link between self-reported 
depressive rumination and experiential avoidance (e.g. Cribb, Moulds & Carter, 
2006). Additionally a number of studies have reported a link between rumination and 
avoidant behaviours including Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang and Chung (2006) and 
Smith et al. (2007). Smith et al. (2007) for example found that high ruminating 
individuals reported significantly more cutting behaviour than low ruminators, which 
has often been understood as a way for individuals to get relief from aversive 
emotional experiences (Linehan, 1993).  This avoidance conceptualisation of 
rumination is consistent with the idea that ruminating about past events may serve to 




The predominant idea for how rumination, as a form of avoidance, might maintain 
intrusive memories comes from cognitive models of PTSD. Experiential avoidance, a 
tendency to avoid contact with certain aspects of private experiences, has been linked 
with many forms of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 1996), but the cognitive PTSD 
models were some of the first to conceptualise rumination as a form of avoidance. 
 
1.5.1 Cognitive processing and intrusive memories in PTSD. PTSD is an 
anxiety disorder which occurs after a traumatic event if individuals process the event 
and/or its sequelae in a way which produces a sense of current threat. The two key 
processes thought to lead to this sense of current threat are individual differences in 
the appraisal of the trauma and/or its sequelae, and individual difference in the nature 
of the memory of the event (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 
As discussed in section 1.4, one of the main symptoms of PTSD is the experience of 
high frequency, involuntarily triggered intrusive memories involving re-experiencing 
of the event in a vivid and emotional way. The intrusive memories can involve all 
sensory modalities and are experienced as if they were happening right now (Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000). In an attempt to explain the occurrence of these intrusive memories, 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that in persistent PTSD the trauma memory is 
poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into its context in time, place, 
subsequent and previous information, and other autobiographical memories. This 
therefore explains a number of aspects of PTSD including problematic intentional 
recall of the trauma (weak semantic route retrieval), the ‘here and now’ quality of the 
trauma memory (no context in time), the absence of links to subsequent information, 
and the easy triggering of the memory by physically similar cues. These aspects all 
contribute to a perception of current threat. 
 
When PTSD patients perceive a sense of current threat and the accompanying 
symptoms, they try to control the threat and symptoms using a range of strategies. 
The more distressing symptoms like intrusive memories are perceived to be, the more 
likely the strategies will be used (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). These strategies, however, 
are maladaptive as they maintain PTSD in three ways; directly producing PTSD 
symptoms, preventing change in negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its 
sequelae, and preventing change in the nature of the trauma memory (Ehlers & Clark, 
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2000). A number of these maladaptive strategies are cognitive avoidance strategies 
which prevent adequate emotional processing of the traumatic experiences as well as 
preventing habituation to traumatic memories (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). For example 
actively trying not to think about the event is a cognitive avoidance strategy which 
may help the individual feel better in the short term but maintains PTSD and the 
distress associated with the memory in the long term by preventing individuals from 
elaborating and contextualising the trauma memory. Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose 
that another of these cognitive avoidance strategies is rumination. 
 
Rumination in PTSD involves continuous thinking about the trauma and its 
consequences, for example how the event could have been prevented or why the 
event happened. Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that rumination is a form of 
cognitive avoidance because it focuses on ‘What if…’ questions rather than on the 
experience of the trauma as it actually happened. This is consistent with Borkovec 
and Inz (1990) who proposed that worry, as a primarily verbal activity, is used to 
avoid physical and emotional reactions towards distressing images. As mentioned 
before when considering the transdiagnostic nature of RNT (section 1.3.1), 
rumination has similar properties to worry.  
 
Santa Maria, Reichert, Hummel and Ehring (2012) suggest that recovery from 
traumatic or highly stressful experiences, and the reduction of intrusive memories, 
requires the elaboration and contextualisation of the event memory, and the 
modification of excessively negative event-related appraisals i.e. the opposite of 
avoidance. For both processes, the authors suggest a concrete style of processing 
information is necessary whereas abstract-evaluative thinking can be expected to 
reinforce and maintain existing negative appraisals and to interfere with emotional 
processing and problem solving. In their study which used an analogue design, 
participants completed a short symptom provocation task to trigger intrusive 
memories about a past experience and then wrote about their negative experience in 
either an abstract-evaluative or a concrete-experiential way. Intrusive memories were 
assessed during the session and in the first 36 hours after the session. Participants in 
the abstract-evaluative condition showed less reduction of intrusive memories during 
the experimental session than those in the concrete-experiential condition, and 
showed a slower recovery in the 36 hours following the session. The possibility that 
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the effects of processing mode on intrusive memories were due to mood induction 
was ruled out.  
 
1.5.2 Cognitive processing and intrusive memories in depression. Like in 
PTSD, rumination in depression may be understood as a cognitive avoidance 
mechanism in that it prevents the processing of emotionally relevant information 
from being integrated into conceptual memory (Williams & Moulds, 2007b). A 
number of lines of research support the idea that avoidant strategies may play a key 
role in mediating the management of intrusive memories in depression (Williams & 
Moulds, 2007b). For example, suppression of intrusive cognitions is commonly 
reported as a response strategy by depressed individuals although it is also rated as an 
ineffective coping response (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998). 
 
If depressed individuals avoid emotionally processing difficult life events (of which 
depressed people experience more; see section 1.2.4) because they ruminate about 
them, it might be hypothesised that the distress associated with the event would 
continue when intrusive memories of the life event occurred. The distress 
experienced when the intrusions occur may then help maintain the depression. The 
depression and the intrusive memories may then continue because rumination 
continues. Rumination may endure for a number of reasons. People may erroneously 
believe rumination to be an advantageous activity with such beliefs tending to focus 
on rumination being a strategy useful for coping, finding solutions and/or 
understanding problems (Wells & Papageorgiou, 2004). Williams and Moulds (2010) 
also suggest that the operation of an attentional bias makes the process of 
disengaging from rumination more difficult in depressed individuals, contributing to 
intrusion maintenance. 
 
The next two sections describe the research supporting the idea that rumination 
maintains the distressing experience of intrusive memories in adult depression. There 
is no research concerning the potential role of rumination in maintaining the 
distressing experience of intrusive memories in youth depression, and it cannot be 
assumed that findings from depressed adult populations apply to child and adolescent 
populations. This provides a rationale for experimentally testing the effect of 
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rumination on the experience of intrusive memories in dysphoric adolescents. The 
rationale for the current study is explained in full in section 1.5.2.3. 
 
 1.5.2.1 Rumination and intrusive memories in depression: cross sectional 
research. Research supports the idea that rumination may maintain the distressing 
experience of intrusive memories in depression. Starr & Moulds’ (2006) cross 
sectional, correlational study with undergraduates found that ruminative responses to 
intrusions were highly correlated with depression. Starr & Moulds suggest that it may 
be that an individual who ruminates about a distressing memory is less likely to 
emotionally process the memory and/or challenge the negative meaning assigned to 
it. Consequently, unprocessed memories continue to intrude and reinforce 
maladaptive cognitions, contributing to depression maintenance.  Williams and 
Moulds (2007a) also found that a number of cognitive avoidance strategies, including 
rumination, were endorsed by respondents reporting negative intrusions and each 
correlated with levels of dysphoria. 
 
Cross sectional research supports the idea that rumination plays a role in maintaining 
the distressing nature of intrusive memories in adult depression. Experimental 
studies, however, are required to show causation. 
 
1.5.2.2 Rumination and intrusive memories in depression: experimental 
research. Williams and Moulds (2007c) were the first to experimentally investigate 
the influence of ruminative processing on the experience of negative intrusive 
memories. They aimed to replicate Watkins (2004) but in relation to intrusive 
memories rather than intrusive thoughts. Watkins (2004) investigated the differential 
impact of writing about a forced failure experience in a concrete, experiential way in 
comparison to an abstract, analytical way and found that participants in the abstract, 
analytical group reported more intrusions about the failure experience than those who 
wrote in a concrete, experiential mode.  
 
In choosing to investigate the area of intrusive memories, depression and rumination 
Williams and Moulds (2007c) were also building on the literature that links 
depression and rumination to non-intrusive autobiographical memories. For example 
it has been demonstrated that individuals with naturally occurring dysphoria or 
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induced sad affect recall a greater number of negative or unpleasant autobiographical 
memories compared to non-dysphoric individuals (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Snyder 
& White, 1982). Additionally a series of studies has illustrated that regardless of the 
nature of the retrieval method (i.e. free recall or prompted), dysphoric individuals 
induced to ruminate recalled more self-referent negative memories and reported that 
they experienced more negative than positive life events (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).  
 
Williams and Moulds (2007c) experimentally induced intrusions via a film clip and 
explored the differential impact of an analytical, experiential and distraction 
induction on the subsequent experience of intrusions concerning the film clip. The 
result did not support the authors’ hypothesis that analytical processing would lead to 
increased intrusions relative to experiential processing. The authors’ provide a 
number of potential explanations for their null findings including that the intrusions 
would have been non self-referential in nature. Self-referential material refers to 
information that is directly linked to one’s sense of self and thus conveys important 
information about one’s personal character. It may be that the effects of analytical 
rumination on intrusions are more toxic if the material is self-referential (Williams & 
Moulds 2010). Additionally the null findings could have been due to issues of 
intrusion measurement. As mentioned previously (section 1.4.2) distress caused by 
intrusions can be independent of their frequency.  The focus in Williams and Moulds 
(2007c) was on intrusion frequency as a marker of unsuccessful processing and this 
might have prevented detection of changes in the affective impact of intrusive 
memories following rumination, for example intrusion-related distress.  
 
Building on their 2007c study, Williams and Moulds (2010) sought to experimentally 
assess the differential effects of analytical, ruminative processing and distraction on 
the experience, rather than the frequency, of self-referent naturally occurring 
intrusive memories in a sample of dysphoric participants. They found that inducing 
an analytical mode of processing resulted in undergraduate participants rating their 
intrusive memory as more negative, more distressing, and evoking a more negative 
response compared to inducing distraction. In addition, participants in the analytical 
rumination condition reported worse (sad) mood relative to those in the distraction 
condition. These are interesting findings which demonstrate that the emotional 
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impact of intrusive memories is affected by rumination. Williams and Moulds (2010) 
suggest it may be that ruminating about negative life events in an analytical manner 
disrupts successful emotional processing and therefore leads to distressing intrusive 
memories of such events. The distress associated with the intrusive memories may 
then contribute to lowering mood, creating a vicious cycle.  
 
Despite the strengths of the Williams and Moulds (2010) study, it is important to note 
that the authors do not report controlling for mood in their analyses meaning there is 
the possibility that the memory ratings may have worsened after rumination 
compared to distraction due to the differential effect of each condition on mood. This 
is particularly important to consider given the consistent findings that distraction has 
a positive impact on mood in comparison to rumination. It is also not apparent what it 
was about rumination that may have affected the emotional impact of the intrusive 
memories in Williams and Moulds (2010) study, because distraction, rather than 
concrete thinking, was used as an alternative to rumination. 
 
1.5.2.3 Cognitive processing and intrusive memories in dysphoric young 
people: rationale for this experimental study. Whilst it has been demonstrated that 
rumination has a negative impact on dysphoric adults’ perceptions of their intrusive 
memories (Williams & Moulds, 2010), there is no such experimental research with 
younger people. It cannot be presumed that findings from adult research will apply to 
children and adolescents as developmental considerations should be taken into 
account. During adolescence, regions of the brain undergo considerable structural 
change. These structural changes affect the cognitive abilities that rely on the 
functioning of particular brain regions where change occurs (Blakemore & 
Choudhury, 2006). Many of these cognitive abilities are likely to be important in 
terms of the thinking styles adolescents adopt, for example selective attention, 
working memory, and problem solving. Therefore it cannot be presumed that 
rumination will operate in the same way and have the same consequences in 
adolescents as it is found to do in adults 
 
There are only a few experimental studies with young people which involve the 
induction of ruminative and alternative styles of thinking. Park et al. (2004) found 
rumination to worsen depressed mood and to increase over-general memory in 
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comparison to distraction in adolescents. While Park et al. (2004) were the first to 
undertake an experimental study to examine the effect of rumination on one cognitive 
aspect of youth negative thinking (over general memory), they point to the 
importance of investigating the impact of rumination on other cognitive aspects 
known to be important in youth depression.   
 
None of the few youth experimental rumination studies have investigated the effect 
of rumination on intrusive memories. Research has increasingly pointed to the 
relevance of intrusive memories in adult depression where the memories seem to 
occur in a similar way to intrusive memories in PTSD. There is minimal research on 
the experience and nature of intrusive memories in youth depression but the research 
there is suggests that intrusive memories are relevant in the same way to depressed 
younger people. Maintenance models of PTSD which implicate intrusive memories 
have been applied to depression and these have highlighted the potential importance 
of avoidance mechanisms in the ongoing experience of intrusive memories. It 
therefore is important to explore the effects of rumination, which has been identified 
as a potential avoidance strategy, on the experience of intrusive memories in 
depression. This research has been started in adults but there is no research exploring 
this with young people. 
 
The study by Williams and Moulds (2010) represented an important contribution to 
the understanding of the effect of rumination on negative intrusive memories in 
depression. The question remains, however, about the mechanisms by which 
rumination was unhelpful in their study given that they compared rumination to 
distraction, where self-focus and processing style both differed. Their study 
suggested that self-focus was a relevant mechanism in understanding the impact of 
rumination on intrusive memories, however, its effect may only be due to the short 
term impact of different levels of self-focus on mood. The current study will be an 
important addition as while it will use a research design similar to Williams and 
Moulds (2010), a concrete experiential thinking style will be induced as an 
alternative to analytical rumination allowing the processing style, independent of 
self-focus, to be investigated. This study should thus provide more knowledge about 
the mechanisms by which rumination produces negative effects on aspects of youth 
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depression, as well as information on effective alternatives to rumination. Such 




Depression is a severe and debilitating disorder which becomes increasingly 
prevalent in adolescence. Unfortunately research suggests that current treatments for 
youth depression only produce modest effects which are not consistently maintained 
(Weisz et al., 2006). New treatments are required. One way to think about designing 
new treatments for a disorder is to consider targeting maintenance factors of the 
disorder (Clark, 1999). Thinking styles have been highlighted in depression research 
as important risk and resilience factors. One known thinking style found to be a 
maintenance factor in depression is rumination.  
 
Rumination is a passive style of thinking where individuals focus on the causes and 
consequences of their depression but do nothing to change their circumstances 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). Rumination has been found to be causally implicated 
in the onset and maintenance of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008). Experimental studies which have induced distraction (where the 
individual is encouraged to redirect thoughts away from personal negative content) in 
comparison to rumination have found that distraction improves mood in the short 
term in dysphoric adult samples. These studies have implicated self-focus as the 
mechanism by which rumination has its unhelpful consequences in adult depression. 
This mechanism, however, only appears to work in the short term. Experimental 
studies which have compared rumination to concrete thinking (a style of thinking that 
involves thinking about the same content but in a direct, experiential way) have 
implicated processing style as the mechanism by which rumination has its longer 
term consequences in depression.  
 
Rumination, in comparison to concrete thinking, has been found to have a negative 
impact on many cognitive aspects of depression over and above its effect on mood, in 
dysphoric adult samples (e.g. Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). 
These cognitive aspects of depression, such as social problem solving and over 
general memory, are thought to maintain depression in the long term. Concrete 
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thinking is thought to have a positive effect on the cognitive aspects of depression in 
comparison to rumination because, unlike rumination and distraction, it does not 
allow difficult experiences to be avoided. 
 
Rumination induction studies with young people are limited in number but the 
evidence is increasingly suggesting that rumination is unhelpful in youth depression, 
as it is in adult depression. As it cannot be presumed that adult research applies to 
young people there is a need to provide further support for the causal role of 
rumination in the maintenance of youth depression and also to explore the 
mechanisms underlying the effects. It is important to understand if processing style 
affects youth mood and their cognitive aspects of depression in similar ways to 
adults.  
 
Adults with depression are found to have specific, vivid, intrusive memories of 
autobiographical events that intrude into consciousness at high frequency (Brewin et 
al., 1999). Depressed young people also experience negative intrusive memories, 
however, there is little research exploring the nature and experience of these 
memories (Meiser-Stedman et al., 2012). Research with adults has suggested that 
rumination may maintain the distressing occurrence of intrusive memories in PTSD, 
via rumination functioning as a form of avoidance where the memory is not 
emotionally processed properly and thus paradoxically occurs at even greater 
frequency (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Williams and Moulds (2010) explored the effect of 
rumination and distraction on the experience of negative intrusive memories (also a 
cognitive aspect of depression) in a dysphoric adult sample. They found that inducing 
an analytical mode of processing resulted in undergraduate participants rating their 
intrusive memory as more negative, more distressing, and evoking a more negative 
response compared to inducing distraction. 
 
This study seeks to recruit a dysphoric adolescent sample to investigate the role of 
intrusive memories and cognitive processing in adolescent depression. A high 
dysphoric sample is important to study as they represent a group at high risk of 
developing depression (NICE, 2005; e.g. Lewinsohn, Solomon, Seeley & Zeiss, 
2000). The study firstly aims to explore the nature of the intrusive memories provided 
by the dysphoric adolescent sample. It then aims to see if processing style does 
42 
 
impact on the experience of intrusive memories for adolescents by inducing 
rumination and concrete thinking. This builds on the design of Williams and Moulds 
(2010) which provided a robust test of causality, but allows the mode of processing to 
be manipulated (as concrete thinking rather than distraction will be used as an 
alternative to rumination) which should give more insight into the mechanisms 
underlying the possible negative effects of rumination on intrusive memories in youth 
depression. 
 
1.7 Aims and Hypotheses 
 
1.7.1. Aim 1. This study aims to understand the experience and nature of 
intrusive memories in a dysphoric adolescent sample. This aim is exploratory in 
nature but the study aims to investigate the frequency, content, qualities, emotional 
impact, and the intrusion and avoidance characteristics of the intrusive memories. 
 
1.7.2 Aim 2. This study aims to consider the impact of inducing rumination 
and concrete thinking on the experience of negative intrusive memories in a 
dysphoric adolescent sample. The hypotheses are as follows; 
 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the rumination condition will show an increase in how 
upsetting they rate their intrusive memory pre to post the induction, compared to 
those in the concrete condition. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the rumination condition will show an increase in how 
sad they rate their intrusive memory makes them feel pre to post the induction, 
compared to those in the concrete condition. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in both conditions will experience a decrease in mood 
from pre to post induction. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Changes in participant mood will not entirely account for the 







The current study was part of a larger project investigating cognitive processes in 
adolescent depression that comprised two experimental studies, one of which is the 
focus of this thesis. 
 
The effects of different cognitive processing styles on the rating of a negative 
intrusive memory were compared amongst young people who scored within the 
upper quartile on a measure of depressive symptoms (Mood and Feelings 
Questionnaire; see Section 2.4.1.1). A 2 (thinking style: Rumination or Concrete) x 2 
(emotional response to memory: pre and post induction rating) mixed experimental 
design was used. 
 
2.2 Ethical approval 
Ethical approval for the study was granted from the King’s College London 
Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Sub-committee on 6
th
 November 
2012 (see Appendix 1). The most salient ethical issues are detailed below. 
 
2.2.1 Consent. Information sheets were provided for parents and young 
people at both the screening and experimental stages of the research (see Appendix 
2). Opt in consent from the young people and opt out consent from the parents (if 
students were aged 16 and under) was sought for eligible students at both stages (see 
Appendix 3 for consent forms). Parent information sheets and consent forms were 
sent by post to maximise the chances that parents would receive and read them. 
 
The opt-out consent procedure was adopted because previous experience suggests 
that the response rate from parents for studies in schools is very low. Additionally, 
Anderman et al. (1995) highlight that school-based studies that adopt a parental opt-
in strategy are vulnerable to bias because parents of adolescents from more socially 




 2.2.2 Managing risk. If, during the screening stage, participants scored in the 
clinical range on the MFQ and ticked the risk item the researchers passed the 
participants’ names to the member of school staff responsible for safeguarding. 
Before completing the questionnaire participants were informed this would happen 
should they tick an item which made the researchers concerned about their safety.  
 
During the experimental stage, if participants ticked the risk item on the MFQ the 
researcher undertook a preliminary risk assessment. If this raised any concerns 
participants had their name passed to the head of safeguarding. At the start of the 
experimental procedure participants were informed that if they indicated they were at 
risk of harm at any point during the procedure the head of safeguarding would be 
notified, in line with the school’s safeguarding procedures. 
 
 2.2.3 Debriefing.  At the end of the experimental procedure the purpose of 
the study was explained to all participants. Regardless of the condition they had been 
allocated to, all participants were trained in the principles of concrete thinking and 
informed about the potential benefits of concrete thinking on mood in comparison to 
rumination. Participants were offered the opportunity to ask questions. At the end of 
the experiment the researcher engaged in benign conversation with participants until 
they reported being ready to return to class. 
 
 2.2.4 Access to interventions. In line with school policy, participants were 
asked about what support was available to them when feeling low. With the 
participants who agreed they would like someone else to talk to, and were happy for 
the school to organise this, the researcher passed on their details to the head of 
safeguarding. Participants who did not want the school informed were advised to visit 
their GP. A system was agreed with the school whereby young people experiencing 
depression who were identified during the research could visit their GP and receive 
an expedited referral to a local CAMHS mood disorder clinic. 
 
2.3 Participants 
2.3.1 Power analysis. Sample size calculation was based on data from an 
experimental study comparing ratings of intrusive memories after a rumination or 
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distraction induction with a dysphoric adult population (Williams & Moulds, 2010). 
Williams and Moulds (2010) reported a difference of 7.91 and a pooled SD of 2.61 
(Rumination: M=48.86, SD=2.57, Distraction: M=40.95, SD=2.68) which 
corresponds to an effect size of d=3.0. Using the reported effect size of Cohen’s 
d=3.0, this study, using a power level of 80% and a significance level of 0.05 would 
need four participants per group to detect a similar effect size using an independent t-
test. The same sample size is needed if a repeated measurement ANOVA is used (to 
control for potential baseline difference) to detect an interaction between time (pre 
and post induction) and condition (rumination and concrete) assuming no baseline 
differences (and a correlation between pre and post measures of r=0.5). Given that 
this study is undertaken with adolescents rather than adults, such a large effect size 
might not be expected. We therefore aimed for 20 participants per group (total 
sample = 40) which would provide 80% power to detect an effect size of d=0.92. 
 
2.3.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria. The inclusion and exclusion criteria for 
the two different stages of the study are described below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria at the screening stage. Pupils from a 
large comprehensive secondary school and sixth-form in South East London 
(academic years 7-13) were included in the screening stage. Young people with an 
identified Learning Disability, pronounced reading and/or comprehension difficulties 
were excluded due to the reading requirements of the study. 
 
2.3.2.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria at the experimental stage. Participants 
who completed the MFQ during the screening stage and obtained a score within the 
upper quartile for their year group were included in the experimental stage of the 
research. Quartile cuts offs were calculated for each separate year group given 
developmental differences in MFQ scores (Cooper & Goodyer, 1993). 
 
The MFQ was re-administered at the beginning of the experimental study. The mean 
duration between screening and completion of the experimental study was 3.71 
weeks (SD = 1.87). Participants were excluded if their MFQ score during the 
experimental study no longer fell within the original upper quartile calculated for 
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their year group at the time of screening. Additionally if participants were unable to 
engage in the allocated processing style (see Section 2.4.2.4) they were excluded. 
 
2.3.3 Recruitment. Participants were recruited from a South London 
secondary school. The most recent Ofsted report (2009) for the school states that the 
number of students eligible for free school meals is above average. 65% of students 
are of Black Caribbean or African background, and nearly a third speak English as an 
additional language. 
 
Participants for this study were initially recruited together with participants for 
another experimental study. Three to four tutor groups from each of the year groups 
in the school were selected to take part in the screening phase. Prior to screening, the 
project was explained to tutor groups as a whole. Young people completed the MFQ 
if their parents had not opted-out, if they were present in class at the time of 
screening, and if they completed a consent form.  
 
Two thirds of the young people who scored in the upper quartile were allocated to 
this study via sequential allocation (with the remaining third allocated to the other 
study) and invited to take part. Opt in and opt out consent was sought from these 
young people and their parents respectively. 
 
As greater numbers were needed for this study after the first round of screening and 
experimenting, a further round of screening was conducted. All those who scored in 
the upper quartile at this stage were invited to take part in this study. 
 
Overall a total of 858 young people were eligible to complete the screening 
questionnaire. Of these 68 were opted out by their parents and 264 opted out 
themselves (by opting out in the classroom or due to absence) (see Figure 1). A total 
of 526 completed the screening questionnaire (57.4% male, 42.6% female). Young 
peoples’ ages ranged from 11 to 19 years with a mean age of 14.07 (SD=1.96). 
 
96 young people scored within the upper quartile and were invited to participate in 
this experimental study. Of these, 5 were opted out of the experimental procedure by 
their parents and 14 opted out themselves, therefore a total of 77 participants 
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completed the experimental procedure. Participants were alternately allocated to 
either the rumination or concrete condition when they arrived to complete the 
experimental procedure. Analysis revealed that young people who opted out did not 
differ significantly from those who did not opt out with regard to MFQ scores 
(t=0.04, p=0.97) (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of participants who opted in and out of experimental procedure 
Status N Mean MFQ score 
Opted out 19 26.5 



























Figure 1: Recruitment pathway 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Exclusion of young people following completion of experimental 
tasks. Of the 77 young people, 24 young people were excluded as their scores no 
Students identified to be screened = 858 
Total number of students screened = 526 
Total number of students screened = 526 
Total number of students falling in the upper 
quartile who were allocated to this study = 96 
Screening stage non completion 
Parental opt out N = 68 (7.92%) 
Student opt out N = 264 (30.77%) 
Experimental study non completion 
Parental opt out N = 5 (5.21%) 
Student opt out N = 14 (14.58%) 
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longer fell in the upper quartile when they completed the MFQ again at the start of 
the experimental session. 16 young people from the Rumination condition and eight 
from the Concrete condition were excluded on this basis. The number of young 
people excluded for this reason across the year groups is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
MFQ inclusion criteria and number of young people excluded across year groups 




Final N Excluded (%) 
7 14 13 7 6 (46) 
8 13 17 12 5 (29) 
9 15 12 10 2 (17) 
10 19 15 11 4 (27) 
11 16 8 4 4 (50) 
12 21 9 7 2 (22) 
13 18 3 2 1 (33) 
                Total:                 77                         53                    24(31)                     
  
A further 16 young people were excluded as they reported engaging in the allocated 
processing style less than 50% of the time (six from the Rumination condition, 10 
from the Concrete condition). Analysis suggests no significant differences in the 
proportion of participants excluded on this basis from each condition (Fisher’s exact 
test: p=0.156). 
 




























Figure 2: Exclusion of young people following experimental tasks 
 
 
Overall there were no significant differences between the number of young people 
excluded from the rumination condition (n=20 [47%]) and the number of young 
people excluded from the concrete condition (n=16 [47%]) (Fisher’s exact test: 
p=1.00). 
 
There were no significant age differences between the young people who were 
excluded and those who were not excluded according to either exclusion criteria (due 
to scoring under 50% on either of the manipulation checks (t[75]=1.45, p=0.15), or 
not having a MFQ score in the upper quartile at two time points (t[75]=-0.50, 
p=0.62)). 
 
2.4 Materials and measures 
 
2.4.1 Self-report Questionnaires. The self-report questionnaires used are 
detailed below. 
 
Allocated to study = 77 
Rumination   N=43 
Excluded due to change in MFQ   N=16 
Excluded due to failing manipulation 
checks   N= 6 
 
Concrete thinking    N=34 
Excluded due to change in MFQ   N=8 
Excluded due to failing manipulation 
checks   N= 10 
 
Total    N = 41 
Rumination    N =23 




2.4.1.1 Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ; Costello & Angold, 1988). 
The MFQ is a 33-item questionnaire developed to assess symptoms of depression 
present over a two week time period in young people aged 8 – 18 years. It consists of 
33 items covering DSM-IV criteria for depression and additional symptoms such as 
feeling unloved, lonely or ugly. Respondents rate the frequency of depressive 
symptoms using a three-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not true) to 2 (often true) 
giving a total score of 0-64, with higher scores indicating greater frequency of 
depressive symptoms. A threshold score of 29 was used for the MFQ, based on a 
large clinic and non clinic sample undertaken in the US (Daviss et al, 2006). 
 
The MFQ has been show to demonstrate good internal consistency and adequate test 
– retest reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78) (Costello & Angold, 1988; Wood, Kroll, 
Moore, & Harrington, 1995). Kent, Vostanis & Feehan (1997) report that MFQ items 
which discriminated between depressed and not depressed are reflected in various 
DSM-III and DSM IV criteria for depression. Cronbach’s alpha for the administration 
of this scale was excellent for the screening sample at 0.92 and good for the 
experimental sample at 0.70. 
 
2.4.1.2 The Child Revised Impact of Events Scale (CRIES-8) (Appendix 4). 
The CRIES-8 (Yule, 1997) is adapted from the Impact of Events Scale (IES) for 
adults (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). It is designed to screen children at risk 
of PTSD. The CRIES-8 correlated well with the original IES (r=0.95, p<0.01) and 
with the number of DSM PTSD symptoms present in a sample of traumatised 
adolescents (r=0.69, p<0.01) (Yule, 1997).  
 
The CRIES-8 consists of eight items, four which constitute an intrusion subscale and 
four which constitute an avoidance subscale. The intrusion subscale assesses the 
frequency and range of intrusions associated with the event and the avoidance 
subscale assesses efforts to suppress thoughts and memories of the event. 
 
Participants can tick ‘not at all’, ‘rarely’ ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ for each item of the 
CRIES-8 and a score of 0, 1, 3 or 5 is applied accordingly, with larger scores for each 




Williams and Moulds (2010) modified the IES for their study so that responses were 
anchored specifically to the intrusive memory identified by the participant. This study 
followed the same process with the CRIES-8. Participants are asked to check each 
item on the table indicating how frequently the comments were true for them 
regarding their identified memory in the last week or so. 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for the administration of this scale was acceptable at 0.62.  
 
2.4.1.3 Children’s Response Styles Questionnaire (C-RSQ; Abela, Brozina, 
& Haigh, 2002). The C-RSQ is a 25-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the 
extent to which young people respond to feelings of sadness with rumination. The 
measure presents a series of reactions to depressive symptoms which map onto three 
subscales: Ruminative Response Subscale, Distractive Response Subscale, and 
Problem-Solving Response Subscale.  
 
The Ruminative Response subscale includes 13 items describing responses to 
depressed mood that are self–focused (e.g., “Think about how alone you feel”). The 
Distracting Response subscale includes seven items describing responses to 
depressed mood that divert the individual’s attention from his or her sad mood (e.g., 
“Watch TV or play video games so you don’t think about how sad you are”). Finally, 
the Problem-Solving subscale includes five items describing strategies to overcome a 
depressed mood (e.g., “Ask a friend/parent/teacher to help you solve your problem”) 
(Abela et al, 2002). For each item, children are asked to indicate how often they 
respond in this way when they are feeling sad (almost never = 0, sometimes = 1, often 
= 2, or almost always = 3). Higher scores on each subscale indicate a greater 
tendency to engage in that particular response style. 
 
Moderate internal consistency is reported for the CRSQ (Abela, et al. 2002). Abela, 




 graders (average 
ages; 8 years 3 months and 12 years, 4 months respectively) report test-retest 
reliability over a four week interval for the three subscales; Rumination (r=0.55, p 
.001), Distraction (r =0.67, p .001) and Problem-Solving (r =0.61, p  .001). The 
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CRSQ has also been shown to positively correlate with depressive symptoms 
experienced by young people (Abela et al., 2004). 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for the administration of the rumination subscale of the CRSQ was 
good at 0.71. 
 
2.4.2 Experimental materials and measures. The experimental materials 
and measures used are detailed below. 
 
2.4.2.1 Pilot. Piloting was conducted prior to the start of the initial screening 
phase.  
 
Four non-clinical adults were initially recruited and consented to undertake the 
experimental protocol to assess preliminary feasibility. No changes to the procedure 
were made on the basis of this stage of piloting.  
 
12 young people from the range of academic year groups were recruited from the 
school used in the main study to pilot the procedure and ensure it was 
developmentally appropriate. As in the main study, consent was obtained from both 
parents and young people. Pilot participants were asked to identify a recent, negative 
intrusive memory before being trained to engage in a ruminative or concrete thinking 
style (using the induction procedures from Taylor et al, in prep). This heavy focus on 
negative personal experiences (identification of a negative intrusive memory and 
focus on a current personal problem in the induction procedure) appeared to elicit an 
unnecessary level of distress for some participants. Therefore, while Taylor et al used 
two imaginary scenarios and one personal situation as part of the induction 
procedure, this study wrote one more imaginary scenario and substituted this for the 
personal situation. 
 
The new scenario used the same format as the other two imaginary scenarios in terms 
of length, structure, and style, and similarly focused on a negative situation that was 
difficult to resolve. When the new scenario was used with pilot participants, ratings 
of their ability to imagine the three scenarios did not differ. Their scores on the VAS 
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mood and manipulation check measures administered after each scenario also did not 
significantly differ between scenarios. 
 
Because a number of the measures had been designed for use with adults, piloting 
also aimed to evaluate how developmentally appropriate they were. The adaptations 
made are outlined below. 
 
Instructions for the intrusive memory interview (Williams & Moulds, 2010) were 
adapted to simplify the language. For example, more examples of intrusive memories 
were provided, and words like ‘negative’ were replaced with phrases like ‘not 
particularly nice for you’. The adapted instructions were tested on the pilot 
participants and feedback from participants indicated that they understood the 
instructions. 
 
Feedback from pilot participants also suggested that the wording used alongside the 
visual analogue scales to evaluate the identified negative intrusive memory in 
Williams and Moulds (2010) was confusing. Thus during the main study when 
participants provided memory ratings they were asked to mark on a VAS scale ‘how 
upsetting they rated their memory’ and ‘how sad the memory made them feel’. 
Participants were additionally asked to mark on visual analogue scales how angry, 
afraid, guilty, numb and helpless their memory currently made them feel, both before 
and after the induction. A number of the pilot participants asked for a definition of 
‘numb’ and explained that they were not familiar with the concept. The scale 
measuring ‘numb’ was thus removed from the main study. 
 
Piloting also highlighted difficulties for some young people in generating an intrusive 
memory that had occurred in the last seven days, but could think of one that had 
occurred within the last few weeks. Therefore in the main study participants were 
asked to identify their most recent memory without giving a time frame, but they 
were asked to specify when it had occurred.  
 
2.4.2.2 Processing style inductions. Experimental processing style inductions 
were based on those used by Taylor et al (in prep); adapted from Watkins, Moberly 
and Moulds (2008). Amendments were based on pilot feedback as noted above. The 
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experimental script used to induce the thinking styles can be seen in Appendix 5. The 
rumination induction involved young people focusing on ‘Why’ questions in relation 
to three scenarios, whereas the Concrete condition involved a focus on ‘How’ 
questions. 
 
Once allocated to either the ruminative or concrete condition, participants were 
introduced to their allocated style of thinking. Their allocated thinking style was 
defined and examples of questions that might be asked in that mode of mind were 
provided.  Participants were then given instructions for the procedure. Young people 
were asked to listen to three scenarios and after each one to spend two minutes 
thinking about the scenario with the questions provided on a prompt card in mind. 
Young people were then asked to complete a number of visual analogue scales before 
being reminded of the task instructions, and read the next scenario. The same 
procedure was repeated for each of the three scenarios. 
 
The three scenarios involved the young person imagining themselves in situations 
that could not easily be resolved. The scenarios included the young person imagining 
that they were unable to get to an important social event, that they had lost a 
borrowed item, and that they had forgotten a piece of homework. The scenarios were 
the same in both thinking style induction procedures. 
 
In the analytic ruminative condition, participants were asked to focus on seven ‘why’ 
type questions outlined on a prompt card in relation to the scenario provided 
immediately before. ‘Why’ type questions focused on the causes, meanings and 
consequences of the scenario. 
 
In the concrete condition, the prompt cards contained seven ‘how’ type questions in 
relation to the scenario provided immediately before. ‘How’ questions focused on 
concrete and sensory details of the scenario.  Examples of the questions used in the 








 Type of questions used in inductions for the different processing modes 
Concrete ‘how’ questions Analytic ruminative ‘why’ questions 
How did this happen? Why did this happen to me? 
What did I notice? What are the consequences of this? 
What is the sequence of events leading 
up to this point? 
What will happen because of this? 
How can I understand this? What will others think of me? 
How can I fix this? What does this mean about me? 
What is the first step toward solving this 
problem? 
What have I done to deserve this? 




2.4.2.3 Visual analogue scales – mood ratings. Ratings of current mood were 
collected at six time points: at the start of the experimental procedure; once an 
intrusive memory had been provided; after each training scenario during the 
processing mode induction; after completion of the experimental procedure. Ratings 
were obtained using Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) that were 10cm in length and 
labelled ‘not at all sad’ and ‘very sad’ at the end points. Participants indicated their 
current mood level by placing a mark on each VAS. To quantify the measure, the 
location of the mark was measured in centimetres, yielding ratings ranging from 0 – 
10 with higher scores indicating higher levels of sadness. Anxiety ratings were 
obtained in a similar way following each training scenario, with the 10cm VAS scale 
end points labelled ‘not at all anxious’ and ‘very anxious’. 
 
2.4.2.4 Visual analogue scales – processing mode induction checks. In order 
to assess participants’ ability to engage in the designated processing style, and as a 
measure of compliance with task demands, participants were asked to rate ‘how able 
they were to think about the situation for two minutes?’, and ‘how much of the time 
they were using the questions on the card?’, following each induction scenario during 
56 
 
the processing mode induction period. These questions counted as the processing 
mode induction checks.  
 
To obtain further information about the processing style during the induction, 
participants were asked ‘were you always thinking about that specific situation or 
thinking about similar situations in the past?’ and ‘were you thinking in words or 
images?’. Participants were asked to indicate their answers by making a mark on a 
visual analogue scale. End points of the scales were labelled respectively ‘not at all 
able, very able’, ‘not at all, all of the time’, ‘always thinking of a past similar 
situation, always thinking of this situation’, and ‘always thinking in words, always 
thinking in images’. To quantify the measure, the location of the mark was measured 
in centimetres, yielding ratings ranging from 0 to 10. See Appendix 6 for the VAS 
given in the processing mode induction period following each scenario. If young 
people scored below five on either of the processing mode induction checks they 
were excluded. 
 
2.4.2.5 The Intrusive Memory Interview (Appendix 7). The version of the 
intrusive memory used in this study was based on Williams and Moulds (2010) 
which was in turn based on the original designed by Hackmann, Ehlers, Specken and 
Clark (2004).  
 
The intrusive memory interview is a semi-structured interview used to elicit 
participants’ subjective experience of a spontaneous negative memory. Adaptations 
were made as outlined in the pilot section (Section 2.4.2.1). The main adaptations 
involved making the language more developmentally appropriate and allowing a 
‘recent’ memory rather than one that occurred in the last seven days.  
 
In the interview, participants are asked to provide a very brief description of their 
own recent intrusive memory, and to provide temporal and frequency information 
about the memory and the event the memory is based on. On visual analogue scales, 
participants are then asked to provide information related to memory quality and 
experience (e.g. ‘How vivid was the memory?’). To quantify the measure, the location 




Participant’s brief memory descriptions were coded according to labels derived from 
Brewin, Hunter, Carroll, and Tata (1996). Brewin et al., (1996) classified 
spontaneous intrusive memories obtained from their depressed adult sample into four 
major categories; illness or death, work / finance, abuse / assault, and relationships / 
family. To make these categories developmentally appropriate for an adolescent 
sample the work / finance category was changed to academic / school. There were no 
memories reported that would fit in to the category of abuse / assault so this was left 
out.  To provide more detail, the illness / death category was split into self and others. 
Table 4 lists the codes and definitions used to code the memories in this study. The 
first and second researcher coded the memory descriptions separately. Out of 41 
memories, the researchers disagreed on the coding of one memory. After discussion a 
consensus was reached. 
 
Table 4 
Definitions of memory coding labels 
Coding label Definition 
1. Illness / injury to self Concerned with threat of, or actual, 
illness, injury or death to self 
2. Illness / injury / death to others Concerned with threat of, or actual, 
illness, injury or death to a significant 
other 
3. Interpersonal  Concerned with relationship, peer, or 
family problems 




2.4.2.6 Visual analogue scales – memory ratings (Appendix 8). Participants 
were asked to rate how sad the memory made them feel and how upsetting they 
would rate the memory. Participants made these evaluations before and after the 
induction procedure using visual analogue scales. Participants were also asked to 
mark on visual analogue scales how angry, afraid, guilty, and helpless their memory 




The end points of all the memory rating visual analogue scales ranged from ‘not at 
all’ to ‘very much’. To quantify the measure, the location of the mark was measured 
in centimetres, yielding ratings ranging from 0 to 10.  
 




The experimental session took roughly 45 – 50 minutes and is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Following a verbal explanation of the study, participants were invited to ask any 
questions and if willing to take part to sign the consent form. Participants then re-
completed the MFQ. Next, participants provided an initial mood rating on a VAS and 
completed the intrusive memory interview with the researcher. Participants then 
completed the CRIES in relation to the memory they had identified in the intrusive 
memory interview. Initial memory ratings were made using VAS. Participants also 
provided mood ratings using VAS at this stage.  
 
Depending on what condition the participant had been randomly assigned to, 
participants were then trained in either the analytical rumination processing style or 
the concrete processing style. Following each of the three scenarios and subsequent 
induction periods, participants completed visual analogue scales rating their mood, 
anxiety and ability to engage in the processing style induction. The induction 
procedure lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
 
After the induction procedure was complete participants were asked to recall the 
memory they had identified during the intrusive memory interview and to think about 
it for ten seconds. Participants then provided final memory and mood ratings using 
VAS. Participants completed the CRSQ individually and were fully de-briefed at the 




















































Verbal explanation of study, opportunity for questions, and signing of consent form 
MFQ 
VAS of sadness 
Intrusive memory interview 
CRIES 
Pre induction memory ratings 
VAS of sadness and happiness 
Introduction of allocated processing style 
Imaginary situation 1, VAS of induction check, sadness & anxiety 
Imaginary situation 2, VAS of induction check, sadness & anxiety 
Imaginary situation 3, VAS of induction check, sadness & anxiety 
Post induction memory ratings 






2.6 Data handling and analysis 
 
2.61 Data protection. Hard copies of participant data were anonymised and 
stored in a locked filing cabinet in the Institute of Psychiatry. All electronic data 
bases were password protected. 
 
2.62 Data cleaning. The main dependent variables analysed using ANOVAs 
(pre and post for each) were assessed for normality and homogeneity of variances 
using QQ plots, histograms and box plots. No serious violations were detected. All 
were slightly skewed but not seriously and the standard deviations were almost 
identical. 
 
2.63 Treatment of missing data. There were a number of cases were 
participants had missed one or two items on the MFQ (screening/experimental stage) 
or the CRSQ questionnaire measures. As there were no cases where there was more 
than 10% of data missing, missing data on the MFQ was replaced with the average 
score for each present item and missing data on the CRSQ was replaced with the 
average score for the present data of that particular subscale. 
 
2.64 Statistical Analysis. Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (RM 
ANOVA) was used to compare pre and post induction values of mood and memory 
ratings while controlling for baseline differences. Pearson correlations were used to 
look for associations between two variables during exploratory analysis. 
 
2.65 Significance levels and effect sizes. For the main hypotheses a 
significance level of p<0.05 was adopted. For more exploratory analyses such as 
correlations an alpha level of 0.01 was adopted to reduce the risk of obtaining false 
positives. However, due to the small sample size (n=41) results will still be reported 
where 0.01≤p≤0.05, but will be reported as trends and should be considered with 
caution. This study, with a sample size of 41, has 80% power to detect correlations of 
0.43 or larger at an alpha level of 0.05, and correlations of 0.5 or larger at an alpha 





3.1 Inspection of data. 
 
Visual inspection of QQ plots and histograms showed that the main dependent 
variables were slightly skewed but the skew was in the same direction and the 
standard deviations were not very different suggesting the variables should be robust 
against violations (Howell, 2002). 
 
3.2. Participant demographics.  
 
The mean average age of participants was 14.39 years (SD = 1.77), ranging from 12 
to 18 years. Comparable numbers of males and females completed the experimental 
tasks (21 males, 20 females). The mean MFQ score was 24.29 (SD = 6.88) and the 
mean score on the rumination subscale of the RSQ was 20.44 (SD = 6.04). 
 
Table 5 
Participant demographics   
 Mean SD Range 
Age 14.39 1.77 6 (12-18) 
MFQ score 24.29 6.88 27 (14-41) 
Baseline sadness
1 
3.65 2.30 8.5 (0-8.5) 
CRSQ Rumination subscale score 20.44 6.04 24 (8-32) 
Note. 
1
0=not at all sad, 10=very sad. 
 
3.3 Correlational relationships between age, depression symptoms and 
rumination. 
 
Pearson r correlations were examined between age and the main variables of 
depression, rumination, memory upset and memory sadness (table 6)
2
. This study 
found that depressive symptoms (MFQ score) was significantly correlated with 
participants’ age (in years) (r=0.53, p<0.01), with older adolescents rating their 
mood as worse. A positive trend was found between trait rumination (as measured by 
                                                          
2
 The role of age was examined in all other analyses but no significant effect was found 
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the rumination subscale on the CRSQ) and age (r=0.37, p<0.05). A positive trend 
also emerged between trait rumination and depressive symptoms (r=0.39, p<0.05), 
with a significant correlation being found between rumination and participant self-
rated mood (baseline sadness) (r=0.51, p<0.01).  
 
Table 6 
Age and main variables correlation matrix 
 Age 
Pearson’s r : p value 
MFQ score 0.53 : 0.00** 
Baseline sadness 0.51 : 0.00** 
CRSQ rumination subscale 0.37 : 0.02* 
Memory sadness
 
0.03 : 0.86 
Memory upset
 
0.19 : 0.91 
Note. * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
3.4 Experience and nature of the dysphoric adolescents’ memories. 
 
3.4.1 Intrusive memory experience. 73% of participants were able to 
identify a negative intrusive memory that they had experienced in the last week. A 
further 25% could identify a negative intrusive memory that they had experienced 
within the last month. 2% (n=1) identified a memory they had experienced about 
three months ago. On average participants had experienced their identified memory 
4.49 times in the past few weeks (SD: 4.57; Range: 0-20), thus an estimate of weekly 
occurrence was 1.5. 
 
3.4.2 Memory content. The majority of memories (83%) were coded in the 
categories of either ‘Illness / injury / death to others’ or ‘Interpersonal’. Table 7 
shows the number of participants whose memories were coded according to each of 







Number of memories coded into each category 
Category Frequency Percentage 
Illness / injury / death to self 4 9.8 
Illness / injury / death to others 17 41.5 
Interpersonal  17 41.5 
Academic /school  3 7.3 
Total: 41 100 
 
Examples of the memory descriptions provided by the adolescent sample can be seen 
in table 8.  The examples are organised within the coding categories. 
 
Table 8 




Illness / injury /  
death to self 
Illness / injury / 
death to others 
Interpersonal  Academic 
/school  
Example 1 “Brother pushed me 
down the stairs” 
“Finding Dad 
dead” 
“Mum and Dad 
arguing which led 





Example 2 “Having an adverse 
reaction and then a 
panic attack when 
taking my first 
migraine tablet ” 
“Sister being 
injured after a 
car crash” 
“Three weeks after 
breaking up with 
my boyfriend, my 
friends left me 
alone in school” 
“Mum saying I 





3.4.3 Emotional impact of memory. Asking participants to think about and 
briefly describe and rate a negative intrusive memory caused them on average to rate 
their mood as significantly lower compared to before they had provided the memory. 
The mean rating of sad mood was 3.65 (SD=2.30) prior to providing the memory and 




When providing their pre-induction memory ratings, participants were asked how 
they felt about their memory when they thought about it in relation to a number of 
different emotions. The strongest emotions participants reported experiencing about 
their identified memory were sadness and anger. Table 9 demonstrates how much of 
the particular emotions participants felt on average in relation to their memory. 
 
Table 9 
Memory Emotions  
Emotion Mean SD Range 
Sad 6.28 2.63 9.5 (0-9.5) 
Anger 5.55 3.18 10 (0-10) 
Afraid 4.76 3.10 9.5 (0-9.5) 
Guilt 4.09 3.47 10 (0-10) 
Helpless 4.91 3.35 9.5 (0-9.5) 
Note. 0 = not at all, 10 = very much. 
 
3.4.4 Memory qualities. Participants were asked about the qualities of their 
negative intrusive memory the last time they experienced it. The vividness, distress, 




Characteristic Mean SD Range 
Vividness* 7.13 1.92 7.5 (2.5-10) 
Distress** 6.66 2.28 8.5 (1.5-10) 
Reliving*** 4.73 3.57 10 (0-10) 
Note. *0=not at all vivid, 10=very vivid. **0=not at all distressing, 10=very much. ***0=clear it was 
just a memory from the past, 10=felt like it was happening again. 
 
3.4.5 Memory intrusion and avoidance. Correlations amongst participant 
mood, participant trait rumination, and the CRIES subscales were investigated. 
Analysis indicated that participant mood was not significantly correlated with the 
CRIES intrusion (r=0.04, p=0.79) or avoidance (r=0.02, p=0.89) subscales. This 
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suggests that the amount of intrusions participants experienced in relation to the 
particular memory they identified, and the extent to which they tried to avoid 
intrusions of their identified memory, was not significantly related to their mood. 
 
The CRIES avoidance subscale also did not correlate significantly with the CRSQ 
rumination subscale (r=0.17, p=0.28), however, correlational analysis suggests a 
positive trend between the CRIES intrusion subscale and the CRSQ rumination 
subscale (r=0.34, p<0.05). This could indicate that the more participants had a 
tendency to ruminate in everyday life, the greater their level of memory intrusiveness, 
or the greater level of memory intrusiveness, the more likely participants were to 
ruminate. In this sample, however, having a general tendency to ruminate and 
participants’ avoidance of their intrusive memories did not appear to be related.  
 
Memory intrusiveness (as measured on the CRIES intrusion subscale) was 
additionally significantly correlated with how sad the participants felt about their 
memory (r=0.59, p<0.01). How sad the participants felt about their memory was 
significantly correlated with trait rumination (r=0.41, p<0.01). 
 
3.5 The impact of inducing rumination and concrete thinking on the experience 
of an intrusive memory.  
 
Sections 3.5.1 – 3.5.3 consider the characteristics of the two condition groups to 
ensure no other group differences could account for any significant findings when the 
hypotheses for this study are tested in section 3.5.5. Section 3.5.4 considers the effect 
of the induction procedure on the two groups. 
 
3.5.1 Participant characteristics. An independent sample t-test was 
conducted to determine if there were significant differences in participant age 
between the experimental conditions. The t test revealed no significant difference 
(t[39]=-0.70, p=0.49).  
 
Chi square analysis was conducted to determine if there was a significant difference 
in gender between the conditions. Again no significant difference was found 
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(Fisher’s exact test: p=0.76). Table 11 summarises participant’s age and gender 
characteristics across condition. 
 
Table 11 
Age (years) and gender distribution of participants across conditions 
 Condition    
 Rumination Concrete Test 
Statistic 
p 
Age        Mean (SD) 14.22 (1.45) 14.61 (2.15) -0.70 0.49 
Gender   Male:Female n (%) 11(27):12(29)  10 (24):8(20)  0.76 
 
 
3.5.2 Memory characteristics. Statistical tests were run to determine whether 
memory characteristics (including memory content, memory qualities, and effect of 
memory on mood) differed significantly across conditions. 
 
3.5.2.1 Memory content across conditions. An Exact Chi square test was 
conducted which is a permutation of the Chi square test and which does not hold the 
assumption that no cells have frequencies lower than 5. The analysis indicates that 
the two condition groups do differ significantly in terms of memory content (Fisher’s 
exact test: p=0.009). Table 12 demonstrates the distribution of the memory content 















Memory content between conditions 








Illness / injury / death to self 0 0 4 22.2 
Illness / injury / death to others 11 47.8 6 33.3 
Interpersonal  12 52.2 5 27.8 
School / academic  0 0 3 16.7 
         Total: 23 100 18 100 
 
3.5.2.2 Memory qualities across conditions. Independent t tests were 
conducted to determine whether there were any significant differences between the 
conditions in terms of the memory qualities. Table 13 demonstrates that the t tests 
revealed no significant differences in memory qualities across the conditions.  
 
Table 13 
Distribution of participant’s memory qualities across conditions 










CRIES Total score 16.82 (3.66) 15.11 (4.71) 1.31 0.20 
Memory frequency* 5.30 (5.64) 3.44 (2.43) 1.30 0.20 
Memory time** 14.70 (30.78) 7.28 (7.51) 1.00 0.33 
Event time*** 48.15 (50.53) 32.83 (27.62) 1.16 0.26 
Vividness**** 7.04 (2.01) 7.25 (1.85) -0.34 0.74 
Reliving level***** 4.77 (3.57) 4.69 (3.68) 0.06 0.95 
Note.
 1
 df for all t tests = 39. *number of times experienced memory in past few weeks. **last time 
experienced the memory (in days). ***how long ago the event the memory was based on occurred (in 
months). ****0=not at all vivid, 10=very vivid. *****0=clear it was just a memory from the past, 




3.5.2.3 Effect of memory on mood across conditions. Asking participants to 
think about and briefly describe and rate a negative intrusive memory caused them on 
average to rate their mood as significantly lower compared to before they had 
provided the memory. Independent t tests revealed that there were no significant 
differences between participants assigned to the rumination condition and 
participants assigned to the concrete condition at either of these mood rating time 
points (t[39]=-0.73, p=0.47; t[39]=-0.77, p=0.45).  
 
3.5.3 Depression status and trait rumination. In order to investigate 
differences between the participants allocated to the two experimental conditions on 
factors that could influence performance on the experimental tasks (baseline mood 
and natural tendency to ruminate) independent t-tests were conducted on MFQ, base-
line level of sadness, and CRSQ rumination subscale scores. Table 14 demonstrates 
the distribution of participant’s scores on these measures and the results of the t tests. 
No significant differences between the conditions on these measures were found. 
 
Table 14 
Distribution of participant’s baseline mood and natural tendency to ruminate across 
conditions 








MFQ score 23.22 (6.69) 25.67 (7.06) -1.14 0.26 
Baseline level of self-
rated sadness* 
3.41 (2.25) 3.94 (2.39) -0.73 0.47 
CRSQ Rumination 
subscale score 
20.22 (5.88) 20.72 (6.40) -0.26 0.79 
Note.
 1
 df for all t tests = 39.  *0=not at all sad, 10=very sad 
 
3.5.4 Induction procedure. To investigate the differential effect of the 
induction conditions on the participants, independent t-tests were conducted on the 
average score across the three scenarios for each of the induction VAS ratings 
provided in the induction training period. Table 15 demonstrates participants mean 
scores per VAS scale across condition and the results of the t tests. The scores which 
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Mean VAS ratings during the induction training period across conditions 








Sadness rating* 5.31 (1.71) 4.49 (2.17) 1.36 0.18 
Anxiety rating** 6.30 (1.88) 5.89 (2.23) 0.65 0.52 
How able to think*** 7.47 (1.34) 7.07 (1.17) 0.99 0.33 
Question use**** 7.10 (1.22) 6.24 (0.90) 2.51 0.02 
Specific vs past***** 4.60 (1.09) 5.57 (1.29) -2.62 0.01 
Words vs images****** 6.99 (1.78) 7.57 (1.81) -1.03 0.31 
Note.
1
 df for all t tests = 39. *0=not at all sad, 10=very sad. **0=not at all anxious, 10=very anxious. 
***0=not at all able to think of the situation for 2 minutes, 10=very able. ****0=thinking about the 
situation using the questions none of the time, 10=all of the time. *****0=always thinking about 
similar past situation, 10=always thinking about this situation. ******0=always thinking in words, 
10=always thinking in images. 
 
3.5.4.1 Mood ratings across conditions. Although the mean VAS sadness 
ratings were higher in the rumination condition compared to the concrete condition 
during the induction training period, this difference did not reach significance 
(t[39]=1.36, p=0.18). Participant’s anxiety ratings were also not significantly 
different across conditions during the induction training period (t[39]=0.65, p=0.52). 
 
3.5.4.2 Participant’s ratings on the processing mode VASs across 
conditions. There was no significant difference across conditions on the first 
processing mode induction check in terms of how able participants were to think 
about the situation for two minutes (t[39]=0.99, p=0.33). There was a trend towards 
a significant difference between conditions on the second processing mode induction 
check, as participants in the rumination condition used the questions on the card for 




Participants in the rumination condition were also significantly more likely to think 
about a similar situation in the past rather than the specific situation provided in the 
induction training period, compared to participant’s in the concrete condition 
(t[39]=-2.62, p≤ 0.01).  
 
Participants in the concrete condition were more likely to think in images rather than 
words compared to those in the rumination condition, however, this difference did 
not reach significance (t[39]=-1.03, p=0.31) 
 
3.5.5 Testing the hypotheses in relation to the impact of rumination on the 
experience of intrusive memories. 
 
3.5.5.1 Hypothesis 1.  It was hypothesised that participants in the rumination 
condition would show an increase in how upsetting they rated their intrusive memory 
pre and post the induction compared to those in the concrete condition. A 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with condition (concrete, rumination) as a between 
subjects variable and time (pre, post) as a within subjects variable was conducted to 
determine if there were significant differences in upset memory ratings. The main 
effect for time (F [1,39] = 5.45,  p<0.05) was significant. The main effect for 
condition (F [1,39] = 0.08, p = 0.77) was not significant. The time x condition 
interaction was not significant (F [1,39] = 0.01, p = 0.92).  These results suggest that 
while participants in both conditions felt significantly more upset by their memory 
after the induction compared to before, the condition the participants were in did not 
make a difference. The mean upset memory ratings are shown in table16. Figure 4 
graphically demonstrates the results of the ANOVA. 
 
Table 16 






Condition Time point Mean (SD) 
Rumination Pre 6.43 (2.66) 
 Post 7.20 (2.22) 
Concrete Pre 6.25 (3.30) 




Figure 4. Memory upsetting rating change over time between conditions. This line 
graph demonstrates the non-significant interaction between time and condition on 
participant’s memory upsetting ratings pre and post induction. 
 
 
3.5.5.2 Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesised that participants in the rumination 
condition would show an increase in how sad their intrusive memory made them feel 
pre and post the induction compared to those in the concrete condition. A 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with condition (concrete, rumination) as a between 
subjects variable and time (pre, post) as a within subjects variable was conducted to 
determine if there were significant differences in sadness memory ratings. The main 
effects for time (F [1,39] = 0.24, p = 0.63) and condition (F [1,39] = 0.38, p = 0.54) 
were not significant. The time x condition interaction was not also significant (F 
[1,39] = 0.98, p = 0.33).  Table 17 shows the mean sadness memory ratings before 
and after the inductions between conditions. Although there was no significant 
difference between the conditions regarding how sad participants rated their memory 
making them feel, the rumination mean scores increased and the concrete mean 
scores decreased which are the directions which were hypothesised. Figure 5 

































Figure 5. Memory sadness rating change over time between conditions. This line 
graph demonstrates the non-significant interaction between time and condition on 
participant’s memory sadness ratings pre and post induction. 
 
Age was entered as a covariate in this repeated measures ANOVA to investigate 
possible developmental aspects but this revealed no significant effect (F [1,38]=0.96, 
p=0.33). 
 
3.5.5.3 Hypothesis 3. It was hypothesised that participant mood would get 
worse from pre to post induction in both conditions. A 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with condition (concrete, rumination) as a between subjects variable and 
time (pre, post) as a within subjects variable was conducted to determine if there 












Pre memory sadness rating Post memory sadness rating
Rumination
Concrete
Condition Time point Mean (SD) 
Rumination Pre 5.98 (2.54) 
 Post 6.30 (2.29) 
Concrete Pre 6.67 (2.78) 
 Post 6.56 (2.52) 
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not significant (F [1,39] = 1.52, p = 0.40) suggesting that participants, regardless of 
their condition, did not experience a decrease in their mood over time. The main 
effect for condition was not significant (F [1,39] = 0.64, p = 0.43) and nor was the 
time x condition interaction (F [1,39] = 0.03, p = 0.87).  The results of the ANOVA 
are graphically demonstrated in figure 6. Table 18 shows the mean mood ratings in 
each condition pre and post induction.  
 
Table 18 










Figure 6.  Mood change over time between conditions. This line graph demonstrates 
the non-significant interaction between time and condition on participant’s sad mood 
pre and post induction ratings. 
 
3.5.5.4 Hypothesis 4. If there were significant differences in participant 












Pre mood rating Post mood rating
Rumination
Concrete
Condition Time point Mean (SD) 
Rumination Pre 4.76 (2.29) 
 Post 5.17 (2.61) 
Concrete Pre 5.33 (2.59) 
 Post 4.47 (3.04) 
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that this effect would not be entirely accounted for by the effect of the inductions on 
participant mood. As there were no significant differences in terms of memory 
ratings pre to post induction for the different conditions, however, there is no need to 





























4.1 Overview of the chapter 
 
This study increases our understanding of the experience of intrusive memories in 
adolescent depression, and considers the impact of cognitive processing styles on this 
experience. This chapter discusses relevant methodological issues, summarises the 
findings and considers these in the context of other research, suggests potential 
clinical implications, and outlines ideas for future research in the area. 
 
4.2. Summary of current study 
 
This study aimed to recruit dysphoric adolescents to gain insight into the experience 
and nature of intrusive memories in adolescent depression, and to determine the 
extent to which processing style affected this experience. This was done by selecting 
students from a London secondary school and sixth form who scored in the upper 
quartile on a measure of depressive symptoms for their year group. All participants 
were asked about a recent negative intrusive memory they had experienced and were 
asked to provide details about the nature and quality of their memory. Experimental 
inductions were then used to compare the effect of two different processing styles 
(rumination vs concrete thinking) on how participants emotionally evaluated their 
memory. Additional information from VAS scales and self-report questionnaires was 
also obtained. A between subjects, repeated measures design was used and RM 
ANOVAs were conducted to determine any significant effects of processing style on 
intrusive memory experience.   
 
4.3 Overview of the findings 
 
This study was one of very few to explore the experience of negative intrusive 
memories in adolescent depression. Analysis of the responses provided by the 
dysphoric adolescent participants to the Intrusive Memory Interview revealed that 
they were able to generate a recent, negative, intrusive memory. The majority of 
participants had experienced such a memory within the last week and had 
experienced this memory a number of times over the past few weeks. The memories 
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they described mainly concerned threat of, or actual, death, injury or illness to a close 
other, or interpersonal problems. The memories were experienced as vivid and 
distressing and with a relatively high sense of reliving. The emotions participants 
most experienced in relation to their memories were sadness and anger. 
 
Correlational analysis of sample characteristics revealed that the older the adolescent, 
the worse their mood.  There were positive trends between trait rumination and both 
participant mood and age. It is particularly relevant to this study that a trend was 
found between the extent to which participants experienced intrusions of their 
memories (as measured by the CRIES intrusion subscale) and participant trait 
rumination. 
 
In the final stage of the study, it was hypothesised that participants induced to think 
in a ruminative style would experience their intrusive memory as more distressing 
compared to engaging in a concrete thinking style, over and above any changes in 
mood.  
 
Analysis revealed that after completing the induction procedure participants rated 
their memory as more upsetting than prior to the induction, however, there was no 
difference between the rumination or concrete groups. In terms of participants rating 
how sad they felt in response to the memory, there was no significant difference in 
these ratings over time (pre to post induction) or between conditions. There was also 
no significant difference in participants’ mood over time or between conditions 
suggesting the inductions did not have an effect on mood. 
 
4.4. Methodological limitations and considerations 
 
4.4.1 Sample size and characteristics. Statistical calculations based on 
findings from Williams and Moulds (2010) suggested that only 4 participants per 
group were required to give sufficient power to find a significant effect. This was due 
to the very big effect size obtained by Williams and Moulds (2010). Given that our 
study, however, was the first of its kind with young people a more conservative target 
of 20 participants per group was aimed for. It should be noted, however, that whilst 
employing a similar design there were differences between Williams and Moulds 
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(2010) and our study in terms of the participant population and the specific 
inductions used. It therefore remains a possibility that our study could have been 
underpowered to detect an effect and a type 2 error may have occurred.  
 
36 participants were excluded after the experimental stage of this study due to either 
scoring too low on the induction manipulation checks or due to instability of MFQ 
scores across the two completion times. While this was a significant loss of numbers, 
the stringent exclusion criteria benefited the study as data from participants was only 
used if the participant demonstrated dysphoria over a period of time and did engage 
properly with the induction material. 
 
The conclusions drawn from this study may be limited by the presence of sampling 
biases. At the screening stage participants with an ID were excluded due to the skills 
needed to complete the experimental procedure independently. This, however, makes 
the sample less representative of the general adolescent population and also means a 
group of people who are actually more likely to experience depression were excluded 
(e.g. Linna et al., 1999). The screening stage was also only completed by those 
adolescents who were present in registration on the mornings screening took place. 
This means the sample may have been biased towards adolescents who attended 
school and were on time. Given that education attendance is negatively associated 
with depression, and school attendance is associated with other correlates of 
depression such as family structure and income (Fletcher, 2008), exclusion of this 
group is a limitation. 
 
In addition to the nonattendance which was counted as students opting out, there 
were also student and parent opt outs at each stage. Although there is no way of 
knowing the reasoning behind these opt outs, there was no significant difference in 
MFQ score between those who did and did not opt to participate at the experimental 
stage suggesting the presence of particularly low mood or depression was not a 
reason. 
 
An advantage of this study in comparison to many other school based studies is that 
an opt-out procedure was used. When opt-in procedures are used, parents who 
provide written consent tend to represent a more socially advantaged group 
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(Anderman et al., 1995). Therefore the use of the opt out procedure in this study may 
have increased the representativeness of the sample. 
 
This study used a broad age range of young people (12 – 18 years) in order to 
research the period of adolescence where there is a significant increase in the 
incidence of depression. There is the possibility this could have influenced 
engagement and therefore exclusion. For example, given that rumination appears to 
become more habitual throughout adolescence, induction procedures which are 
sufficient for older adolescents may not be for younger adolescents. If this had been 
the case age effects would have been expected when analysing the data from the 
likert scales administered during the induction, but this was not the case. It could also 
have been that younger adolescents found it harder to concentrate but again this was 
not indicated on the induction likert scales. 
 
4.4.2 Use of an analogue sample. This study aimed to explore the experience 
and nature of intrusive memories in adolescent depression as well as investigating the 
impact of a ruminative thinking style on the experience of intrusive memories in 
adolescent depression. A clinically depressed sample, however, was not used 
meaning it is important to consider to what extent our findings can be generalised to a 
depressed sample. Participants who did not score in the upper quartile at two time 
points were excluded meaning the sample is more likely to represent adolescents with 
persistent sub threshold depressive symptoms rather than adolescents with temporary 
low mood. Given that increasing levels of depressive symptoms are associated with 
an increasing incidence of major depression (e.g. Lewinsohn, Solomon, Seeley & 
Zeiss, 2000) a high dysphoric sample are appropriate and important to study given 
their risk of developing depression. 
 
4.4.3 Ethical issues associated with using a dysphoric sample. This study 
required some important ethical issues to be considered. While this study did not use 
a clinical sample, many of the young people scored above the suggested threshold for 
likely depression on the MFQ. This therefore raises issues about the acceptability of 
asking the participants to partake in exercises that have the potential to lower mood 
(either by asking about an intrusive memory, or inducing a ruminative processing 
mode). Participants were notified before providing consent that they would be 
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required to think about sad or upsetting topics, and there was no obligation for them 
to take part. When conducting research with children under the age of 16 it is also 
important to gain parental consent. While our opt out procedure meant there was the 
possibility parents might not read the information sheet and thus unintentionally give 
consent by not replying, this possibility was minimised by posting information sheets 
to the parents’ home addresses. At the end of the experimental procedure participants 
were fully debriefed. During debriefing participants were all exposed to the concrete 
processing style and informed about the potential positive effects of concrete thinking 
on mood. Participants were not released back to class until they felt ready and the 
researcher engaged them in general conversation to facilitate this. A positive mood 
induction may have been the most appropriate technique to use at this stage and 
should perhaps be used in any future similar research. Participants who were 
identified as low in mood or at risk during the experimental procedure were offered 
extra help via the school or a local CAMHS service. It is likely a number of these 
young people would not have been identified for extra support had they not taken part 
in this study. 
 
4.4.4 Use of an upper quartile. This study only recruited participants for the 
experimental stage who fell in the upper quartile for their year group in terms of their 
MFQ score. This means that the data exploring the experience and nature of the 
intrusive memories is limited insofar as it is unclear how this data would compare to 
a non-dysphoric sample. It may be for example that significant correlations would 
have been found between mood and certain memory characteristics if participants 
with a range of dysphoria levels had been used, rather than only those participants 
who all scored high on a measure of depressive symptoms. It would be interesting for 
future studies to replicate this study with an upper and lower quartile group. 
 
4.4.5 Measurement of intrusive memories and their characteristics. The 
intrusive memory for each participant was identified using the intrusive memory 
interview. As found during piloting, the adolescent participants all appeared to 
understand the concept of an intrusive memory well when read the intrusive memory 
interview instructions, and the majority of participants easily identified an example. 
Although a small number of participants expressed reluctance to give many details 
about the content of their memory, all were happy to provide ratings about the nature 
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and experience of the memory.  It is therefore likely that the intrusive memory data 
provided by participants is representative of their experience.  
 
The use of a repeated measures design where participants rated the emotional impact 
of their memory at two time points could have been problematic as it may be that 
participants remembered their previous answer and re-provided that rather than truly 
thinking about how the memory was making them feel at the post time point. The use 
of VAS scales only with end points (rather than number markers all the way along) 
aimed to reduce the likelihood of this as it seems probable that participants would be 
more likely to remember an exact number than a point on a line. There is also the 
possibility that demand effects occurred whereby participants provided scores on the 
basis of what they expected the experimenter wanted. Debriefing at the end of the 
procedure, however, indicated that participants were not aware of the experimental 
hypotheses.  
 
4.4.6 Effectiveness of experimental processing style induction. The 
effectiveness of the inductions was measured using two VAS manipulation checks as 
described in the methodology. Participants who scored less that 50% on either 
manipulation check were excluded making the study methodologically rigorous. 
There is the possibility, however, that demand effects occurred and participants 
believed they should say they had been using the questions on the card or had been 
thinking about the scenario for a high proportion of time, despite not having done so. 
This, however, was not identified in debriefing, and a relatively large proportion of 
participants were excluded due to scoring below 50% on at least one of the 
manipulation checks suggesting participants were not concerned about providing low 
ratings on these measures. Four other VAS ratings were taken alongside the 
manipulation checks to help gain insight into the effect the induction was having on 
the way participants were thinking and feeling.  
 
To help track the effect of the inductions on participant mood two of the VASs 
measured the self -reported effects of each induction on sad mood and anxiety. The 
fact that no significant difference was found between the two conditions in terms of 
mean mood or anxiety ratings is consistent with past studies suggesting concrete 
thinking does not improve mood in relation to rumination in the short term (e.g. 
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Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Moberly & Watkins, 2006). 
However, previous studies using similar methodologies to this study with adolescents 
(Taylor et al, in prep; Leigh et al, in prep b) found sad mood in both conditions to 
worsen following the inductions.  These studies both used hypothetical and personal 
scenarios during the induction procedure whereas this study only used hypothetical 
scenarios.  It is possible that it was the focus on personally relevant material that 
resulted in mood deterioration in the previous studies. On the other hand the mood 
findings from studies using hypothetical scenarios to aid induction of thinking styles 
have been mixed. Using hypothetical scenarios to induce concrete and analytical 
thinking, Watkins, Moberly and Moulds (2008) did find an increase in despondency 
over time whereas Moberly and Watkins (2006) found no difference in positive affect 
and a reduction in negative affect over time (with no difference between conditions). 
 
To determine how well participants were engaging in the induction procedure they 
were asked to complete a VAS indicating how much time they spent thinking about 
the scenarios (manipulation check 1). There were no significant differences between 
the concrete and rumination conditions on this VAS suggesting participants in both 
conditions equally attempted to think about the scenarios and engage with the task. 
 
To assess how well participants were able to engage in the processing style allocated, 
a VAS was employed for participants to indicate how much time they were using the 
questions on the card (manipulation check 2). The fact that there was a trend towards 
participants in the concrete condition spending less time using the questions on the 
card is consistent with the idea that people may find it harder to engage in a thinking 
style which is not naturally their own. For our dysphoric sample, many of whom 
scored high in trait rumination (see section 4.5.1), it would be expected that it would 
be hard to keep thinking about a situation in a concrete way.  
 
A further VAS was employed to determine whether participants were more likely to 
think about the exact situation provided by the scenario or a similar situation from 
their past. Compared to participants in the concrete condition, participants in the 
rumination condition were significantly more likely to think about similar past 
situations rather than the exact situation provided. This is consistent with the idea that 
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rumination involves people using past negative experiences to think about their 
current experience.  
 
Another VAS was used to assess whether participants were more likely to use images 
or words when thinking about the scenarios in the induction procedure. Surprisingly 
there was not a significant different between conditions in terms of which participants 
were more likely to think in images. Participants in the concrete condition being more 
likely to think in images would be consistent with the idea that reduced concreteness 
when worrying allows avoidance of aversive imagery (Stöber, Tepperwien & Staak, 
2000; Borkovec, 1994).  
 
Overall the VAS induction findings suggest that participants in both conditions were 
able to engage adequately in the induction procedure and that the induction procedure 
was supporting participants to engage in either a ruminative or concrete way as 
intended. It is surprising, however, that the participants did not think more in images 
when induced to think in a concrete way compared to a ruminative way. Despite 
having rigorous manipulation checks our procedure could perhaps benefit from 
further manipulation checks which assess the extent to which participants say they 
thought in an abstract or concrete way. For example many of the adult rumination 
induction studies have used procedures similar to Williams and Moulds (2010) who 
asked participants to rate how focused they were on themselves and how much they 
were thinking in an abstract way, on VAS scales, when using a distraction vs 
rumination design. Rating if they are thinking in an abstract or concrete way, 
however, may be difficult for adolescents who are unlikely to have a clear 
understanding of these concepts. 
 
A further limitation of the induction procedure is that while engagement with the 
allocated thinking style was measured during the induction procedure, it was not 
measured while the post memory ratings were being provided. There is the possibility 
that participants stopped thinking in their allocated style while being asked to think 
about and re-rate their memory and reverted back to their usual style of processing. It 
would, however, have been practically difficult to include assessment of processing 
style while the post memory ratings were being provided.  One potential way to judge 
the processing style at the time of the post ratings could have been to ask participants 
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to record, retrospectively, their type of thinking (concrete vs abstract) on another 
manipulation check. Alternatively it might have been better to ask participants to 
directly ruminate or concrete think about their memory rather than relying on the 
induced processing mode to persist. The rationale for not doing this is outlined in 
section 4.5.3.3.5. 
 
4.5 Discussion of the results 
 
Information gained from self-report questionnaires concerning participants’ 
depressive symptoms, trait rumination and intrusive memories is considered. Each 
research aim is then discussed in turn in the context of the relevant hypotheses. 
 
 4.5.1 Self report questionnaire data concerning depressive symptoms, 
rumination and intrusive memories. There was a significant relationship between 
age and self-reported depressive symptoms in this study with older children 
experiencing more depressive symptoms than younger children. This is consistent 
with Meiser-Stedman et al. (2012) who found a trend towards a significant 
relationship between age group and depressive symptoms (as measured using the 
Birleson Depression Self-Rating Scale) in a school sample aged 11 to 18 years. Our 
study also found a trend between trait rumination and age with older children being 
more likely to have a trait ruminative style compared to younger children. This is 
consistent with Leigh et al. (in prep a) who found trait rumination as measured by the 
CRSQ to increase with age in a school sample aged 11 to 15 years.  
 
The elevated levels of trait rumination in our sample (mean age = 14.39) is 
demonstrated by a mean of 20.44 on the CRSQ rumination subscale which is 
considerably higher than for non-clinical adolescent samples using the same measure 
(e.g. McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) and Verstraeten, Vasey, Raes & 
Bijttebier (2009)). Leigh et al. (in prep a) found a mean rumination subscale score on 
the CRSQ of 8.54 in a non-clinical sample with an average age of 13.3 years. Their 
average score increased to 15.3 for those scoring 21-28 on the MFQ, and to 21.5 for 
those scoring above 29 on the MFQ. The average MFQ score in our study was 24.29 
meaning our results are relatively consistent with Leigh et al. (in prep a) whose 
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participants were slightly younger. Rumination thus appears to be a response style 
elevated in dysphoric adolescent samples.  
 
This study found a positive trend between depressive symptoms and trait rumination. 
This is consistent with the growing cross sectional and longitudinal questionnaire 
evidence pointing to a tendency to ruminate being a vulnerability and maintenance 
factor in depression (see section 1.3.3).  
 
Despite being unable to determine causation, the significant correlations and trends 
found between the CRIES intrusion subscale score, the CRSQ rumination subscale 
score, and how sad the memories were rated is consistent with the idea that 
rumination is an unsuccessful emotion regulation strategy. As in PTSD (see section 
1.5.1), depressed individuals may avoid processing emotionally difficult events by 
ruminating about them but then the distress associated with the event will continue 
when intrusive memories of the life event occur, and this may maintain depression. 
These correlations would need to be tested with a larger sample size and regression 
analyses in future studies for any firm conclusions to be drawn. 
 
4.5.2 The experience and nature of intrusive memories in a dysphoric 
adolescent sample. Exploratory in nature, the first aim of this study was to 
investigate the frequency, content, qualities, emotional impact, and the intrusion and 
avoidance characteristics of the intrusive memories provided the by the dysphoric 
adolescent sample. 
 
4.5.2.1 Occurrence and frequency of intrusive memories. Our findings 
reveal that the dysphoric adolescents in our sample were all able to generate a 
negative intrusive memory and the vast majority (73%) could identify one that had 
occurred in the last week. This is in line with Meiser-Stedman et al. (2012) who 
found that in an adolescent school sample intrusive memories were a relatively 
common phenomena. It is also consistent with the adult literature. Starr and Moulds 
(2006) found that 83% of their undergraduate participants reported an intrusive 
memory of an unpleasant event within the last seven days, and Williams and Moulds 
(2007a) found 60% of their undergraduate sample reported a negative unpleasant 
memory within the last week.  Reynolds and Brewin (1999) compared how many 
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people reported a negative intrusive memory in the last week in a depressed and 
PTSD adult sample. 73% of their depressed sample and 98% of the PTSD sample 
could report such a negative intrusive memory.  
 
The specific memory identified by participants in our study occurred on average 1.5 
times in one week. In their study with undergraduates Starr and Moulds (2006) found 
a mean frequency of 1.28 and in their depressed group, Reynolds and Brewin (1999) 
found an average of 1.1. In their adolescent sample Meiser-Stedman et al. (2012) 
found a mean of 1.15.  This suggests frequency is relatively consistent across the 
different samples used in the different studies. 
 
Taking our findings on the occurrence and frequency of negative intrusive memories 
together with similar studies with different populations, including depressed and non-
depressed samples of different ages, intrusive memories appear to be a common 
experience for the majority of adolescents and adults. Although there is some 
inconsistency in the literature (e.g. Meiser-Steadman et al., 2012), our finding that the 
occurrence/frequency of intrusive memories is not related to depressive symptoms is 
consistent with a number of other studies (e.g. Williams and Moulds, 2007a, Brewin 
et al.1996). Newby and Moulds (2011b) found a large proportion of individuals to 
report a negative intrusive memory regardless of their depression status (currently 
depressed, recovered depressed and never depressed), and found no significant 
difference in memory frequency between the three groups. Similarly Brewin et al. 
(1998) found that after controlling for baseline depression, intrusions did not predict 
depression symptoms at follow up. These findings support the idea that intrusive 
memories are a general feature of human memory rather than a symptom of particular 
psychological disorders (Bywaters, Andrade & Turpin, 2004). Looking to the PTSD 
literature, studies have suggested that presence and frequency of intrusive memories 
are poor predictors of PTSD symptoms prospectively (Newby & Moulds, 2011a). In 
both PTSD and depression there has been a move towards the idea that other memory 
characteristics rather than frequency may predict condition severity. 
 
4.5.2.2 Content of intrusive memories. The reported content of the memories 
provided by our dysphoric adolescent sample is very similar to the content of 
intrusive memories found in depressed adult research. Reynolds and Brewin (1999) 
86 
 
found that a depressed group of adult participants were more likely to report intrusive 
memories consisting of death, illness or injury to family members (40%), or 
interpersonal problems (35%), whereas participants with PTSD were more likely to 
report memories consisting of personal illness or injury (36%), or personal assault 
(36%). This is consistent with our findings where the majority of memories were 
either coded in the ‘illness/ injury/death to others’ (41.5%) or ‘interpersonal 
problems’ (41.5%) categories. No memories could be classified as personal assault or 
abuse in this study and thus the category was not used. This suggests that while 
PTSD intrusive memories tend to be focused on an event which indicated danger to 
the self, intrusive memories in depression are more relational in content.  
 
Intrusive memories are considered a common reaction to negative events (see 
Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) and the finding that interpersonal problems are 
one of the most common memory content in this study is consistent with the research 
on interpersonal negative life events as risk factors for depression (Hammen, 1991). 
Chronic, severe stressors that affect relationships are some of the most important risk 
factors for depression (Thapar et al., 2012) and resiliency findings particularly 
highlight the protective effects of good quality interpersonal relationships.  
 
On the other hand, Williams and Moulds (2007a; 2007b; 2010) who used 
undergraduate, non-clinical samples, found memories of interpersonal problems to be 
by far the most common suggesting intrusive memories in general are most likely to 
consist of interpersonal problems. In two studies which report memory content for 
depressed samples (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999; Patel et al. 2007) memories of 
illness/injury/death to another, along with interpersonal problems, were the most 
common, whereas they occurred much less in the undergraduate samples. One 
potential explanation for this is that memories concerning death/illness/injury to 
another may be more likely to be experienced by people who are/become depressed 
because environmental risk factors for depression include experiencing stressful life 
events of this kind (Birmaher et al. 1996). Interpersonal problems may be a more 
universal problem, differing via extent/impact rather than occurrence in depressed 




4.5.2.3 Intrusive memory qualities. If occurrence, frequency and content of 
intrusive memories can all be relatively similar between non depressed and depressed 
samples this suggests there may be something else about these memories that makes 
them significant in depression. More recent research has suggested this may be 
concerned with certain qualities of the memories (e.g. Williams and Moulds, 2007a).  
 
Previous adult research has found that PTSD and depressed patients both commonly 
report intrusive memories as being vivid, distressing, and as being accompanied by a 
sense of reliving the original experience (e.g. Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). This study 
found that the dysphoric adolescent participants gave an average vividness rating for 
their intrusive memory of 7.13 on the VAS rating scale where 0=not at all vivid and 
10=very vivid. On similar scales, Patel et al. (2007) found a vividness mean of 8.2 in 
their sample of depressed adult patients and Williams and Moulds (2007a) found a 
mean of 6.9 in their undergraduate sample. The adolescent dysphoric participants in 
this study provided an average memory distress rating of 6.66 on a VAS scale where 
0=not at all distressing and 10=very distressing.  In a similar pattern to the vividness 
ratings, other studies that have measured memory distress in a similar way and which 
have used depressed adult samples, found higher mean ratings; Reynolds and Brewin 
(1999) (7.9) and Patel et al. (2007) (7.9), whereas with an undergraduate sample 
Williams and Moulds (2007a) found a lower mean rating of 5.7. In terms of feeling 
like they were reliving the memory the dysphoric adolescent participants in this study 
gave a mean rating of 4.73 on a VAS where 0=clear it was just a memory from the 
past and 10=felt like it was happening again. Using a similar method Patel et al. 
(2007) found a mean rating for nowness (conceptually similar to reliving in this 
study) of 5.7 with their depressed sample and Williams and Moulds (2007a) found a 
mean rating of 4.7 with their undergraduate sample. 
 
Assuming a linear relationship between memory qualities and depressive symptoms it 
would make sense that the memory ratings of vividness, distress and reliving of our 
dysphoric sample fall somewhere between the two other types of samples (depressed 
and not depressed) which have provided ratings in other studies. Our study, when 
considered in the context of other research, does indicate that the greater these 
memory qualities the more depressive symptoms people experience. This is also 
supported by the fact that Newby and Moulds (2011b) found levels of distress and 
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vividness to be two memory qualities which distinguished their depressed, recovered 
and never depressed groups (with the depressed group recording the highest ratings 
and the non-depressed group the lowest ratings).  
 
Williams and Moulds (2007a) and Williams and Moulds (2007b) found significant 
correlations between dysphoria and intrusion related distress, and Williams and 
Moulds (2007a) found a significant correlation between dysphoria and nowness 
(independent of intrusion frequency). This study, however, did not find any 
significant correlations between ratings of memory vividness, distress, or reliving, 
and depressive symptoms. Williams and Moulds (2007a) and Williams and Moulds 
(2007b) both used undergraduate samples displaying a range of levels of dysphoria 
and thus it could be that a significant correlation would have been found between 
mood and memory qualities in our study had our sample not been confined to those 
scoring high on a measure of depressive symptoms. There is also the possibility that a 
medium or small correlation was present but our study did not have the power to 
detect it. 
 
Our study, like Meiser-Stedman et al. (2012), highlights the importance of memory 
qualities for adolescents experiencing intrusive memories. They found that intrusive 
memory frequency and memory quality (e.g. sensory based quality, fragmented 
structure) contributed to the on-going experience for young people of intrusive 
memories of a negative life event. Intrusive memory frequency and memory quality 
in their study also partially mediated the relationship between peri-event affect and 
depressive symptoms. 
 
4.5.2.4 Emotional impact of intrusive memories. Patel et al. (2007) found 
that the two main emotions associated with intrusions in their study, involving 
moderately to severely depressed adult patients, were anger and sadness. This study 
replicated these findings with dysphoric adolescents where sadness and anger were 
the strongest emotions associated with the intrusive negative memories provided. The 
average sadness memory rating score in this study was 6.28 and for anger was 5.55. 
Again these scores fall between the mean scores gained by Patel et al. (2007) whose 
depressed adult sample gave a mean memory sadness score of 8.7 and a mean 
memory anger score of 7.4, and Williams and Moulds (2007a) whose undergraduate 
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sample gave a mean memory sadness score of 5.2 and a mean memory anger score of 
3.5.  
 
Williams and Moulds (2007a) also considered memory emotion scores for a high 
dysphoric subsample in their study and they found that the memory emotions of 
sadness, helplessness, guilt and anger were all higher in the dysphoric subsample 
compared to the overall sample. The mean memory sadness score for the dysphoric 
subsample was 6.5 which is more consistent with the score found with the dysphoric 
sample in this study (6.28). Scores for helplessness (4.91 vs 5.5) and guilt (4.09 vs 
4.2) were relatively similar for our sample and Williams and Moulds (2007a) 
dysphoric subsample, although anger was higher in our sample (5.55 vs 3.8). Further 
supporting the idea that negative memory emotions may be stronger the more a 
person is experiencing depressive symptoms, Newby and Moulds (2011b) found that 
depressed participants reported higher ratings of negative emotions (specifically 
sadness and helplessness, and a trend for anger) for their intrusive memory compared 
with the never depressed group. 
 
Combined with other studies, this study suggests that on average the more strongly 
certain emotions are experienced in response to negative intrusive memories, the 
more depressive symptoms people experience. This study did not find any significant 
correlations between depressive symptoms and the strength of the different emotions 
experienced in relation to the intrusive memories but reasons for this may include 
lack of power and/or a lack of dysphoria range in participants. 
 
4.5.2.5 Summary of intrusive memory experience. In summary our findings, 
combined with results from other studies on negative intrusive memories, support the 
idea that intrusive memories are a common experience for all adolescents and adults 
and that intrusion occurrence, frequency, or content does not distinguish depressed, 
recovered, dysphoric and non-depressed samples, or adult and adolescent samples. 
Memory qualities and associated emotions may be the characteristics that help 
distinguish intrusive memories in general and intrusive memories associated with 




4.5.3 Effect of processing style on participant mood and memory ratings. 
The second aim of this study was to consider the impact of inducing rumination and 
concrete thinking on the experience of negative intrusive memories in a dysphoric 
adolescent sample.  
 
To explore the second aim it was important to consider whether the two groups 
(rumination and concrete), to which participants were allocated, differed in any 
characteristics which could have affected the outcome of the experimental procedure. 
Analysis showed that the two groups did not differ on a range of key variables. A 
significant difference was found for the memory content where the concrete group 
had examples of all four content categories whereas the rumination participants only 
reported memories from two of the categories. There is a possibility that different 
types of memories could respond differently to the cognitive processing styles. There 
is, however, no evidence to support this idea from other studies.  
 
4.5.3.1 Summary of hypotheses and findings. Listed below are summaries of 
each hypothesis and the relevant findings. 
 
4.5.3.1.1 Hypothesis one. The first hypothesis was that participants in the 
rumination condition would show an increase in how upsetting they rated their 
intrusive memory pre to post the induction, compared to those in the concrete 
condition. This study found that while participants rated their memory as more 
upsetting after completing the inductions compared to before, there was no 
significant difference between participants allocated to the rumination or concrete 
condition.  
 
4.5.3.1.2 Hypothesis two. The second hypothesis was that participants in the 
rumination condition would show an increase in how sad they felt about their 
memory pre to post the induction, compared to the concrete condition. This study 
found that participants did not rate feeling sadder about their memory from pre to 
post induction in either the rumination or concrete condition.  
 
4.5.3.1.3 Hypothesis three. The third hypothesis was that participants in both 
conditions would experience a decrease in mood from pre to post induction. This 
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study found that sad mood did not significantly change from pre to post induction in 
either the rumination or concrete condition. This non-significant effect over time is 
not consistent with the hypothesis. This finding suggests that the inductions did not 
have a significant effect on participant mood. 
 
4.5.3.1.4 Hypothesis four. The fourth hypothesis was that any difference in 
memory distress from pre to post induction between conditions would not be due to 
changes in mood alone. Given that no significant difference was found between 
conditions in terms of how upsetting or how sad participants rated their memories to 
be pre to post induction, there is no need to control for mood to determine if any 
effects are over and above any effect of condition on mood. 
 
 4.5.3.2 Discussion of effects over time. The fact that participants in both 
conditions rated their memory as significantly more upsetting after compared to 
before the inductions suggests that thinking about difficult hypothetical scenarios in 
general resulted in participants thinking their negative intrusive memory was more 
upsetting than previously. It might be expected that this was due to the inductions 
making participants generally feel sadder thus being more likely to negatively 
evaluate their memory. This study, however, found that sad mood did not change 
significantly over time for the participants.  
 
A different explanation may be a methodological one. After rating their memories 
participants were asked to think about a range of hypothetical scenarios including 
forgetting a piece of homework and losing a friend’s ipod, during the induction 
procedure. It might have been that when asked to return to and re-rate their memories 
(often consisting of very difficult content such as family members dying), they 
seemed comparably more upsetting. Interestingly there was no change in how sad 
participants rated their memory making them feel. This might be a product of the 
wording used demonstrating a difference between how participants objectively rated 
their memories and how they actually felt about them following comparisons. 
 
As mentioned, this study found that participant mood did not worsen from pre to post 




4.5.3.3. Discussion of effects between conditions. The fact that participants in 
the rumination condition did not rate their negative intrusive memory as more 
upsetting, or feel sadder about their memory, after the inductions compared to those 
in an alternative condition is in contrast to Williams and Mould’s (2010) findings 
with undergraduates. Potential explanations for our results not being consistent with 
the hypotheses or Williams and Moulds (2010) study are considered below. 
 
4.5.3.3.1 Effect of mood. Williams and Moulds (2010) compared rumination 
to a distraction condition whereas this study compared rumination to a concrete 
condition. Williams and Moulds (2010) found a large effect of their inductions on 
mood which is unsurprising given that non-self-focus (as in distraction) is the 
mechanism found to increase mood in the short term in dysphoric samples (Watkins 
& Teasdale, 2001). Williams and Moulds (2010), however, do not report controlling 
for mood in their analyses. It might therefore be that participants rated their memories 
as less distressing after induction in the distraction condition compared to the 
rumination condition because they felt generally happier. One reason our study failed 
to replicate the findings of Williams and Moulds (2010) could thus be because the 
use of a concrete condition rather than a distraction condition meant the inductions 
had no significant effect on mood.  
 
4.5.3.3.2 Differential effect of rumination on depression symptoms. While 
exploring the nature of trauma related rumination, Ehring, Szeimies, and Schaffrick, 
(2009) asked 83 healthy university students to watch a distressing video and then 
read through a thought transcript in either a ruminative, distraction, or concrete 
condition. Their study revealed no significant effects of condition on distress ratings 
of intrusive memories, in response to reminders of the video, after the manipulations. 
This was the case even though they did find participants in the distraction and 
concrete conditions to experience a significant decrease in negative mood pre to post 
manipulation, compared to the analytical thinking group whose mood ratings did not 
change significantly over time. The authors suggest it is possible that abstract 
ruminative thinking has different effects on different types of PTSD symptoms, in 
that it affects mood, but not intrusive memories. In line with the conclusion from this 
study, it is possible that our study has demonstrated that rumination does not affect 
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the emotional experience of intrusive memories in adolescent depression (even if it 
does affect other aspects of depression; see section 1.3.5 & 1.3.6). 
 
4.5.3.3.3 Insufficient power. The above explanations presume that processing 
style does not have a direct effect on the experience of negative intrusive memories in 
dysphoric samples. On the other hand it may be that there is an effect but this study 
did not detect it. As discussed in section 4.4.1 this study may have been 
underpowered. This study did, however, considerably increase the sample size 
required from the power calculation to account for this so lack of power is unlikely to 
be the only explanation. 
 
4.5.3.3.4 Developmental considerations. There is the possibility that William 
and Moulds’ (2010) effects would have remained had mood been controlled before. 
In this case it is important to consider why their study may have found an effect of 
condition on memory distress when this study did not. Williams and Moulds (2010) 
used an adult sample so it may be that that the impact of rumination on intrusive 
memories is different in adolescents.  
 
As mentioned in section 1.5.2.3, during adolescence regions of the brain undergo 
considerable structural change. These structural changes affect cognitive abilities 
such as working memory, selective attention, and problem solving, that rely on the 
functioning of particular brain regions where change occurs (Blakemore & 
Choudhury, 2006). Many of these cognitive abilities are likely to be important in 
terms of the thinking styles adolescents adopt (e.g. Wilkinson & Goodyer, 2006). 
Therefore it cannot be assumed that rumination will operate in the same way and 
have the same consequences in adolescents as it is found to do in adults. Given this 
study’s results regarding the characteristics of intrusive memories in a dysphoric 
adolescent sample, it is clear that adolescents do experience intrusive memories at a 
similar rate and in a similar way to dysphoric adults. Furthermore, the rumination 
questionnaire data demonstrates that adolescents do ruminate and that rumination is a 
vulnerability and maintaining factor in adolescent depression, in the same way it is in 
adult depression. One possibility is that the link between rumination and intrusive 
memories is in some way different in a developing adolescent compared to an adult.  
A developmental explanation, however, is unlikely given that Williams and Moulds 
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(2010) used undergraduates (average age 19.57 years) who were not much older than 
our adolescent sample, especially our participants in the sixth form classes. Age was 
entered as a covariate in the repeated measures ANOVA for memory sadness ratings 
but no significant effect was found.  
 
4.5.3.3.5 Nature of induced processing styles. If processing style does affect 
the experience of negative intrusive memories then another possible reason Williams 
and Moulds (2010) found a significant effect and this study did not is due to the 
persistence of the different thinking styles used in the two studies. The effect of 
induced distraction lasted long enough in Williams and Moulds (2010) for 
participants to rate their memories as less negative, distressing and sad at the post 
memory rating point compared to the pre memory rating point. One potential 
explanation, yet to be tested, is that it is harder to keep a concrete processing mode 
persisting and thus participants in our study had reverted back to their trait thinking 
style by the time they rated their memories at the post time point.  
 
Alternatively, it may be that participants required longer than the ten seconds they 
had to think about the memory after the inductions for the concrete processing mode 
to have a positive effect on the emotional evaluation of the memory. One hypothesis 
is that distraction may have more of an immediate effect and be easier to engage in, 
compared to concrete thinking which may require more practice and take more time 
to have an effect. One way to overcome the issue that applying concrete thinking 
successfully to the memory may take time would be to get participants to concrete 
think / ruminate about the memory directly at the end of the inductions. However, by 
not doing this we were keeping the study as ecologically valid as possible by 
encouraging a particular thinking style, eliciting an intrusive memory, and then 
looking at the effect of that particular thinking style on the memory. We were not 
making the assumption that just because people ruminate, they automatically 
ruminate about their intrusive memories. 
 
4.5.3.4 Summary of discussion on experimental findings. It is unclear why 
our results were inconsistent with our first two hypotheses that participants would 
rate a negative intrusive memory as more upsetting, and feel sadder about their 
memory, once they were induced to think in a ruminative way in comparison to a 
95 
 
concrete way. One potential explanation is that Williams and Moulds (2010) found 
significant effects due to the effect of the inductions on mood and actually a 
ruminative processing style does not affect participants’ experiences of intrusive 
memories. On the other hand the methodology of this study may not have been 
effective enough to detect any effects. For example participants may not have been 
thinking in the way they were induced to at the time they re-rated their memory. 
Further research is required to clarify such issues. 
 
4.6 Clinical implications 
 
This study is one of the first to consider the nature and experience of intrusive 
memories in adolescent depression. When considered alongside other research on 
intrusive memories, the findings from this study support the idea that the more these 
qualities are associated with intrusive memories, the more depressive 
symptomatology the person may experience. This provides a rationale for focusing 
on intrusive memories when assessing and treating depression in young people.  
 
Therapeutic techniques aimed at facilitating the processing of trauma memories have 
been successfully implemented in PTSD treatments. Hackmann et al., (2004) for 
example found that therapy for 22 patients with PTSD enabled the frequency, 
vividness, distress and nowness of intrusive memories to fade gradually. The 
cognitive therapy for PTSD used in this study involved elaborating the trauma 
memory via a combination of cognitive therapy techniques and imaginal reliving 
(Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). Cognitive therapy methods (e.g. socratic questioning and 
behavioural experiments) were used to change problematic appraisals. Imaginal 
reliving and the writing of a narrative were used to reconstruct the traumatic event 
and to identify its worst moments. For each of these moments information that 
updates its meaning was identified and incorporated into the memory via verbal or 
imagery techniques. The updating information was either information that became 
available at a later time point or new conclusions that resulted from cognitive 
restructuring. 
 
The effective components of PTSD treatment are unclear, with some studies 
suggesting repeated exposure to the memory is just as effective at reducing symptoms 
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as exposure with a form of cognitive restructuring (e.g. Marks, Lovell, Noshirvani, 
Livanou, & Thrasher, 1998; Foa et al. 2005). Despite the lack of consensus, research 
suggests that treatments involving some kind of memory exposure work are on 
average more effective than other interventions without such a component, for 
example relaxation training (e.g. Marks et al. 1998; Taylor et al. 2003)   
 
Given the similarity of intrusive memory qualities in PTSD and depression it follows 
that helping patients successfully emotionally process negative intrusive memories in 
depression may be beneficial. Preliminary work with adults has suggested this may 
be the case. Kandris and Moulds (2008) report one case study of a man who met 
criteria for MDE and where five 90 minute sessions of imaginal exposure (IE) was 
used to target intrusive memories of a negative life event as a treatment for his 
depression. IE encourages engagement with the emotions and distress elicited by a 
memory, thereby providing an adaptive response that is counter to avoidant 
mechanisms (Williams & Moulds, 2010). The participant reported reduced frequency 
of intrusive memories at post-treatment and a low frequency of intrusive memories 
and intrusion-related distress six months later. He did not meet criteria for MDE at 
follow up. Furthermore, Wheatley et al. (2007) describe the initial successful 
application of imagery rescripting to the treatment of two adult patients with a 
primary diagnosis of major depression who reported intrusive memories. The two 
case studies reported by Wheatley et al. (2007) indicate that imagery rescripting was 
associated with a significant reduction in distressing intrusive memories. Relatively 
rapid and long-lasting symptom reduction was achieved in patients with histories of 
severe and recurrent depression, consistent with the idea that regular intrusive 
memories are a maintaining factor for depression (Brewin et al. 1999).  
 
Similarly to PTSD treatments, the mechanisms by which treatments for depression 
focused on negative intrusive memories may be most effective are still unclear. For 
example it may be the reduction in avoidance of the memory, the change in cognitive 
appraisals, or the ability to recall a more positive representation instead of the 
negative memory. It is likely all lead to successful emotional processing of the 
memory in different ways. More research is clearly required to test these treatments 
on greater numbers of dysphoric and depressed people in case series and controlled 
trials. These may also give insight into the mechanisms by which the treatments 
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might work and thus identify the most important elements of this kind of treatment. 
Despite the need for further research, a focus on processing negative intrusive 
memories when treating depression provides an exciting avenue which can hopefully 
lead to the improvement of depression treatments in both adults and young people. 
 
This study was unable to provide clear information on the effect of thinking styles on 
the experience of negative intrusive memories in adolescent depression. The 
experimental condition (rumination or concrete thinking) did not have a significant 
effect on the emotional evaluation of intrusive memories but there are various reasons 
why this may be other than suggesting thinking styles are not important.  
 
With the trend found between memory intrusiveness and trait rumination we might 
tentatively suggest that a ruminative thinking style negatively affects the extent of 
memory intrusiveness, or that memory intrusiveness maintains a ruminative thinking 
style. In support of a relationship between memory intrusiveness and rumination, 
Kandris and Moulds (2008) found that while the aim of IE was to reduce intrusive 
memories and associated distress, it also reduced trait rumination in their case study.  
 
Given the similar nature of rumination to worry, the reduced concreteness theory of 
worry (see section 1.3.5) is consistent with the idea that people may try to avoid vivid 
and distressing intrusive memories by ruminating when depressed. This, however, 
does not allow the memory to be emotionally processed and thus the intrusive 
experience and the distressing nature of the memory remains. Treatments which 
focus on increasing concreteness when experiencing intrusive memories could thus 
reduce particular qualities of the memories such as vividness and sense of reliving by 
allowing the memory to be adequately emotionally processed. IE itself is likely to 
increase concrete thinking by encouraging a direct focus on intrusive memories. This 
could explain why Kandris and Moulds (2008) found rumination to reduce following 
imagined exposure. 
 
The relationship between rumination and memory intrusiveness, combined with other 
adolescent rumination studies which show the negative impact of rumination on 
different aspects of depression, such as social problem solving and negative future 
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thinking (e.g. Leigh et al, in prep b, Taylor et al, in prep), suggest a focus on thinking 
styles in treatments for youth depression could be beneficial. 
 
4.7 Recommendations for future research 
Replicating this study with young people scoring low on a measure of depressive 
symptoms might provide more information on what distinguishes the intrusive 
memories of dysphoric and depressed samples from non-dysphoric samples. It would 
help confirm the conclusion generated from combining the findings of this study with 
findings from other studies that people who have intrusive memories high in 
particular qualities (e.g. vividness, associated distress, sense of reliving and 
associated sadness and anger), the more depressive symptoms they may experience.  
 
Expanding the age range of the participants to include younger children would allow 
exploration of whether intrusive memories occur in similar ways in depressed 
children at an earlier developmental stage. Given that rumination increased with age 
in our study it would be interesting to identify at what age children begin to 
experience ruminative thoughts and how this interacts with aspects of depression, 
including intrusive memories, which themselves may only start to occur at a certain 
developmental stage. 
 
When thinking about the effect of thinking styles on the experience of negative 
intrusive memories it would be good to replicate this study with more numbers to see 
if this study missed detecting significant effects due to a lack of power. If an effect of 
rumination on intrusive memory experience was still not found it would be important 
to consider some of the methodology criticisms to ensure the study design can 
effectively measure the impact of ruminative and concrete thinking on the experience 
of an intrusive memory. Repeating the study with rumination, concrete and 
distraction groups could provide more insight into the mechanisms by which thinking 
styles may have an effect of the experience of negative intrusive memories. 
 
It should be considered the findings reported for this study only apply to the one 
specific memory identified in the intrusive memory interview. This study does not 
provide information regarding the occurrence, frequency and nature of other intrusive 
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memories the young people may also have been experiencing. Participants in this 
study are likely to have chosen their most prominent intrusive memory. To make this 
study more ecologically valid it would be interesting for future research to explore 
young people’s overall experience of intrusive memories. It could be that there are 
differences between dysphoric and non-dysphoric samples not only in terms of their 
most prominent memory but also in terms of less prominent intrusive memories. It 
would also be interesting to observe the effects of different cognitive processing 
styles on these less prominent intrusive memories. 
 
The most exciting opportunity for future research would appear to involve exploring 
the effects of interventions aimed to alter the experience and nature of intrusive 
memories and the resulting effect this could have on rumination and depression 
levels. This research is in the preliminary stages with adults and is yet to be started 
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Appendix 1: Ethics letter 
 
Dr Patrick Smith 
Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
De Crespigny Park 
London SE5 8AF 
 
06 November 2012 
 
Dear Dr Smith 
 
PNM/12/13-9 Rumination in adolescent depression: the impact on cognitive processes. 
 
Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for sending in the amendments/clarifications requested to the above project. I am pleased to 
inform you that these meet the requirements of the PNM RESC and therefore that full approval is now 
granted with the following provisos: 
1. All Information Sheets: Please insert the correct wording for the ‘No fault compensation 
scheme:’ ‘If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information’ followed by your name, 
departmental and email address.   
2. All Consent Forms: In the first bullet point include the date up to which participants can 
withdraw their date i.e. 30 June 2013. 
Note that you do not need to submit a response to the above provisos, however it is a condition of the 
approval granted by the PNM RESC that the provisos are carried out prior to the study commencing. If 
the provisos are not adhered to, the approval granted by the PNM RESC would no longer be valid. 
Should you have any queries on this please do not hesitate to contact the Research Ethics Office. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London Guidelines 
on Good Practice in Academic Research (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 06 November 2014. If you need approval beyond 
this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to this explaining 
why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will not be necessary 
unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is for one year, you will 
not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of the 
research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the study 
description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection when all work 
with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data analysis or publication of 
the results. For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-existing data, approval must cover 
any period during which the researcher will be accessing or evaluating individual sensitive and/or un-
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anonymised records. Note that after the point at which ethical approval for your study is no longer 
required due to the study being complete (as per the above definitions), you will still need to ensure all 
research data/records management and storage procedures agreed to as part of your application are 
adhered to and carried out accordingly. 
 
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research Ethics 
Office.  
 
Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will need 
approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx   
The circumstances where modification requests are required include the addition/removal of participant 
groups, additions/removal/changes to research methods, asking for additional data from participants, 
extensions to the ethical approval period. Any proposed modifications should only be carried out once 
full approval for the modification request has been granted. 
 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to the 
approving committee/panel. In the event of an untoward event or an adverse reaction a full report must 
be made to the Chair of the approving committee/review panel within one week of the incident. 
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time to 
ascertain the status of your research.  
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your panel/committee 
administrator in the first instance (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx 
). We wish you every success with this work. 
 


















Appendix 2: Information sheets 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
This information sheet is for parents and carers 
REC Reference Number: PNM/12/13-9 
Rumination in adolescent depression: the impact on cognitive processes 
We would like to invite your child to participate in this original research project during school time.  You should 
only allow your child to participate if you want to; choosing not to let your child take part will not disadvantage 
them in any way. Before you decide whether you let your child take part, it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what their participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. 
 Aims 
There are many pressures on young people today inside and outside of school and life can be difficult at times. 
When difficulties mount up they can affect how your child may feel. They might make them feel moody or really 
low, which may stop enjoying things as much as they used to and can affect sleep, appetite, and concentration. It 
can also stop them getting on with friends and family.  
We want to investigate the relationship between mood and the ways in which young people think. We also want 
to investigate how thinking in certain ways influences how children experience past memories, and how much 
information they can hold in mind.  
 Who are we asking to take part? 
Firstly, we are inviting all pupils to take part by filling out a questionnaire about their mood (unless they have 
trouble reading English). We are then inviting pupils whose scores on the questionnaire fall within a particular 
range to take part in some further tasks.  
 What will happen if I agree that my child can take part? 
We will also be seeking consent directly from your child to take part in the study. If your child agrees, and you do 
not opt out, your child will be asked to complete a questionnaire related to their feelings.  This questionnaire will 
take approximately 5 minutes to complete.  There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions. Your 
child will complete the questionnaire in their classroom during tutor time. The questionnaire is private and will be 
handed back to us and it will not be seen by any other pupils or by teachers. 
Your child does not have to take part.  It is up to you and your child to decide whether they will take part or not.  If 
you decide that your child may take part, they are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A 
decision not to take part, or a decision to withdraw at any time, will not affect the standard of education or care 
that you or your child receives.   
If you do not wish your child to take part, please return the attached form in the enclosed pre-paid 
enveloped within two weeks, or contact Dr Patrick Smith, Damien Rushe or Jennifer Scott using the 
contact details at the end of this information sheet.  If we do not hear back from you within two weeks, we 
will assume that you are happy for your child to fill out the questionnaire. 
If your child’s score on the questionnaire falls within a particular range, he or she will be invited to participate in 
some further tasks. These tasks will involve either talking about a past memory, or examining working memory 
capacity. Again, there are no right or wrong answers to any of the tasks involved, and all responses are kept 
strictly confidential.  Sessions will be done at school and scheduled in liaison with a member of school staff in 
order to minimise disruption to your child’s school day.  The session will be conducted in private, but there will 
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always be someone there to help if needed. To help in our work, we will ask your child if we can record the tasks 
using an audio recorder. 
If your child is eligible to complete these tasks, we will contact you again to let you know and to ask you 
to inform us if you do not wish your child to take part.   
It is up to you to decide whether your child will take part or not.  If you decide to let your child take part, you are 
free to withdraw them at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision not to take part, or a decision to 
withdraw at any time, will not affect the standard of education or care that your child receives.  
 Are there any risks? 
It is unlikely that there are any risks.  Sometimes, thinking about low mood can be upsetting, but there will always 
be someone there to help if your child needs it.  All the information your child tells us is private and confidential.  
However, if we are told something that suggests that your child is at risk of harm (for example if someone is 
threatening them, or if they want to hurt themselves), then we would have to make an exception to this 
confidentiality. We would discuss this with them first and then inform you.  We will help your child to access 
services that can help them if they are in this situation.  If you are worried about your child’s wellbeing at any 
stage, you can also contact your GP for further advice. 
 Are there any benefits?  
The main benefit is that by participating in the study any young people with difficulties with their mood will be 
identified and we can assist them in accessing services which can help them.  
 Arrangements for ensuring confidentiality.   
We will keep the original paper copies of the questionnaire that your child fills out.  These will be locked away 
securely and only the study team will have access to them.  All data will be entered into a computer database so 
that we can analyse the results.  Data stored on the computer will be anonymised (it will not have young people’s 
names on it). You can withdraw your child’s data at any time before we begin writing the final project (until June 
30th 2013). All data will be securely stored at King’s College London after completion of the study for a set period 
of time. 
 Name and contact details of the researchers 
If this study has harmed your child in any way you can contact King’s College London using the details below for 
further advice and information: 
 
Dr Patrick Smith 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
  
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   patrick.smith@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
Damien Rushe / Jennifer Scott 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
 
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   damien.rushe@kcl.ac.uk 
 jennifer.scott@kcl.ac.uk 
 
This study has been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee at King’s 







INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
This information sheet is for parents and carers 
REC Reference Number: PNM/12/13-9 
Rumination in adolescent depression: the impact on cognitive processes 
We would like to invite your child to participate in the next part of this research project.  Before you decide whether you 
want your child to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what their participation 
will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 Aims 
There are many pressures on young people today inside and outside of school and life can be difficult at times. When 
difficulties mount up they can affect how your child may feel. They might make them feel moody or really low, which may 
stop enjoying things as much as they used to and can affect sleep, appetite, and concentration. It can also stop them 
getting on with friends and family.  
We want to investigate the relationship between mood and the ways in which young people think. We also want to 
investigate how thinking in certain ways influences how children experience past memories, and how much information they 
can hold in mind. 
 Who are we asking to take part? 
Your child kindly already completed a questionnaire about their mood for us – thank you very much for agreeing for your 
child to be involved.  Now we are inviting pupils whose scores on this questionnaire fall within a particular range to take part 
in some further tasks. 
 What will happen if I agree that my child can take part? 
Your child has already completed a questionnaire about their feelings. 
We are now inviting your child to take part some further tasks. These will involve either talking about a past memory or 
examining working memory capacity. Again, there are no right or wrong answers to any of the tasks involved.  Sessions will 
be done at school and scheduled in liaison with a member of school staff in order to minimise disruption to your child’s 
school day.  The session will be conducted in private, but there will always be someone there to help if needed. To help in 
our work, we will ask your child if we can record the tasks using an audio recorder. 
It is up to you to decide whether your child will take part or not.  We will also be seeking consent directly from your child to 
take part in this part of the study.  If you decide to let your child take part, you are still free to withdraw your child at any time 
and without giving a reason.  A decision not to take part, or a decision to withdraw, will not affect the standard of education 
or care that you or your child receives. 
If you do not wish your child to take part in the next phase of the study, please return the attached form in the 
enclosed pre-paid enveloped within two weeks, or contact any of the researchers using the contact details at the 
end of this information sheet.  If we do not hear back from you within two weeks, we will assume that you are 
happy for your child to take part in the next phase of the research.  
 Are there any risks? 
It is unlikely that there are any risks.  Sometimes, thinking about low mood can be upsetting, but there will always be 
someone there to help if your child needs it.  All the information your child tells us is private and confidential.  However, if 
we are told something that suggests that your child is at risk of harm (for example if someone is threatening them, or if they 
want to hurt themselves), then we would have to make an exception to this confidentiality. We would discuss this with them 
first and then inform you.  We will help your child to access services that can help them if they are in this situation.  If you 




 Are there any benefits?  
The main benefit is that by participating in the study any young people with difficulties with their mood will be identified and 
we can assist them in accessing services which can help them.  
 Arrangements for ensuring confidentiality.   
We will keep the original paper copies of the questionnaires that your child filled out.  These will be locked away securely 
and only the study team will have access to them.  All data will be entered into a computer database so that we can analyse 
the results.  Data stored on the computer will be anonymised (it will not have young peoples’ names on it). You can 
withdraw your child’s data at any time before we begin writing the final project (until June 30th 2013).  All data will be 
securely stored at King’s College London after completion of the study for a set period of time. 
 Name and contact details of the researchers 
If this study has harmed your child in any way you can contact King’s College London using the details 
below for further advice and information: 
 
Dr Patrick Smith 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
  
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   patrick.smith@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
Damien Rushe / Jennifer Scott 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
 
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   damien.rushe@kcl.ac.uk 
 jennifer.scott@kcl.ac.uk 
 
This study has been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee 
















INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
This information sheet is for young people 
REC Reference Number: PNM/12/13-9 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
Rumination in adolescent depression: the impact on cognitive processes 
We are asking you to take part in a research project. If you decide not to take part, nothing bad will happen to 
you. You should only take part if you want to. Before you decide if you want to or not, we would like you to 
understand why we are doing this project and what will happen if you do take part. Please read the following 
information carefully and talk to other people about it if you want. Please ask us if there is anything that you’re not 
sure about.  
 Why are we doing this project?  
Young people are expected to do lots of difficult things these days (such as exams) and sometimes they can get 
stressed. When you get very stressed, this can affect how you feel. It might make you feel moody or low.  You 
may stop enjoying things as much as you used to. It can also affect how well you sleep, how much you eat, or 
being able to concentrate. It can even stop you getting on with friends and family.  
We want to look at the ways in which young people think and how this affects the way they feel. We also want to 
look at how thinking in certain ways affects how you feel about things that happened in the past, or how good 
your memory is.  
 Who are we asking to take part? 
Firstly, we are asking all pupils to take part by filling out a form with some questions about how they are feeling 
(unless they have trouble reading English). We will then ask pupils who get a certain score on the questionnaire 
to do some further tasks.  
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you sign the consent form, this means that 
you understand the project, and you want to take part. It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not and you 
do not have to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free to pull out at any time and without saying why.  
If you decide not to take part, or to pull out at any time, no one will be angry with you and nothing bad will happen 
to you. If you have any questions about this project and what you are being asked to do, please ask the 
researcher before you decide whether to join in.   
If you are under 16 years old, we will also ask your parent/carer if you can take part. If you are over 16 years old, 
we will be sending your parent/carer an information sheet about the study, so they are aware that you might 
choose to take part. 
 What will happen if I agree to take part? 
If you (and your parent/carer if you are under 16) agree to take part, you will be asked to fill in a form with some 
questions about how you feel. This will take about 5 minutes.  It is not a test and there are no right or wrong 
answers. You will complete the questions in your classroom during class time. Your answers to the questions are 
private. They will be handed back to us and will not be seen by any other pupils or by your teachers. 
If you get a certain score on the questionnaire, you will be asked to do some tasks involving different ways of 
thinking. These tasks will be in the form of stories and questionnaires and will involve both speaking and using 
pen and paper. You will be asked to fill out some forms with questions about how you are feeling and what you 
think about if you feel sad. You will also be asked to talk about some sad things that might have happened in the 
past or to do a short task to test your memory. This will take about 50 minutes. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the tasks. Some of your answers will be recorded, if this is OK with you. Recordings of your answers 
will be deleted once the research team has written them down.  
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 Could anything bad happen to me if I take part? 
It is unlikely that anything bad will happen to you if you take part in this project. Sometimes, answering questions 
about how you feel can be upsetting, but there will always be someone there to help if you need it.  All the 
information you tell us is private. If you tell us something that means that you are at risk of harm (for example if 
someone is hurting you, or if you want to harm yourself), then we would need to talk to your parents about it, or to 
other people who can help you. We would always talk to you about this first.   
 What are the good things about taking part?  
One good thing is that if you are feeling very low and you take part in the study we can help to find people who 
can help you with these feelings.  
 Who will see the forms that I fill out? 
We will keep any forms that you fill out.  These will be locked away safely and only the project team will be able to 
look at them.  All the information will be entered into a computer database so that we can look at the results. 
Information stored on the computer will not have your name on it. You can ask us to take any information about 
you out of the project any time before we start writing it (until June 30th 2013). All information will be kept safely at 
King’s College London for a few years after the project is finished. 
 Name and contact details of the researchers 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London using the details below for further 
advice and information: 
 
Dr Patrick Smith 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
  
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   patrick.smith@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
Damien Rushe / Jennifer Scott 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
 
Email:   damien.rushe@kcl.ac.uk 
 jennifer.scott@kcl.ac.uk 
 
This study has been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee at King’s 















INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
This information sheet is for young people 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Reference: PNM/12/13-9 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
Rumination in adolescent depression: the impact on cognitive processes 
We are asking you to take part in a research project. If you decide not to take part, nothing bad will happen to 
you. You should only take part if you want to. Before you decide if you want to or not, we would like you to 
understand why we are doing this project and what will happen if you do take part. Please read the following 
information carefully and talk to other people about it if you want. Please ask us if there is anything that you’re not 
sure about.  
 Why are we doing this project?  
Young people are expected to do lots of difficult things these days (such as exams) and sometimes they can get 
stressed. When you get very stressed, this can affect how you feel. It might make you feel moody or low.  You 
may stop enjoying things as much as you used to. It can also affect how well you sleep, how much you eat, or 
being able to concentrate. It can even stop you getting on with friends and family.  
We want to look at the ways in which young people think and how this affects the way they feel. We also want to 
look at how thinking in certain ways affects how you feel about things that happened in the past, or how good 
your memory is.  
 Who are we asking to take part? 
Firstly, we asked all pupils to take part by filling out a form with some questions about how they were feeling. Now 
we are asking pupils who got a certain score on the questionnaire to do some more tasks.  
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you sign the consent form, this means that 
you understand the project, and you want to take part. It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not and you 
do not have to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free to pull out at any time and without saying why.  
If you decide not to take part, or to pull out at any time, no one will be angry with you and nothing bad will happen 
to you. If you have any questions about this project and what you are being asked to do, please ask the 
researcher before you decide whether to join in.   
If you are under 16 years old, we will also ask your parent or carer if you can take part.  
 What will happen if I agree to take part? 
You already filled out a questionnaire about how you feel – thank you very much for doing this.  Because of your 
score on these questions, we are asking you to do some more things as part of our research.   
If you (and your parent/carer if you are under 16) agree to take part, the tasks we ask you to do will involve you 
trying different ways of thinking. These tasks will be in the form of stories and questionnaires and will involve both 
speaking and using pen and paper. You will be asked to fill out some forms with questions about how you are 
feeling and what you think about if you feel sad. You will also be asked to talk about some things that might have 
happened in the past or to do a short task to test your memory. This will take about 50 minutes. There are no right 
or wrong answers to the tasks. Some of your answers will be recorded if this is OK with you. Recordings of your 
answers will be deleted once the research team has written them down.  
 Could anything bad happen to me if I take part? 
It is unlikely that anything bad will happen to you if you take part in this project. Sometimes, answering questions 
about how you feel can be upsetting, but there will always be someone there to help if you need it.  All the 
information you tell us is private. If you tell us something that means that you are at risk of harm (for example if 
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someone is hurting you, or if you want to harm yourself), then we would need to talk to your parents about it, or to 
other people who can help you. We would always talk to you about this first.   
 What are the good things about taking part?  
One good thing is that if you are feeling very low and you take part in the study we can help to find people who 
can help you to deal with these feelings.  
 Who will see the forms that I fill out? 
We will keep any forms that you fill out.  These will be locked away safely and only the project team will be able to 
look at them.  All the information will be entered into a computer database so that we can look at the results. 
Information stored on the computer will not have your name on it. You can ask us to take any information about 
you out of the project any time before we start writing it (until June 30th 2013). All information will be kept safely at 
King’s College London for a few years after the project is finished. 
 Name and contact details of the researchers 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King’s College London using the details below for further 
advice and information: 
 
Dr Patrick Smith 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
  
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   patrick.smith@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
Damien Rushe / Jennifer Scott 
Department of Psychology, Box PO77, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 
De Crespigny Park,  
London SE5 8AF  
 
Tel: 0207 848 0033 
Email:   damien.rushe@kcl.ac.uk 
 jennifer.scott@kcl.ac.uk 
 
This study has been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee at King’s 

















Appendix 3: Consent forms 
 
This OPT OUT OF RESEARCH PARTICIPATION form is for parents and carers 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:  PNM/12/13-9 
Thank you for considering allowing your child to take part in the research. 
Please only complete and return this form if you do NOT wish your child to participate in 
this research project. 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet. If you have any 
questions arising from the Information Sheet, please contact the researcher to discuss these 
(using the contact details provided on the Information Sheet) before you complete this form. 
 
Child’s name:   __________________________________________ 
 
 I have read the information sheet about the above study. 
 I DO NOT want my child to take part in the study. 
 I understand that this decision will not affect the standard of education or care that 
my child or I receive 
 
Parent or carer’s name  ____________________________________ 
 
Parent or carer’s signature ____________________________________ 
 






OPT OUT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 






This consent form is for young people 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Reference: PNM/12/13-9 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research.  
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research. If you have any questions about this project and what you are 
being invited to take part in, please ask the researcher before completing this form.   
 
 
 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data until the project write-up begins (30th June 2013).  
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to 
me.  I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of 
the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
Name:   ______________________________________________________ 
Class:   ____________________ 
Date of Birth:  ____________________ 
I agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction 
and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 




confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 
 






CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 





CONT FORM F 
This consent form is for young people 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Reference: PNM/12/13-9 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research.  
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research. If you have any questions about this project and what you are 
being invited to take part in, please ask the researcher before completing this form.   
 
 
 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data at any point until the project write-up begins (30th June 2013).  
 
 I consent to my participation being audio-recorded for use by the researcher team. 
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to 
me.  I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of 




agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction 
and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 




Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 




CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 








Appendix 4: CRIES 
Please can you now check each item on this table indicating how frequently these 
comments were true for you regarding your memory during the past seven days. 
 Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often 
1. I thought about it when I didn’t 
mean to 
    
2. I tried to remove it from my 
memory 
    
3. I had waves of strong feelings 
about it 
    
4. I stayed away from reminders 
of it (e.g. places or situations) 
    
5. I tried not to talk about it     
6. Pictures about it popped into 
my mind 
    
7. Other things kept making me 
think about it. 
    



















Appendix 5: Induction scripts 
Rumination induction script 
 
Now we are going to do something different. This task involves thinking about 
problems in a particular way. Sometimes when we are thinking about problems we 
might think  
 
 Why did this happen to me? 
 What will this mean? 
 What will happen because of this? 
 What will others think of me? 
 What does this mean about me? 
 What have I done to deserve this? 
 Why do things like this keep happening? 
 
 
I am going to give you three imaginary situations and what I would like you to do is 
spend 2 minutes imaging yourself in the situation and answering the questions on the 
card in your mind. I won’t be asking you to tell me what you thought of for each but 
it is important that you to try to answer all of the questions and give roughly equal 
time to each question. If you find your mind wandering, gently bring your attention 
back to the situation I give you and the questions. If you find it hard to fill the time, 
I’d like you to replay the thoughts, like they’re on a tape loop, until I tell you to stop.  
 
So, I will give you a situation and you will spend 2 minutes thinking about the 
situation answering the questions on the card. Does that make sense? 
 
Practice Situation One: 
Imagine yourself in this situation -you have been invited to a party at a bowling alley 
for your best friend’s birthday. Your friend has been planning it for ages and is really 
excited about it. Your friend is a little bit nervous that people won’t turn up and you 
have promised to meet them at the bowling alley early before the party.  
 
You have been talking about the party all week and you’re really looking forward to 
it. The party is at a bowling alley you have never been to, so you arrange to call your 
best friend when you get off the bus for directions from the bus stop.  
 
I’d like you to imagine that it is the day of the party, you’re ready and really excited 
and you get the bus. You are playing with your phone on the bus and listening to 
music and thinking about who will be at the party. Can you imagine yourself in that 
situation? Picture what you can see around you in as much detail as possible? 
 
The bus pulls up to the stop you need to get off at and you get off the bus. You reach 
your phone and go to find your friends number to find out where you need to go. As 
you press the dial button your phone turns off. You try to turn it on again and it won’t 
work. You realise that you forgot to charge it before you left the house and the 




Try to imagine that in as much detail as possible. Notice any feelings in your body. 
Notice how you feel and what you think. Try to hold on to that feeling. Your friend is 
relying on you to be at the party but because you haven’t charged your phone you 
don’t know how to get there and can’t get in touch to explain. 
 




Practice Situation Two:  
We’re going to do the same thing with a different situation. Remember if you find 
your mind wandering, bring your attention back to the situation and these questions. 
Replay the thoughts, like they’re on a tape loop, until I tell you to stop.  
 
Imagine yourself in this situation – You are chatting to your friend at school about 
your favourite band and they tell you that they have just downloaded the band’s new 
album onto their ipod. You really want to listen to the album and ask your friend if 
you can borrow their ipod. Your friend agrees that you can have it over the weekend. 
 
At the weekend you are getting the bus home from the shops and are enjoying 
listening to the album on your friend’s ipod. Suddenly you notice your phone ringing 
and put the ipod down on the seat next to you to answer the phone. 
 
You get off at the next bus stop and when you go to use the ipod again you realise 
you have left it on the seat on the bus. 
 
Notice any feelings in your body. Notice how you feel and what you think. Try to 
hold onto that feeling. Your friend really loves their ipod and you have just left it on 
the bus which has already driven away. 
 
Now think about the situation using the questions on this card. (Card 2) 
 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all sad and 10 is very sad, how sad do 
you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all anxious and 10 is very anxious, 
how anxious do you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is very much, how able were 
you to think about that situation for 2 minutes? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is none of the time and 10 is all of the time, 
how much of the time were you thinking about the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
 On this scale, can you mark whether you were thinking about just this 
situation or a similar event that has happened to you in the past 






Practice Situation Three:  
We’re going to do the same thing with another imaginary situation. Remember if you 
find your mind wandering, bring your attention back to the situation and these 
questions. Replay the thoughts, like they’re on a tape loop, until I tell you to stop.  
 
I’d like you to imagine yourself in this situation at school. You have been working 
really hard on an important piece of homework/assignment. The teacher for that 
lesson is really strict and you have tried really hard to get the work right. It’s taken 
you a long time to finish it and you’re really pleased with it.  
 
On the morning you are due to hand it in you are running late and you have to rush to 
school. I would like you to imagine that in as much detail as possible. Imagine 
rushing around the house, hurrying to get to school.  
 
You rush to form just on time and sit down at a desk. You open your bag to get your 
homework to hand in for the next lesson and realise that you have forgotten it. Notice 
any feelings in your body. Notice how you feel and what you think. Try to hold on to 
that feeling, this is a really important piece of homework and the teacher is very 
strict.  
 
Now think about the situation using the questions on this card. (Card 3) 
 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all sad and 10 is very sad, how sad do 
you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all anxious and 10 is very anxious, 
how anxious do you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is very much, how able were 
you to think about that situation for 2 minutes? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is none of the time and 10 is all of the time, 
how much of the time were you thinking about the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
 On this scale, can you mark whether you were thinking about just this 
situation or a similar event that has happened to you in the past 







Why didn’t I charge my phone? 
What are the consequences of this? 
What will happen because I can’t phone my friend? 
What will my friend think of me? 
What does it mean about me? 
What have I done to deserve this? 
Why do things like this keep happening to me? 
 
CARD TWO 
Why didn’t I put the ipod somewhere safe when my phone rang? 
Why didn’t I pick up the ipod when I got off the bus? 
What are the consequences of this? 
What will my friend think of me? 
What does this mean about me? 
What have I done to deserve this? 
Why do things like this keep happening to me? 
 
CARD THREE 
Why did I rush today of all days? 
Why didn’t I pack the homework? 
What are the consequences of this? 
What will my teacher think of me? 
What does it mean about me? 
What have I done to deserve this? 
Why do things like this keep happening to me? 
 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is very sad and 10 is not at all sad, how sad do 
you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is very anxious and 10 is not at all, how 
anxious do you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is very much, how able were 
you to think about that situation for 2 minutes? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is none of the time and 10 is all of the time, 
how much of the time were you thinking about the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
 On this scale, can you mark whether you were thinking about just this 
situation or a similar event that has happened to you in the past 




Concrete thinking induction script 
 
Now we are going to do something different. This task involves thinking about 
problems in a particular way. Sometimes when we are thinking about a situation that 
has upset us we might think about how it happened and what led up to the problem 
happening. 
 
We might imagine the situation re-playing in our mind really vividly, like we are 
watching a movie of how it happened, at the same time remembering how it made us 
feel in our body and what we could see and hear at the time. We might picture it 
through our own eyes, as if we are looking out on the situation and watching it 
happen. We might think about the situation as if it were happening again right now. 
We might think about  
 
 How did this happen? 
 What did I notice? 
 What is the sequence of events leading up to this point? 
 How can I understand this? 
 How can I fix it? 
 What is the first step to solve this problem? 
 How can I decide what to do next? 
 
I am going to give you an imaginary situation. What I would like you to do is spend 2 
minutes imaging yourself in the situation and answering the questions on the card in 
your mind. I won’t be asking you to tell me what you thought of for each but it is 
important that you to try to answer all of the questions and give roughly equal time to 
each question. 
 
I would like you to imagine the situation as if it is happening right now. Focusing on 
how it happened and what has led up to it happening. Imagine it in your mind as 
vividly as possible, like a movie from the beginning to the end. Try to see it through 
your own eyes, as if you are looking out on it happening.  
 
If you find your mind wandering, gently bring your attention back to the situation and 
these questions. If you find it hard to fill the time, I’d like you to replay the thoughts, 
like they’re on a tape loop, until I tell you to stop.  
 
So, I will give you a situation and you will spend 2 minutes thinking about the 
situation, imagining it like a movie in your mind and answering the questions on the 
card. Does that make sense? 
 
Practice Situation One: 
Imagine yourself in this situation -you have been invited to a party at a bowling alley 
for your best friend’s birthday. Your friend has been planning it for ages and is really 
excited about it. Your friend is a little bit nervous that people won’t turn up and you 
have promised to meet them at the bowling alley early before the party.  
 
You have been talking about the party all week and you’re really looking forward to 
it. The party is at a bowling alley you have never been to, so you arrange to call your 




I’d like you to imagine that it is the day of the party, you’re ready and really excited 
and you get the bus. You are playing with your phone on the bus and listening to 
music and thinking about who will be at the party. Can you imagine yourself in that 
situation? Picture what you can see around you in as much detail as possible? 
 
The bus pulls up to the stop you need to get off at and you get off the bus. You reach 
your phone and go to find your friends number to find out where you need to go. As 
you press the dial button your phone turns off. You try to turn it on again and it won’t 
work. You realise that you forgot to charge it before you left the house and the 
battery has died.  
 
Try to imagine that in as much detail as possible. Notice any feelings in your body. 
Notice how you feel and what you think. Try to hold on to that feeling. Your friend is 
relying on you to be at the party but because you haven’t charged your phone you 
don’t know how to get there and can’t get in touch to explain. 
 
Now think about the situation using the questions on this card. (Card 4) 
 
 
Practice Situation Two:  
We’re going to do the same thing with a different situation. Remember if you find 
your mind wandering, bring your attention back to the situation and these questions. 
Replay the thoughts, like they’re on a tape loop, until I tell you to stop.  
 
Imagine yourself in this situation – You are chatting to your friend at school about 
your favourite band and they tell you that they have just downloaded the band’s new 
album onto their ipod. You really want to listen to the album and ask your friend if 
you can borrow their ipod. Your friend agrees that you can have it over the weekend. 
 
At the weekend you are getting the bus home from the shops and are enjoying 
listening to the album on your friend’s ipod. Suddenly you notice your phone ringing 
and put the ipod down on the seat next to you to answer the phone. 
 
You get off at the next bus stop and when you go to use the ipod again you realise 
you have left it on the seat on the bus. 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is very sad and 10 is not at all sad, how sad do 
you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is very anxious and 10 is not at all, how 
anxious do you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is very much, how able were 
you to think about that situation for 2 minutes? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is none of the time and 10 is all of the time, 
how much of the time were you thinking about the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
 On this scale, can you mark whether you were thinking about just this 
situation or a similar event that has happened to you in the past 





Notice any feelings in your body. Notice how you feel and what you think. Try to 
hold onto that feeling. Your friend really loves their ipod and you have just left it on 
the bus which has already driven away. 
 
Now think about the situation using the questions on this card. (Card 5) 
 
Practice Situation Three:  
I’d like you to imagine yourself in this situation at school. You have been working 
really hard on an important piece of homework/assignment. The teacher for that 
lesson is really strict and you have tried really hard to get the work right. It’s taken 
you a long time to finish it and you’re really pleased with it.  
 
On the morning you are due to hand it in you are running late and you have to rush to 
school. I would like you to imagine that in as much detail as possible. Imagine 
rushing around the house, hurrying to get to school.  
 
You rush to form just on time and sit down at a desk. You open your bag to get your 
homework to hand in for the next lesson and realise that you have forgotten it. Notice 
any feelings in your body. Notice how you feel and what you think. Try to hold on to 
that feeling, this is a really important piece of homework and the teacher is very 
strict.  
 
Now imagine yourself in that situation, picturing it like a movie from the beginning 
to the end and answering the questions on this card. (Card 6) 
 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all sad and 10 is very sad, how sad do 
you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all anxious and 10 is very anxious, 
how anxious do you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is very much, how able were 
you to think about that situation for 2 minutes? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is none of the time and 10 is all of the time, 
how much of the time were you thinking about the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
 On this scale, can you mark whether you were thinking about just this 
situation or a similar event that has happened to you in the past 






How did this happen? 
What did I notice when my phone turned off? 
What is the sequence of events leading up to this point? 
How can I understand this? 
How can I fix it? 
What is the first step to solve this problem? 
How can I decide what to do next? 
 
CARD FIVE 
How did this happen? 
What did I notice when I realised I had left the ipod on the bus? 
What is the sequence of events leading up to this point? 
How can I understand this? 
How can I fix it? 
What is the first step to solve this problem? 
How can I decide what to do next? 
 
CARD SIX 
How did this happen? 
What did I notice when my homework wasn’t in my bag? 
What is the sequence of events leading up to this point? 
How can I understand this? 
How can I fix it? 
What is the first step to solve this problem? 
How can I decide what to do next? 
 
 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is very sad and 10 is not at all sad, how sad do 
you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is very anxious and 10 is not at all, how 
anxious do you feel at this moment? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is not at all and 10 is very much, how able were 
you to think about that situation for 2 minutes? 
 On a scale of 0-10 where 0 is none of the time and 10 is all of the time, 
how much of the time were you thinking about the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
 On this scale, can you mark whether you were thinking about just this 
situation or a similar event that has happened to you in the past 









How sad do you feel 
now? 
0                                                                                   10 






How anxious do you feel 
now? 
0                                                                                   10 






How able were you to 
think of the situation for 
the 2 minutes? 
0                                                                                   10 






How much of the time 
were you thinking about 
the situation using the 
questions on the card? 
0                                                                                    10 






Were you always 
thinking about that 
specific situation or 
thinking about similar 
situations in the past? 
0                                                                                    10 
Always thinking of a                                        Always thinking of  






Were you thinking in 
words or images? 
0                                                                                    10 








Appendix 7: Intrusive Memory Interview 
 
Sometimes memories just pop into our minds; we remember things without trying to. 
Sometimes memories we don’t want happen following an event. For example a friend 
saying something horrible to you might make you remember a time when someone 
else said something mean to you. Or the smell of hospitals might cause you to get a 
memory about a time when you or a family member was ill in hospital, even though 
you didn’t want the memory. 
 
What I’d like you to do is tell me about a memory like this that you have had in the 
last week. 
 
The memory should be one you didn’t mean to think about. It should be a memory 
that just popped into your mind even though you didn’t want it to. 
 
The memory should be of an event or situation which wasn’t particularly nice for 
you. The event the memory is about must have happened at least a few weeks ago but 
it could have happened years ago when you were much younger. 
 
Please could you just tell me briefly what your memory is about? You don’t need 
to give me lots of detail, just a short description. 
 













Please mark on the scales: 
 How vivid was the memory? 
 How distressing did you find this memory? 
 How much did it feel like it was happening now compared to something 
that happened in the past? For example, did you feel like you were 











Appendix 8: Visual analogue scales – Memory ratings 
 









Please also rate how this memory makes you feel right now. 
 




































Not at all                                                                        Very much 
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This project aimed to evaluate a ward-based mindfulness based stress reduction 
(MBSR) group for staff at an adolescent psychiatric unit. Staff completed pre and 
post self-report measures. Participants were also interviewed about their experience 
and completed a feedback questionnaire. Analysis of results suggests a staff MBSR 
group in a ward environment is a feasible and acceptable option. Although 
participants enjoyed the group and were motivated to attend, attendance appeared 
more feasible for members of the MDT compared to nurses and HCAs. Participants 
reported having learnt a number of mindfulness skills including increased 
observation, awareness, and ability to treat thoughts and feelings non-judgementally. 
Only the Observe subscale on the Five Facet Mindfulness questionnaire had 
significant differences between pre and post scores. Significant increases in self-
compassion and decreases in staff burnout were not found. Potential explanations for 
these non-significant results include low numbers due to significant drop out rates 
resulting in low power, questions over the sensitivity of the questionnaires, and lack 



















1.1 Literature Review 
 
1.1.1 Stress in health care professionals working in mental health 
settings. Stress is a prevalent issue for staff working in mental health settings. 
Sorgaard et al., (2007) found that while staff in community mental health teams 
experienced more organisational problems, higher work demands and less contact 
with colleagues, ward staff reported a worse social environment and a lack of control. 
 
Demands experienced by nurses, specifically in mental health settings, include the 
intense nature of nurse-patient interactions (Cronin-Stubbs & Brophy, 1985) and the 
confrontation of difficult and challenging behaviours on a regular basis (Sullivan, 
1993). Jenkins and Elliot (2004) write that previous studies of mental health nurses 
have identified a variety of stressors in the work environment. These include 
administrative and organisational issues such as the volume of paperwork and lack of 
consultation over work-related changes (Dawkins, Depp & Selzer, 1985), inadequate 
staffing (Carson, Leary, De Villiers, Fagin, & Radmall, 1995), dealing with 
potentially violent and/or suicidal patients (Sullivan, 1993) and conflict between staff 
(Trygstad, 1986).  
 
Shapiro, Astin, Bishop and Cordova (2005) report that stress in health care 
professionals can lead to increased depression, decreased job satisfaction, disrupted 
personal relationships, psychological distress, and even suicide. Shapiro et al. (2005) 
also note that stress may harm professional effectiveness as it decreases attention, 
reduces concentration, impinges on decision making skills, and reduces providers' 
abilities to establish strong relationships with patients.  
 
Unsurprisingly it has been shown that stress can lead to increased staff burnout 
(Spickard, Gabbe & Christensen, 2002) which is defined as a syndrome of 
depersonalization, emotional exhaustion, and a sense of low personal 
accomplishment. Jenkins and Elliot outline that burn-out in mental health nursing has 
been associated with a number of stressors, for example Sullivan (1993) found 
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positive correlations between the level of emotional exhaustion and various aspects 
of patient care (violent incidents and continuous one to one observation) and the 
workload environment (staffing, administrative duties and workload). 
 
Shanafelt, Bradley, Wipf and Back (2002) additionally found that burnout was 
significantly associated with suboptimal self-reported patient care. The well-being of 
mental health professionals can therefore be considered an appropriate target for 
intervention in inpatient mental health settings. 
                                                                                          
1.1.2 Mindfulness training. Mindfulness has been conceptualized as a state 
in which one is highly aware of the present moment, acknowledging and accepting it, 
without getting caught up in thoughts about the present experience or in emotional 
reactions to it (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Anderson, Carlson, Segal et al., 2004).  
 
The concept of mindfulness originates from eastern spiritual traditions and refers to a 
form of attentional control developed through meditative practices (Baer, 2003). 
Kabat-Zinn (2000) recognised the potential usefulness of mindfulness practices to 
people in Western society and clinicians now teach the skills independent of the 
religious and cultural traditions of their origins. Training in mindfulness attempts to 
increase awareness of thoughts, emotions, and maladaptive ways of responding to 
stress, thereby helping participants learn to cope with stress in healthier, more 
effective ways (Bishop et al., 2004). 
 
Research demonstrates that mindfulness interventions can effectively reduce stress, 
anxiety, and depression in both clinical and nonclinical populations (Miller, Fletcher 
& Kabat-Zinn, 1995; Shapiro, Schwartz & Bonner, 1998). Different forms of 
mindfulness programmes exist, the most common of which include mindfulness 
based stress reduction (MBSR), mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT), and 
mindfulness within dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT).  
 
MBSR was developed by Kabat-Zinn (1982) in a behavioural medicine setting for 
people with a range of chronic pain and stress related disorders. In the 8-10 week 
course, two hour weekly sessions are held for instruction and practice in mindfulness 
meditation skills, together with discussion of stress, coping, and homework 
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assignments. In mindfulness practices participants are encouraged to focus attention 
on the target of observation (for example the breath). Participants are instructed to 
non-judgmentally notice their thoughts and feelings but not to become absorbed in 
their content. 
 
MBCT was developed by Segal, Williams and Teasdale (2002), who suggested that 
individuals who have experienced major depressive episodes are vulnerable to 
recurrences whenever mild dysphoric states are encountered, because these states 
may reactivate the depressive thinking patterns present during the previous episode/s, 
thus precipitating a new episode (Baer, 2003). MBCT is an 8 week group 
intervention based on the MBSR programme but incorporating elements of cognitive 
therapy that facilitate a detached view of one’s thoughts. MBCT is designed to 
prevent depressive relapse by teaching formerly depressed individuals to observe 
their thoughts and feelings nonjudgmentally. This attitude helps prevent the 
escalation of negative thoughts into ruminative patterns (Teasdale Segal, & Williams, 
1995). 
 
DBT (Linehan 1993a, 1993b) is a treatment approach for borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) where the focus is on both acceptance and change. Mindfulness skills 
are taught in DBT within the context of synthesizing acceptance and change. DBT 
clients learn mindfulness skills in a year-long weekly skills group. Although the skills 
taught are similar to those targeted in MBSR, including nonjudgmental observation 
of thoughts, emotions, sensations, and environmental stimuli, the concepts are 
organized differently (Baer, 2003). 
 
Studies of mindfulness training with health care professionals usually involve MBSR 
group interventions. Working in clinical settings can involve managing some very 
difficult and distressing situations, and given that the aim of mindfulness 
interventions in these contexts is usually to help reduce staff stress rather than treat 
recurrent depression or BPD, a stress reduction programme would seem most 
appropriate. 
 
1.1.3 Mindfulness interventions with health care professionals. Shapiro et 
al. (1998) examined the short term effects of an 8 week mediation-based stress 
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reduction intervention on premedical and medical students, and found that 
participation in the intervention could effectively reduce self-reported state and trait 
anxiety, reduce reports of overall psychological distress, increase scores on overall 
empathy levels, and increase scores on a measure of spiritual experiences assessed at 
termination of intervention. 
 
Specifically in terms of health care professionals currently involved in clinical work, 
Shapiro et al. (2005) examined the effects of an eight week mindfulness-based stress 
reduction intervention which consisted of eight two hour sessions per week.  
 
Participants were either assigned to the intervention group or a wait list control 
group. Only 10 participants completed the mindfulness intervention as there was a 
44% drop out rate. Those who participated in the intervention reported decreased 
perceived stress and greater self-compassion when compared with controls. Reported 
psychological distress, satisfaction with life, and job burnout (as measured by the 
Maslach Burnout Inventory) were decreased; however, the differences between 
experimental and control groups along these dimensions were not significant. The 
authors suggest this may be understandable given the small numbers in the study and 
the likelihood that the study was therefore insufficiently powered. Responses to open 
ended questions, which were administered at the end of the intervention, suggested 
further benefits to the mindfulness intervention and that it had a positive impact on 
participant's lives. The authors do acknowledge that the significant drop out rate is a 
cause for concern and suggest that it indicates that adding a two hour intervention 
plus daily home practice to an already demanding schedule may not be feasible for a 
substantial number of health care professionals. 
  
Galantino, Baime and Maguire et al. (2005) have also provided support for the 
beneficial impact of mindfulness in relation to mood and emotional exhaustion in 
health care professionals. 84 employees, who were all in administrative and direct 
patient care capacities, were recruited from a university hospital to complete a 
mindfulness meditation programme. The 8 week mindfulness meditation programme 
was based on MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 1994) and cognitive therapy (Teasdale, 
1995). Significant improvements in mood (as measured by the Profile of Mood States 
– Short Form (POMS-SF) questionnaire) and a decline in emotional exhaustion (as 
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measured by the MBI) were found following completion of the programme. The 
authors conclude that mindfulness meditation may have helped participants manage 
stress in the health care and personal environments.  
 
Further evidence of the effectiveness of mindfulness training for health care 
professionals was provided by Singh et al. (2006) who found that the addition of 
mindfulness training to behavioural training considerably enhanced the ability of 
group home staff to effectively manage the aggressive behaviour and learning of 
individuals. Following the mindfulness training there was reduced staff interventions 
for aggressive behaviour, increased patient activity, and increased reported staff 
satisfaction. 
 
Building on the recommendation of Shapiro et al. (2005) to explore ways to offer 
mindfulness programs that do not require large time commitments, Moore (2008) 
piloted a voluntary mindfulness skills course for trainee psychologists, which 
consisted of 14 session of 10 minute structured practices over 4 weeks. A repeated 
measures design was used where pre and post self-report measures were 
administered, as well as participants being asked for their feedback of their 
experiences of undertaking the course. The course was found to facilitate the 
development of mindfulness skills (as measured by the Kentucky Inventory of 
Mindfulness Skills) however a hypothesised reduction in perceived stress was not 
found using the Perceived Stress Scale. Participants however did comment on the use 
of mindfulness practices as a stress coping strategy in the qualitative feedback. 
  
The evidence base in this area is still quite limited. The current study aimed to further 
explore the feasibility and effectiveness of mindfulness-based staff interventions. 
Staff at a National and Specialist adolescent inpatient unit in South London had 
identified a need for a skills-based well-being group. Mindfulness was practised 
clinically on the ward so it was felt important to build in a resource for the self-
practice of staff using it with young people.  It was therefore felt that an MBSR 
intervention with sound theoretical underpinnings and a growing evidence base was a 
good choice for the unit.  Due to the high drop out in similar situations (Shapiro et al., 
2005), some adaptations were made to the structure whilst aiming to stay true to the 
key elements of the original programme. These adaptations were primarily to 
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minimise clinical time used attending the programme, to make examples relevant to 
the setting, and where possible to think about applications for staff use (for example 
in work with young people and challenging situations).  This study aimed to focus on 
feasibility as well as an initial evaluation of the impact of the programme with the 




1. To examine the feasibility of a ward-based staff mindfulness group. 






























The thirty clinical ward staff at the Bethlem Adolescent Unit (BAU) were offered the 
opportunity to attend a ward based mindfulness group for an hour each week. Staff 
were asked to try and attend at least 3 of the 8 sessions offered which was the criteria 
for qualifying as a participant. This is because shift patterns meant that it was 
difficult for staff to commit to attending 8 consecutive weekly sessions. 
 
Before the group commenced staff were asked to complete a set of self-report 
measures. Once the group had finished, those who had attended for the specified 
number of sessions were asked to complete the measures again. The primary outcome 
measure was the Maslach Burnout Inventory. The Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire and the Self Compassion Scale were administered as process 
measures. The staff who qualified as participants were also interviewed to gain 
qualitative information regarding their experience of the group. The qualitative 
interview involved the researcher asking a number of pre set, open questions. 
Alongside the interview participants were asked to complete a feedback 
questionnaire.  
 
Quantitative results were repeated measures of standardised questionnaires, analysed 
primarily using Wilcoxon signed rank tests (as the data were non parametric), and a 
tailored post-group evaluation questionnaire.  Qualitative results were structured 
interviews, analysed using thematic analysis. Results were fed back to staff at the 




All clinical staff at the BAU were invited to attend the mindfulness group and to take 
part in the research. Staff on the BAU consist of Nurses, Health Care Assistants 
(HCAs), and a Multi-disciplinary Team (MDT) which includes Doctors, a Social 






2.3.1 Information sheet and consent form. The information sheet and 
consent form which were placed in the envelopes with the pre questionnaires can be 
seen in Appendix 1. 
 
2.3.2 Measures. The measures administered to participants are described 
below. 
 
2.3.2.1 The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI). The MBI (Appendix 2) is a 
scale designed to assess various aspects of the burnout syndrome. It consists of 22 
items and participants give a score of between 0 and 6 (where 0 equates to ‘never’ 
and 6 to ‘everyday’) depending on how often they feel the way described in the item. 
 
The MBI addresses three general scales: 
1. Emotional exhaustion, which measures feelings of being emotionally 
overextended and exhausted by one's work 
2. Depersonalization, which measures an unfeeling and impersonal response 
toward recipients of one's service, care treatment, or instruction 
3. Personal accomplishment, which measures feelings of competence and 
successful achievement in one's work 
 
Maslach and Jackson (1981) reported high reliability for the MBI including reliability 
coefficients of 0.83 for the whole scale and 0.89 for the Emotional Exhaustion 
subscale, 0.74 for the Personal Accomplishment subscale and 0.77 for the 
Depersonalisation subscale. 
 
Maslach and Jackson (1981) also reported high validity for the MBI. They 
demonstrated convergent validity in several ways; individual’s MBI scores were 
correlated with behavioural ratings made independently by a person who knew the 
individual well, MBI scores were correlated with the presence of certain job 
characteristics that were expected to contribute to burnout, and MBI scores were 
correlated with measures of various outcomes that had been hypothesised to be 
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related to burnout. Maslach and Jackson (1981) also provided evidence of 
discriminate validity for the MBI. 
 
2.3.2.2 The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ). The Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (Appendix 3) is based on a factor analytic study (Baer et 
al., 2006) of five independently developed mindfulness questionnaires. The analysis 
yielded five factors that appear to represent elements of mindfulness as it is currently 
conceptualized. The five facets, which are the names of the subscales for the FFMQ, 
are observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging of inner experience, 
and non-reactivity to inner experience. 
 
When using the FFMQ items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true). 
 
The five facets have been shown to be internally consistent and correlated in 
expected directions with numerous other constructs in several samples. They are also 
significantly correlated with the original mindfulness instruments from which they 
were derived. Regression, mediation, and confirmatory factor analyses have 
supported the validity of the FFMQ (Baer et al., 2006; 2008). 
 
2.3.2.3 The Self Compassion Scale (SCS). The Self Compassion Scale (Neff, 
2003) (Appendix 4), using a scale of one (almost never) to five (almost always) asks 
participants to rate on 26 items how they typically act toward themselves at difficult 
times. The questionnaire contains six subscales including self-kindness, self-
judgement, common humanity (perceiving failure as part of the experience of being 
human), feelings of isolation at times of failure, mindfulness, and over-identification 
with thoughts leading to rumination and catastrophising. 
 
The SCS has shown internal consistency of .92; test-retest reliability of .93 during a 
3-week interval; significant positive correlations with social connectedness, 
emotional intelligence, and life satisfaction; and significant negative correlations with 




2.3.2.4 Interview Schedule. The interview schedule (Appendix 5) was 
designed by the researcher and asked questions about participant’s experience of the 
group, the feasibility of the group, home practice, and participant’s use of 
mindfulness outside of the group. 
 
2.3.2.5 Feedback Questionnaire. The feedback questionnaire (Appendix 6) 
was designed by the researcher and primarily uses tick boxes and visual analogue 
scales for participants to rate their opinion of mindfulness groups following 
participation, the impact the group had on them, and their desired way to attend 




The mindfulness group took place on Tuesdays at 2-3pm in the group room on the 
ward. The group was based on Kabat-Zinn’s (1982) mindfulness based stress 
reduction program. It involved eight weekly hour sessions and was adapted for the 
ward staff participants by the facilitator using patient management and stress 
management examples. The group involved experiential exercises and enquiry. The 
group was interactive and all attendees participated. At the end of each session 




The mindfulness group was advertised a number of weeks before it was due to start 
using posters displayed around the ward. Information about the group and the 
research was also emailed to staff, and presented in a group planning meeting. The 
mindfulness group was also a rolling agenda item on the weekly staff meeting in the 
weeks leading up to the start of the group.    
 
A week before the group began participants were left a pack in their pigeon holes 
containing the information sheet, consent form, and pre measures. These envelopes 
were numbered and unsealed. For the purpose of confidentiality the researcher was 
the only person who knew which member of staff had been allocated which number. 
Participants needed to be identified by matched name and number so pre and post 
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questionnaire scores could be compared and the researcher could keep track of which 
staff had attended what number of sessions. Staff were asked to complete the consent 
form and measures, seal them in the envelope, and leave the envelope in a box in the 
nursing office for the researcher to collect. 
 
Staff attended the group over the eight weeks. Once the group had finished staff who 
had attended at least three sessions were given another pack which contained an 
information sheet and post measures. Again participant’s envelopes were numbered 
and they were asked to leave their post measures sealed in the envelope for collection 
by the researcher. 
 
Participants who had attended at least three sessions were also invited to attend an 
interview. This structured interview was recorded and involved the researcher asking 
a number of pre-set open questions about the participant’s experience of the group. 





2.6.1 Quantitative data. The scores on the three questionnaire measures were 
calculated and pre and post scores for each participant were matched. Data was 
entered into SPSS and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were performed.  
 
2.6.2 Qualitative data. The interviews were transcribed by the main 
researcher and they were then coded using thematic analysis via the procedure 
outlined by Braun and Clark (2006). Braun and Clark (2006) define a theme as 
capturing “something important about the data in relation to the research question and 
represent some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (p10). 
They identify six phases needed to conduct a thematic analysis. The current analysis 
was conducted in the following way, using the phases as a guide: 
 




Step 2: Initial codes were generated by identifying features that appeared interesting 
and relevant to the research question. The relevant parts of the transcripts were 
marked with coding labels. If a very similar response occurred at other points in the 
data set, the same coding labels were applied. 
Step 3: All codes were listed and then organised into topic areas (experience of the 
group, feasibility, skills learnt, incorporating mindfulness into personal and 
professional life, and suggestions for group improvement). 
Step 4: The codes were organised into themes within their topic areas by finding 
titles that would incorporate groups of codes. 
Step 5: The theme titles were refined to make sure each represented a distinct group 
of related codes and that one title did not incorporate too many divergent topics. 
 
The facilitator of the intervention analysed approximately 30% of the qualitative data 
set and the level of agreement between coders was 71.4% demonstrating a 
satisfactory level of interrater reliability. 
 
2.7 Feeding back results 
 
Results were fed back to staff at the BAU during a weekly team meeting to help 
inform the decision on whether a staff mindfulness group or mindfulness practices 
will become a routine intervention on the unit, and what modifications needed to be 














3.1 Quantitative data 
 
3.1.1 Attendance. All clinical staff at the BAU were offered the chance to 
attend the MBSR group. Figure 1 demonstrates how many staff attended sessions: 
 
 
Figure 1.  Staff attendance at the group sessions. 
 
Some non-attendance appeared to be due to practical issues, for example there were 
four staff who attended one group who were only working on the ward for the 
duration of one week so could only have attended one group. One of the staff who 
attended two groups was also only available for two groups due to extended leave. 
 
Staff were not formally questioned if they did not wish to attend the groups, however, 
two of the five staff who did not attend any groups offered the following reasons for 
their non-attendance; being at work and accessing thoughts and feelings was not 
something desirable to engage in as it could then be hard to go back to work, and the 
manager might find out the answers given on the questionnaires being used to 
evaluate the group. 
 
3.1.2 Description of participants. There were nine staff who attended at least 
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Figure 4.  Age of participants. 
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3.1.3 Pre and post questionnaires. To qualify as participants in the research, 
staff had to attend at least three sessions. Of the ten participants who attended at least 
three sessions, nine completed pre and post measures. The mean number of sessions 
attended by the nine participants was four. 
 
Data was not normally distributed so Wilcoxon signed rank tests were used to 
compare pre group and post group scores on the MBI, Five Facet and Self 
Compassion questionnaires. A significant difference was found between the pre and 
post Five Facet scores for the subscale Observe (n = 9, Z = -2.39, p = 0.017). No 
significant differences were found between pre and post scores on the MBI and Self 
Compassion questionnaires. All statistical test outcomes can be seen in Appendix 7. 
 
3.1.4 Feedback questionnaire. Feedback on the feedback questionnaires was 
unanimously positive. All ten participants who completed the feedback questionnaire 
thought that: 
 Offering a mindfulness group to staff working on a ward is a good idea 
 They would consider attending another mindfulness group if it was offered at 
their place of work 
 They would recommend a colleague to attend a mindfulness group if one were 
available 
 They would encourage their patients to attend mindfulness groups that were 
available to them 
 
The mean amount of expected home practice done by staff completing the feedback 
questionnaire was 30.5%. 
 
When asked to rate on a scale of 0 to 10 (0=not at all, 10=completely) whether 
attending a mindfulness group altered the way staff approached or coped with 
stressful situations, the mean score given was 7.15 (range 0.5 – 10). When asked to 
rate on the same scale whether attending a mindfulness group had altered aspects of 




Table 1 demonstrates the responses endorsed when participants were asked how they 




Participants’ desired structure of future mindfulness groups 
Structure Number of participants 
10 minutes a day 0 
20 minute session once a week 0 
20 minute session twice a week 3 
One hour session per week 5 
Other  
10 minutes a day plus one hour session per week 1 
20 minutes twice a week or one hour per week 1 
 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the responses endorsed by participants when they were asked 
about their ideal way to attend the 8 week mindfulness group.  
 
Table 2 
Participants’ desired way to attend the 8 week mindfulness group 
Desired way to attend Number of participants 
Two hour weekly sessions plus home practice 2 
One hour weekly sessions plus home practice (as 
we did) 
8 
All sessions offered over the course of one week 0 









3.2 Qualitative data  
Summary of themes organised into topic areas: 
 
3.2.1 Experience of the group. For a staff group to be effective it is 
important that staff actually attend. This will be influenced by two factors: the 
feasibility of attending the group, but also the motivation staff have to attend the 
group. This motivation will be affected by participant’s experience of the group so 
understanding how participants viewed their experience is important. If participants 
are happy to be involved in a group it is logical that they will take more away from it 
than if they would rather not be attending.  
 
Fortunately our participants identified the group as a pleasant thing to do and this was 
a strong theme to emerge. Staff made comments such as “I found it a nice place to 
be” and “I loved it, really relaxing”.  
 
The participants identified the time of the group as space away from work stresses. 
Staff mentioned that the group “provided a valuable opportunity for a period of calm 
in the middle of the afternoon of a busy day” and that it “allowed time to be in the 
moment and feel body sensations”.  
 
The group also provided the opportunity for staff to spend time with each other, but 
in a different sort of way to usual. The following quote demonstrates this theme well: 
“I think working as we do, in the environment that we do, we often have a sense that 
we should be reflective, and we should take time out to look after ourselves and our 
colleagues, but we often do that in a verbally mediated way in staff-support and 
things like that, but this was a very different approach and style”.  
 
This different style was not completely viewed in a positive way. A number of 
participants talked about finding the group exposing.  One person said “...you’ve got 
to give a different aspect of yourself non -verbally don’t you? And even though it’s 
just lying on a mat and doing body maps, or sharing what you think about things, or 




Participants also identified the group as being difficult at times for other reasons. For 
example one participant said “...sometimes the chaos and business of the ward and 
leaving that, and then taking that time to wind down is quite hard initially”. 
 
Overall however the group was better than participants expected. Participants talked 
about the group being more useful than they thought it would be and including more 
experiential exercises than they imagined.  
 
3.2.2 Feasibility. In terms of feasibility the main theme to come through in 
the analysis was that the time slot worked well. Participants identified that the time 
slot covered both the early and morning shift, did not clash with any other regularly 
timetabled events on the ward, and occurred when most of the young people were at 
school. Some participants did caveat this with the fact the time slot was fine if the 
ward was stable. For example one participant said “if somebody is getting restrained 
we can’t all sit and meditate…and can’t plan for that really”. 
 
Participants did also highlight that it was difficult to attend when the group clashed 
with other commitments. Examples used included meetings and being on call but also 
annual leave and not being on shift. For example one nurse commented “you can’t 
change your off day, so I missed it, you know, I couldn’t have helped that, that was 
just how the rota worked”. Some participants did mention that it would be useful to 
be allocated the time specifically by their manager, and also that reminders are useful 
to make sure they can organise their workload to make sure the slot remains free. 
Further studies need to explore this barrier in more detail as it is of concern that, 
while the bulk of the inpatient staff are nurses, they were in the minority of attendees. 
 
When talking about homework a common theme was that participants did not feel 
that they had done enough of it, mainly because they forgot, despite good intentions. 
Participants recognised that it was important to prioritise time to do homework tasks, 
but this often did not occur. A number of participants talked about doing homework 
tasks in an informal way for example telling other people about mindfulness and 
trying to do the odd activity mindfully. When talking about homework one 
participant said “I did…doing some tasks mindfully after the first few groups, but not 
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particularly conscientiously…I would struggle to find a specific reason. It didn’t 
reflect a lack of interest, just a lack of application”. 
 
3.2.3 Skills learnt. One way to consider the effectiveness of the mindfulness 
group is to evaluate the skills that were learnt by participants. Participants talked 
about learning a range of skills. A common theme to emerge was that the group had 
helped participants to slow down their thinking, to focus, and to prioritise. For 
example one participant described what he had learnt in the group sessions helping 
him to “unclutter the various overlapping thoughts in my mind”. Another participant 
said “Running around with the chaos and the way the ward is at times you think 
you’re being very mindful but when in fact you’re not. You actually get to be quite 
mindless I think. So I think the exercises help you sort of to think, help you slow down 
your thinking and to prioritise things, which I think is a helpful skill to keep doing 
really”. 
 
The mindfulness group appeared to facilitate greater awareness in participants, as 
demonstrated in the following quotation. “...as I’m driving most of the time it makes 
my journey to work that more of an experience as opposed to sometimes I wonder 
how I got from point A to point B before I end up at home. But now I’m more 
conscious, sometimes not all the time. And I think that’s credit to things I learnt in the 
group”. 
 
Some participants also mentioned learning that they didn’t need to be judgemental 
and critical of themselves and their feelings and thoughts. For example one 
participant said that the group “helped me to realise that what I was feeling was 
normal and that I am going to feel distressed and upset but that’s fine to feel that 
way”. 
 
Another theme that emerged was that not only was the group experienced as relaxing 
but that it taught people how to relax. Some participants also mentioned having learnt 





Although participants talked about a number of skills the group had taught them 
during the interviews a number of participants did make comments suggesting that 
they had not gained the skills completely yet. 
 
3.2.4 Incorporating mindfulness into personal and professional life. When 
considering effectiveness in terms of whether the group had made a difference to 
participant’s lives, a number of themes came through when talking about the 
usefulness of mindfulness outside the group. Many participants mentioned using 
mindfulness techniques to get to sleep. For example one participant said 
“...particularly before I go to bed, my mind is just running, running with thoughts, so 
I would use sort of body scanning techniques just to try and calm them down”. 
 
One of the main themes to emerge in terms of usefulness outside the group was 
participants using mindfulness techniques in stressful situations. This was both in 
terms of work and non-work situations. For example one participant said “if I was on 
the tube for instance in a stress situation, I would try focus on the breathing...and 
that I found helpful for me”, and another participant said “I think when things get 
particularly stressful within the working environment, I tend it use it in order not to 
allow myself to overheat or become over stressed”. 
 
In terms of work situations participants also mentioned using mindfulness techniques 
in meetings, particularly to focus and to notice when their mind wanders off topic. 
For instance one participant said “...before, I think definitely in meetings when other 
professionals are there, I think maybe I let them lead sometimes. I was off somewhere 
else and not in the moment, and I’m definitely using that to recognise that and bring 
myself back”. Another participant said in relation to mindfulness “I find I use it when 
I do quite stressful meetings such as tribunals where you need to concentrate on what 
you’re saying and it tends to work really”. 
 
The other main theme to emerge in terms of using mindfulness outside the group was 
the actual and potential use of mindfulness with patients.  One participant said “I 
actually talked to the young people sometimes about mindfulness and how I found it 
helpful and maybe they would as well”. Referring to the group, another participant 
said that it “pretty much expanded my nursing skills repertoire in some respects 
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because I take things I learnt in the group and try and implement them with the young 
people”. 
 
3.2.5 Suggestions for group improvement. When evaluating the 
effectiveness and feasibility of an intervention it is important to consider how 
participants think it could have been more effective or feasible. In terms of suggested 
improvements for the mindfulness group, many participants mentioned that the room 
needed to be bigger. For example one participant said “I wasn’t too keen about lying 
on a mat on the floor. I found it awkward being in that room, although it’s a big 
room, it’s not quite big enough really. It’s really about, sort of, impinging on other 
people’s personal space”. 
 
Participants would also have preferred it if staff could attend every session. This was 
for a couple of reasons. One participant said “I would have loved to have had the 
whole thing...where they fed back from last week, I felt left out because I missed that 
week and yeah, so I kind of lost a bit there because I didn’t really know what they 
were talking about”. Another participant said “running a group like that in an 
inpatient service meant you tended to get a fluctuating cast of attendees so sometimes 
the momentum of the group stalled a little bit because things had to be repeated. I 
think a stable group throughout would have been obviously easier”. 
 
Participants suggested that it would have helped to have protected time to attend the 
group. They also suggested that more consistent attendance would have been 
facilitated if the group had been arranged further in advance. One participant said “if 
it had been arranged further in advance...I would have made sure that particular 
day, I was on shift”.  
 
Participants also suggested some different group time possibilities that could enhance 
effectiveness and/or feasibility. For example one participant commented that “it’s 
probably harder to concentrate on the mindfulness technique than if say was to do it 
before or after work for example” and another said “I didn’t know whether doing it 
in the morning, when the kids are at school might sort of then make people more 




4.1 Discussion of findings 
 
The current study shows that a staff MBSR group in a ward environment is a feasible 
and acceptable option. The group can also be seen to have facilitated the development 
of mindfulness skills in participants.  
 
Although only the Observe subscale on the Five Facet Mindfulness questionnaire had 
significant differences between pre and post scores, participants reported having 
learnt a number of mindfulness skills including increased observation, awareness, and 
ability to treat thoughts and feelings non-judgementally. The significance of the 
differences between pre and post scores on Observe subscale is consistent with 
Moore (2008) who found that the Observe subscale of the KIMS was the only 
subscale with a significant difference between pre and post scores in his study with 
trainee psychologists. 
 
A significant difference in the Describe, Acting with awareness, Non-judge and Non-
react subscales of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire was not found in this 
study. Given that participants did report gaining skills in these areas during the 
interviews, it may be that the Five Facet Mindfulness questionnaire was not sensitive 
to the amount of change experienced by participants. Alternatively when completing 
the pre-course questionnaires participants may not have been fully aware of how 
‘unmindful’ they were resulting in an initial over estimation of their mindfulness 
skills.  
 
Alternatively it could be hypothesised that greater mindfulness skills may have 
developed if more sessions had been attended and if more home practice had 
occurred. The average participant only attended half of the sessions on offer and thus 
it is unsurprising that some skills may not have been learnt or practised to a 
satisfactory level. In addition, participants suggested that they did on average 30.5% 
of the expected home practice. Home practice is considered a key component of most 
mindfulness interventions and is likely to have an effect on the effectiveness of the 
intervention. Carmody and Baer (2008), for example, found that for adult participants 
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with stress related problems, illness, anxiety or chronic pain; time engaged in home 
practice of formal meditation exercises was significantly related to extent of 
improvement in most facets of mindfulness and several measures of symptoms and 
well-being. Similarly Kristeller and Hallett (1999) found that for women with binge 
eating disorder participating in a mindfulness intervention, reported practice time 
correlated with improvements in Binge Eating Scale scores and BDI scores. 
 
Baer et al. (2006) suggest that the skills of observing internal mental and physical 
states might be a facet of mindfulness that is highly sensitive to change as a result of 
meditative practice and as mindfulness skills develop changes in other facets of 
mindfulness will be more evident (Moore, 2008). A number of participants did report 
that they did not feel they had gained the mindfulness skills completely in the 
qualitative feedback. It may be that continued practise following the group, as well as 
greater attendance and home practice, would increase the effectiveness of the 
intervention and produce more significant differences on pre post mindfulness 
questionnaire measures. 
 
An increase in Self-Compassion scores overall or on any of the subscales was not 
found using the Self Compassion Questionnaire. This is slightly different to Moore 
(2008) who reported a significant change in self-report of Self-kindness, but there 
were no significant results for any other subscales in his study. An increase was 
found in the Self kindness subscale in this study but the difference did not reach 
significance. Moore (2008) notes that the high-test reliability coefficient of 0.93 on 
the Self Compassion Questionnaire might affect the utility of the scale for assessing 
change over the short duration of the course. Although Moore’s (2008) intervention 
only lasted a duration of four weeks, the same could apply to the eight week course 
used in this study.  
 
A reduction in perceived stress was also not found using the MBI. Again this is 
consistent with Moore (2008) who reported that a hypothesised reduction in 
perceived stress using the Perceived Stress Scale was not found. If the non-significant 
results found using the Five Facet and Self Compassion questionnaire in this study 
indicate an insufficient amount of learning of mindfulness skills then this may 
explain why the MBSR group did not facilitate a reduction in stress. Like with the 
172 
 
mindfulness skills however, the quantitative and qualitative data are not entirely 
consistent. During the interviews following the MBSR group participants mentioned 
using the mindfulness techniques they had learnt in stressful situations and similarly 
indicated on the feedback questionnaire that attending the group had altered the way 
they approached or coped with stressful situations. One possibility for the 
inconsistency in quantitative and qualitative data (which was also the case in Moore) 
is that the MBI was not sensitive enough to the amount of change experienced by 
participants. 
 
Given the small sample size, it is also possible that the power of the study was not 
sufficient to detect differences of a modest or small effect size, especially given the 
insufficient ‘dose’ of intervention each participant received. 
 
In the context of contributing to the literature so far, we have shown that it is possible 
to implement a structure more similar to the original MBSR programme in a busy 
clinical setting with a variety of healthcare professionals.  However, more adaptations 
are required to enhance attendance and engagement in homework.   
 
The qualitative interview and feedback data in this study was particularly positive. 
Participants enjoyed the group and thought it had benefit for themselves in and 
outside the group setting. Participants were motivated to attend the group but did 
encounter some feasibility issues which made it harder to attend including shift 
patterns not including group time, other commitments such as meetings clashing with 
the group, and the unpredictability of an inpatient ward meaning intentions to attend 
the group were not always realised. 
 
The low attendance rates, although not unexpected given the high dropout rate in 
other staff mindfulness intervention studies (e.g. Shapiro et al., 2005), were 
disappointing. Representation of the MDT at sessions was good but it was hoped that 
many more nurses and health care assistants would have attended given that they are 
on the front line dealing with patients continuously while on shift, and thus may be 
most at risk of experiencing staff burnout. The attendance rates and interviews 






A criticism of this study is that the participants who were interviewed were those who 
had managed to attend at least three sessions of the group. This means the study was 
unable to investigate in depth the reasons behind those who attended less than three 
sessions which may have highlighted more feasibility issues. On the other hand 
participants often mentioned other colleagues and their experience of attending/not 
attending the group during interviews. It is also unlikely that the non-participants 
experienced completely different feasibility issues to the participants who shared the 
same job role. Given that the participants were very positive in their feedback it may 
be that they were more motivated to attend, and thus more motivated to find ways 
around the feasibility issues. How such staff achieved this may have been clearer if 
comparison to those who did not attend was possible. 
 
Additionally, the positive nature of the feedback may not have been replicated by the 
staff members who did not attend the group or who only attended one or two 
sessions. Not being able to interview these non-participants means the feedback about 
the group may not be as thorough and representative as it could be and thus important 
recommendations may be missed. This study also does not include any long term 
follow up meaning any longer term effects of a ward based MBSR group are 
unknown. 
 
Despite limitations, the analysis of the interviews and feedback questionnaire have 
led to the identification of a number of recommendations for improving the MBSR 
group, which will be put into place and evaluated following the audit cycle. These 




The ward group room was identified as being too small which made participants feel 
uncomfortable at times. There is no bigger room on the ward but another room on the 
surrounding site could be a possibility. This would involve negotiation with staff 





The problem of nurses and HCAs struggling to attend many groups due to sessions 
not fitting in with shifts could perhaps be resolved by having taster sessions and then 
planning the group a month or two later. People could then decide if the group was 
something they wished to participate in and then request shift patterns accordingly. 
This would help counter some of the disadvantages of not being able to attend every 
session including a fluctuating cast of attendees and not knowing what people are 
referring to when talking about concepts from the session before. 
  
Given that attendance rates and home practice rates were rather low it may be that 10 
minute practices at the start of the day / shift, in addition to a weekly hour group, may 
be an easier and more effective option to promote mindfulness practice and a mindful 
culture on the ward. It may also help address some of the comments about improving 
the timing of the group, for example having the practice at the start of the shift may 
enable the staff to be mindful for the rest of the shift. 
 
In terms of the content of the group, participants were pleased to engage in 
experiential exercises and valued being able to spend time together, and support each 
other, in a different way to a verbally mediated staff support group. A continued 
focus on experiential exercises in future groups would thus appear positive, although 
there are some circumstances where more discussion may be useful.  
 
Although the majority of participants were able to report situations where they had 
used their mindfulness skills outside the group, either in one or both of their 
professional and personal lives, some participants were unable to provide any 
examples. In- group discussions of when attendees have applied mindfulness skills in 
the preceding week may be particularly useful for those attendees who struggle to 
apply the principles outside of the group. It may provide such attendees with the 
ideas needed to try out mindfulness techniques in areas of their lives where they 
could be helpful. Continuing, and even increasing, the use of clinically relevant 
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Why is this research being done and what does it involve? 
 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of a 
ward based staff mindfulness group. To do this, staff of the Bethlem 
Adolescent Unit will be invited to attend a mindfulness based stress reduction 
group, run by the ward’s Clinical Psychologist. The group is open to all staff, 
the only condition being that they feel able to commit themselves to at least 
four of the eight group sessions. The group will run for one hour a week, for 
eight weeks. Questionnaires will be issued to participants before the group 
starts and after it finishes. Some data may also be collected from participants 
during the group. Participants will additionally be invited to attend brief 
interviews once the group finishes to gain more information about their 
experiences. 
 
What do I have to do now? 
 
 An envelope containing this information sheet, a consent form, and the 
first set of questionnaires will be placed in staff trays before the group is 
due to start.  
 After reading this information, please fill out the consent form.  
 If consenting to participate, please fill out the questionnaires and put them 
back in the envelope. Seal the envelope, and place it in the designated 
tray in the nursing office.  
 If you decide not to participate but feel comfortable stating a reason, 
please fill out the appropriate part of the consent form. Please still seal 
your envelope with all papers inside, and place it in the designated tray. 
 
What else will I have to do? 
 
 If you consent to participate you will need to try and attend the staff 
mindfulness group for at least three of the eight sessions offered. 
 We will ask you to fill in another set of questionnaires once the group has 
finished. These will be issued in a similar manner to the initial 
questionnaires. 
 Once the group has finished you will also be invited to attend a brief 
interview to talk about your experiences of the group. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
 
You will not be asked to provide your name or any other identifiable 
information when filling in your questionnaires. Your envelope will have a 
number written inside it which corresponds to a list of numbers which is 
matched to a staff name. This list is kept so pre and post questionnaire data 
can be compared. This list will only be seen by the researcher and will be 
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kept in a safe, locked environment. The list will be destroyed once the 
research has been completed. In a similar way, only your number will be 
recorded when taking part in the post group interview. The researcher will be 
the only person to know who said what, and no names or identifiable 
information will be used in the write up.  
 
What else should I know? 
 
You have the right to withdraw from the research at any time, and you can 
ask the researcher to destroy your data at any point during the investigation. 
 
If any significant issues or distress arise for you while you are filling out the 
questionnaires, or participating in the groups or interviews, you are welcome 
to talk to the researcher or group facilitator.  
 
Alternatively if you are struggling with issues related to stress at work it is 
advised that you talk to your supervisor or manager. You may also wish to 
consider referring yourself to the confidential staff counselling service. For an 
assessment call Mary Banks, Principal Staff Counsellor on: 020 3228 4365 or 






I understand what will happen if I want to take part in the research 
 
 
I have had a chance to ask the researcher any questions 
 
 
I understand that any data used for the study is stored fully confidentially 
 
 















Signature                                         Printed name                                      Date 
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Appendix 2: Maslach Burnout Inventory 
Human Services Survey 
The purpose of this survey is to discover how various persons in the human services 
or helping professions view their jobs and the people with whom they work closely. 
Because persons in a wide variety of occupations with answer this survey, it uses the 
term recipients to refer to the people for whom you provide your service, care, 
treatment, or instruction. When answering this survey please think of these people as 
recipients of the service you provide, even though you may use another term in your 
work. 
On the following page there are 22 statements of job-related feelings. Please read 
each statement carefully and decide if you ever feel this way about your job. If you 
have never had this feeling, write a “0” (zero) before the statement. If you have had 
this feeling, indicate how often you feel it by writing the number (from 1 to 6) that 
best describes how frequently you feel that way. An example is shown below. 
Example: 
 
HOW OFTEN:   
            
 
How Often 
0 - 6 Statement: 
                                    I feel depressed at work.     
 
If you have never felt depressed at work, you would write the number “0” (zero) 
under the heading “How Often”. If you rarely feel depressed at work (a few times a 
year or less), you would write the number “1”. If your feelings of depression are 







A few times a 
week 
3 
A few times a 
month 
2 








Human Services Survey 
HOW OFTEN:   
            
How Often 
0 – 6 
I feel emotionally drained from my work 
I feel used up at the end of the workday 
I feel fatigued when I get up in the morning and have to face another day on the job 
I can easily understand how my recipients feel about things 
I feel I treat some recipients as if they were impersonal objects 
Working with people all day is really a strain for me 
I deal very effectively with the problems of my recipients 
I feel burned out from my work 
I feel I’m positively influencing other people’s lives through my work 
I’ve become more callous toward people since I took this job 
I worry that the job is hardening me emotionally 
I feel very energetic 
I feel frustrated by my job 
I feel I’m working too hard on my job 
I don’t really care what happens to some recipients 
Working with people directly puts too much stress on me 
I can easily create a relaxed atmosphere with my recipients 
I feel exhilarated after working closely with my recipients 
I have accomplished many worthwhile things in this job 
I feel like I’m at the end of my rope 
In my work, I deal with emotional problems very calmly 






A few times a 
week 
3 
A few times a 
month 
2 








Appendix 3: Five facet mindfulness questionnaire 
 
 Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire  
Description:  
 
This instrument is based on a factor analytic study of five independently developed 
mindfulness questionnaires. The analysis yielded five factors that appear to represent 
elements of mindfulness as it is currently conceptualized. The five facets are observing, 
describing, acting with awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to 
inner experience.  
  
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Write the number 
in the blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you.  
 
 
            1                       2                            3                        4                       5  
never or very      rarely true      sometimes true      often true      very often or  
rarely true              always true 
 
 
_____ 1. When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving.  
_____ 2. I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings.  
_____ 3. I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions.  
_____ 4. I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them.  
_____ 5. When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted.  
_____ 6. When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my  
body.  
_____ 7. I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words.  
_____ 8. I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or  
otherwise distracted.  
_____ 9. I watch my feelings without getting lost in them.  
_____ 10. I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling.  
_____ 11. I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and  
emotions.  
_____ 12. It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking.  
_____ 13. I am easily distracted.  




           15. I pay attention to sensations, such as wind in my hair or sun on my face   
_____ 16. I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things  
_____ 17. I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad.  
_____ 18. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present.  
_____ 19. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of the  
thought or image without getting taken over by it.  
_____ 20. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars  
passing.  
_____ 21. In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting.  
_____ 22. When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it because  
I can’t find the right words.  
_____ 23. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m  
doing.  
_____24. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after.  
_____ 25. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking.  
_____ 26. I notice the smells and aromas of things.  
_____ 27. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words.  
_____ 28. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.  
_____ 29. When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them  
without reacting.  
_____ 30. I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel  
them.  
_____ 31. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or  
patterns of light and shadow.  
_____ 32. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words.  
_____ 33. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go 
_____ 34. I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing.  
_____ 35. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad,  
depending what the thought/image is about.  
_____ 36. I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior.  
_____ 37. I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail.  
_____ 38. I find myself doing things without paying attention.  
_____ 39. I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas 
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Appendix 4: Self-compassion scale 
Self-Compassion Scale 
(Kristin Neff, 2003) 
 
How I Typically Act Toward Myself in Difficult Times 
 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. To the left of each item, 
indicate how often you behave in the stated manner. 
 
`    1            2            3            4            5 
Almost                                           Almost 
never                                              always 
 
_____ 1. I’m disapproving and judgmental about my own flaws and inadequacies. 
_____ 2. When I’m feeling down I tend to obsess and fixate on everything that’s       
wrong. 
_____ 3. When things are going badly for me, I see the difficulties as part of life that 
everyone goes through. 
_____ 4. When I think about my inadequacies, it tends to make me feel more separate 
and cut off from the rest of the world. 
_____ 5. I try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling emotional pain. 
_____ 6. When I fail at something important to me I become consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy. 
_____ 7. When I'm down and out, I remind myself that there are lots of other people  
in the world feeling like I am. 
_____ 8. When times are really difficult, I tend to be tough on myself. 
_____ 9. When something upsets me I try to keep my emotions in balance. 
_____ 10. When I feel inadequate in some way, I try to remind myself that feelings of 
inadequacy are shared by most people. 
_____ 11. I’m intolerant and impatient towards those aspects of my personality I  
don’t like. 
_____ 12. When I’m going through a very hard time, I give myself the caring and 
tenderness I need. 
_____ 13. When I’m feeling down, I tend to feel like most other people are probably 
happier than I am. 
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_____ 14. When something painful happens I try to take a balanced view of the  
situation. 
_____ 15. I try to see my failings as part of the human condition. 
_____ 16. When I see aspects of myself that I don’t like, I get down on myself. 
_____ 17. When I fail at something important to me I try to keep things in  
perspective. 
_____ 18. When I’m really struggling, I tend to feel like other people must be having  
an easier time of it. 
_____ 19. I’m kind to myself when I’m experiencing suffering. 
_____ 20. When something upsets me I get carried away with my feelings. 
_____ 21. I can be a bit cold-hearted towards myself when I'm experiencing  
suffering. 
_____ 22. When I'm feeling down I try to approach my feelings with curiosity and 
openness. 
_____ 23. I’m tolerant of my own flaws and inadequacies. 
_____ 24. When something painful happens I tend to blow the incident out of  
proportion. 
_____ 25. When I fail at something that's important to me, I tend to feel alone in my 
failure. 
_____ 26. I try to be understanding and patient towards those aspects of my                                               


















Would you be able to tell me about your experience of attending the mindfulness 
based stress reduction group? 
 
In your opinion, what were the main advantages of attending the group?  
 
In your opinion, what were the main disadvantages of attending the group? 
 
Impact of group 
 
In what ways (if any) do you feel that you benefited from attending the group? 
 
What did you learn from attending the group? 
 
What impact did attending the group have on you? 
 
Have you used anything that you learnt in the group outside the group setting? 
 
Experience of sessions 
 
Was there anything you disliked about being in the group sessions? 
 
Is there anything that would have made the group more enjoyable or useful for you? 
 
What prior expectations did you have about the group? How did the reality of the 




How convenient for you was it to attend the group?  
 
What barriers prevented you being able to attend sessions?  
 
What things made it easier for you to be able to attend sessions? 
 
How could the timing or structure of the group be altered to make the group more 




Did you ever complete homework for the group? If so, how did you find this? What 






Use of mindfulness 
 
Do you use mindfulness to manage stress in your personal or professional life? 
 






























Appendix 6: Feedback questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
 
Do you think offering a mindfulness group to staff working on a ward is a good idea? 
 
Yes                           No 
 
 
























What proportion of expected home practice did you do? 
 
 
 0% 100% 
 






Would you consider attending another mindfulness group if it was offered at your 
place of work? 
 





Would you recommend a colleague to attend a mindfulness group if one were 
available? 
 




Would you encourage your patients to attend mindfulness groups that were available 
to them? 
 




When in the day would be easiest for you to attend a group such as mindfulness?  





If you were to continue attending mindfulness sessions on the ward, how would you 
ideally like this to be structured.  All sessions would be drop in (voluntary)? 
 
10 minutes a day 
 
20 minute session once a week 
 
20 minute session twice a week 
 








In an ideal world what would have been your most desired way to attend the 8 week 
mindfulness group? 
 
2 hour weekly sessions plus home practice 
 
1 hour weekly sessions plus home practice (as we did) 
 
All sessions offered over the course of one week 
 






Appendix 7: Statistical test outcomes 
Wilcoxon Signed rank tests: 













-0.53 0.60 Not significant 
Five Facet Observe 
subscale 
-2.39 0.017 Significant 
Five Facet Describe 
subscale 
-1.59 0.11 Not significant 
Five Facet Non-
react subscale 
-1.63 0.10 Not significant 
Five Facet Act with 
Awareness subscale 
-0.42 0.67 Not significant 
Five Facet Non-
judge subscale 












-0.51 0.61 Not significant 
Self-compassion 
Isolation subscale 











-0.11 0.91 Not significant 
Total Self-
compassion score 
-1.01 0.31 Not significant 
 
